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Fore�gn off ices· use many means in the conduct of 
relations with other nations. They select and apply them 
according to the needs of the situation, and accordi�g to 
their traditions and predilections.- The olde·st and still 
significant instrument in the conduct of foreign relations 
is the special envoy; indeed, it appears that the ·impor­
tance of special agents is increasi�g in our time; 
Some forms of_ government are more co�genial than 
others to the use of special envoys. Venice's lead in the 
establishment of permanent missions is not surprising. 
She was the only republic among the major European states; 
decisions were not made by one man but by a small_ group of 
aristocrats. It took relatively lo�g to reach an �greement 
on a specific order for an envoy while the_ ·general patterns 
of Venetian fore�gn policy remained the same. This is one 
of the reasons why a permanent representative acti�g along 
the general lines of Venetian policy rather than on speci­
fic orders was more suited to the Venetian system of_ govern­
ment. An administration which ·is dominat�d by one man 
reacts faster, and can make use of the special envoy to 
represent the opinion of the head of_ government; the agent 
becomes his "alter ego," as President Woodrow Wilson once 
said about one of his envoys,· Colonel House. 
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The· American system of. government is most susceptible 
to the use of special envoys in the conduct of foreign 
relations. The President has a stro~g and independent 
position, but constitutional restrictions limit his powers. 
The appointment of r~gular ambassadors requires "advice and 
consent" of the Senate which means delay and sometimes 
embarrassment for the President. Since the time when 
American diplomacy began to take shape, Presidents have 
circumvented that clause. Geo~ge Washi~gton set the prece-
dent. When he became President, the United States had no 
regular representative in London since John Adams, the 
appointed minister, had left E~gland after he had been 
treated with studied incivility. The British minister in 
the United States had also returned home. It was essential 
for the United States to maintain some means of communica-
tion with the British. In these circumstan~es Geo~ge 
Washi~gton appointed Gouvernor Morris in October 1789 as 
"private·agent" and did not inform Co~gress until 1791. In 
dealing with the Barbary states, the title "consul" was 
conferred to an ~gent who received a regular commission and 
full powers to negotiate a treaty. Again the Senate was 
not asked for its "advice and consent" to ,the appointment 
of a constitutional officer with ·the power to initiate a 
treaty. Since then the number of special envoys has run 
into the thousands. Some were unimportant, others brought 
s~gnificant results; some missions were short-lived, others 
stretched the ·"temporary" character. Myron C. Taylor, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal representative, 
stayed seven years in Italy on his ·special· mission to the 
Vatican. He ·was ·in full-time ·employment with ·a re:gular 
staff and rank and title ·of ambassador, but no nomination 
was ·sent to the Senate •1 
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The habit of sendi3:1g personal repres·entatives as 
special envoys abroad has increased rapidly in the twenti-
eth ·century. Presidents who exerted strong leadership in 
fore~gn affairs used this· means ·frequently, for "amo~g all 
the instruments available .to the President in his ·conduct 
of fore~gn relations, none is more 'flexible than the use 
of personal represeritati ves·. ·" 2 Since the appointment of 
special ~gents--like ·an executive ~greerrierit--is not re-
stricted by Co~gress, it is often used "specifically to 
avoid the 'difficulties, complexities and embarrassments 
that are occasionally produced" by the procedure as defined 
in the Constitution; 3 those· ·appointments ·can be ·made even in 
"utter. disr<:gard of the Senate--and, if neces·sary, of the 
Secretary of State," 4 since for some ·Presidents special 
envoys were also a means to diminish ·the influence of their 
1Henry M. Wriston, The Spe·cia1· Envoy,· Foreign Affai·rs 
1960, XXXVIII, 219-237. 
2Ibid., 219. 3 Ibid., .222. 
4Ernest W. Spaulding, Am.bass'adors Ordinary and Extra-
ordinary (Washington, 1961), 6. 
Secretaries of State." Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, .in particular, disliked the Department of State 
and r~gular diplomatic procedure. Therefore, they made 
extensive use of the institution of the special envoy. 
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Since the officials of the State Department, not 
presidential representatives, are the officers charged with 
the conduct of foreign relations, problems between the two 
institutions were inevitable." The basic issue was the ques-
tion of the powers and competence of the State Department 
and the President. The status of the President's special 
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envoy, his responsibility, his relationship to the· State 
Department and to the 'diplomats residi~g abroad had to be 
defined. The ·failure to do so led to frequent tensions 
between Presidents, their Secretaries of State, and career 
diplomats. 
The mission of a special envoy is a delicate ·affair 
which poses many problems.· The ·del~gate ·has to have the 
ability to accomplish his aims and has to enjoy the Presi-
dent's confidence. The ·President's ·choice should also be 
acceptable to the State Department and American diplomats 
in the countries ·concerned. Furthermore, the envoy must be 
welcome to the government or governments to which he is 
sent. His aims and powers should be well defined and ad-
justed to the situation. They should be limited to avoid 
infri~gements on the rights and interests of other officers 
of the administration. Possible favorable ·and unfavorable 
consequences should be considered and weighed against each 
other. 
There 'is no general rule ·for the mission of special 
envoys,· for conditions are dif fererit in every case;' but 
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some patterns are ·alike, some considerations and some con-
sequences are similar. This thesis treats one of the 
missions under the· Roosevelt administration, the journey of 
Sumner Welles to Europe ·in February 1940. At a critical 
juncture ·in the European war, ·Pres·iderit Roosevelt serit 
Under Secretary of State Welles· as his personal representa-
tive ·to four European countries·. The special envoy stayed 
nearly one ·month and talked with all leading states·men in 
the countries he visited. This study tries to explain the 
situation which seemed to neces·s:itate the mission, the· 
origins of the idea, how the mission was planned and carried 
thro~gh. The author deals with ·the personal problems ·cre-
ated by such a mission, the reaction of the State Depart-
ment, its head and its diplomats, the consequences· for the 
personal relations between the President, the 'Secretary of 
State,· the Under Secretary of State, and some of the regu-
lar representatives.· The thesis attempts to·· examine the 
ability of the special envoy, the ·role of his personality, 
his attitude towards his task, and his handling of the 
problems and issues connected with his mission; it tries to 
show what he could have achieved, what he tried to achieve, 
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and what he did achieve. The author makes use ·of the epi-
sode to elucidate certain of the problems. connected with 
the use of personal envoys in American diplomacy. Further-
more,' the missi·on offered an opportunity. to examine ·many of 
the issues· in international relations and problems America 
faced duri~g the so-called "phony war" or ·11sitzk:r:ieg." 
The study is ·o!ganized accordi~g to issues· ,r.a.ther than 
in chronol~gical order since. chronol~gy was of minor im-
portance to the ·author's intent. The st~ge is set with a 
description of the events in Washi~gton. There follows a 
short presentation of the· journey itse·lf to establish the 
necessary chronol~gy and to introduce· dratnatis· p·er:so·n:ae. 
This part is succeeded by the treatment of the issues of 
this mission and the ·possibilities· it offered; first there 
are ·those· for which Welles·: ·could have ·s·triven. The ·author 
tries to prove that the envoy actually did not care ·for 
those. goals, .and he explains what m~ght have been accom-
plished if Welles had tried to achieve some of those ob-
jects. A discussion of the special envoy's real aim fol-
lows. The study attempts to show his. goal, the way in which 
he tried to reach success·, the problems which faced him in 
his endeavors, .and the chances he missed. A final chapter 
deals with the results of this mission. 
CHAPTER .I 
THE ANNOUNCEMENT . 
"The hangman with his little b~g came creepi~g through 
the gloom." Journalists murmured the 'distorted Oscar Wilde 
verse to each other as Lord Runciman stepped ·from the train 
in Pr~gue's railroad station. 1 Chamberlain's emissary 
smili~gly greeted the Sudeten-German del~gation which had 
in perfect timi~g reached the station a few seconds before. 
The occasion was. gloomy, indeed. Less than two months later 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Runciman's chief, 
emerged from his plane in Munich. A day later the Sudeten-
Germans rejoiced. They would become a part of the Greater 
German Empire. Chamberlain returned to London wavi~g the 
Munich agreement as he left the plane. "Peace in our time" 
was secured and Runciman's mission had helped to prepare it. 
Eighteen months later reporters were reminded of the 
scene in Pr~gue. President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced 
that an American emissary was. goi~g to shake hands with 
Hitler in Berlin. Would there be another "Peace in our 
time"? 
1John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, 
2nd ed. (London, 1963), p. 79. 
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CHAPTER II 
PLANS AND PLANNERS 
President Roosevelt had ·frequently mentioned Welles's 
name in the announcement of the mission; when newspapermen 
b~gan d~<Jgi~g into their mo~gue files, they found Sumner 
Welles· was no unknown quantity. It was not the first time 
that the Under Secretary of State had appeared in the lime-
light. 
At the time of his appointment Welles was 4 7 years 
old. He had spent his life at top schools and thereafter 
a sporadic career in diplomacy. Born in New Yo.rk City, 
educated at Groton and Harvard, .he had entered the foreign 
service under Woodrow Wilson in 1915. His career had taken 
Welles to Tokyo, Havana, and Buenos Aires. He ·proved to be 
able and ambitious. As a yo~g diplomat he had realized 
that Latin America would become increasi~gly important for 
its northern ne~ghbor, and offered opportunity for rapid 
advancement because the State Department had few specialists 
in that field. In 1920 he became Assistant Ch~ef, in 1921 
Chief of the Division for Latin American Affairs. In 1922 
he res~gned (supposedly because he incurred the wrath of a 
powerful Republican Senator by opposi~g the appointment of 
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a henchman of the Senator's to a responsible post in the 
Dominican Republic). 1 
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After his res:ignation, Welles received several_ govern-
ment appointments as del~gate to Pan-American conferences 
and as personal representative of the President to Latin 
American republics. On April 6, 19 33, he· was recalled from 
retirement and appointed Assistant Secretary of State. 
Three weeks later he left the State Department again and 
went as Ambassador to Havana. There he spent a busy seven 
months maki~g himse·lf unpopular. In a rather h~gh....;handed 
manner he interfered in the Cuban domestic turmoil, and in-
st~gated and supported revolution and counterrevolution. By 
the end of the year he had succeeded in replaci~g the popu-
lar and stable. government of Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin with 
the unpopular Fu~gencio Batista. The enraged populace 
ha~ged him in eff~gy'. 2 The. disr~gard for Cuban feeli~gs and 
the way in which the Amer.ican diplomat incited intr~gues re-
minded Latin Americans painfully of the Panama affair and 
other activities by their northern ne~ghbor in Central 
America. Welles's supercilious personal diplomacy had 
caused a serious setback for the new good-ne~ghbor policy. 
1Julius w. Pratt, Cordell Hull. 2 vols. {New York, 
1964), I, 18, s. F. Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of 
State and Their Diplomacy, vols. XII and XIII. 
2Erich Angermann, Die Vereinigten Staaten· von Amerika, 
dtv-Weltgeschichte des 20.Jahrhunderts, v. 7 {Muenchen, 
1966), .177f. Time, XXXV, .No. 8 {Feb. 19, 1940), 15. 
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Welles ·returned to his post as Assistant Secretary. 
In May 1937 he was appointed Under Secretary of State. In 
the same .year he came up with ·.the idea of an international 
conference on Armistice Day, which :could be stopped only by 
the combined efforts of Secretary of State Hull and Prime 
Minister Chamberlain. This event s~gnified an increasi1:1g 
interest in world affairs, especially in European policy. 
Welles had had little experience with ·European nations. In 
the summer of 1939 he had spent a holiday overseas but had 
remained in Switzerland except for a short visit to London. 
His sphere of interest and competence was Latin America. 
The experts for Europe r~garded his new concern as an in-
trusion into their field. 
Sumner Welles seemed to many the perfect diplomat •. 
His mere appearance su9gested his occupation. Tall, trim, 
"faultlessly groomed"--so the New York Times claimed1--he 
was "a casti1:1g director's dream of a diplomat. 112 His intel-
lectual abilities were exceptional, but he lacked human 
warmth and understandi~g, kindness and friendliness. His 
cool rigidity appalled many, though it was praised for his 
his appearance as a diplomat. Remarks ·of friends and ac-
quaintances ra~ged from "unbendi~g p~rsonality"--"at best 
1New York Times, Feb. 10, 1940, 2 
2Time, XXXV, 8 (Feb. 15, 1940} , 15. 
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the Wellesian demeanor is on the chilly side" to ~'glacially 
toplofty even when he is e~g?lged in a fight. 111 · A journalist 
remarked, ."Welles wore white .gloves· as a child at play in 
the country, and the impressiveness of his mind is still 
somewhat obscured by his air of suspecti~g lurki~g contamin-
ation in his surroundi~gs. 112 Tho~gh some people seem to 
believe the chillier a person is,· .the better diplomat he 
makes,· this ·is not necessarily true ·in Welles's case. The 
German interpreter, who was present at all of Welles's 
conversations in Germany, was so impressed with Welles's 
disposition that he remarked afterward that even if Hitler 
had wanted to make a constructive proposal, he would have 
been discouraged by Welles's icy attitude. 3 Welles's 
demeanor was not well suited to induce others to want to do 
him or his country favors. 
Nevertheless, the President esteemed Welles h:lghly as 
a seasoned diplomat, experienced in the kind of n~gotiations 
to be required duri~g this mission. His greatest handicap 
was his lack of experience .in European affairs. In reviewi~g 
1william Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1953), 
186; Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper; 
the Story of American Diplomacy and the Second. World War 
(New York, 1940), 13; Harold Ickes, Secret Diary, 3 ·vols. 
(1953), III, 223. 
2Alsop, 13. 
3Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Buehrie 1923-
1945. Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswaertigen Amt 
mit den Staatsmaenri'ern Europas (Frankfurt a/M, Bonn, 1961), 
476. 
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the Welles mission an Italian diplomat indeed suspected 
that Welles had been ~gnorant of the real state. of affairs, 
and ready. to accept all the ."commonplaces in the more 
unreliable ·press. 111 His ·inexperience was also an asset, 
for he had not exposed himself unduly by remarks or by a 
policy which seemed hostile to one or the Other. group of 
Americans or European. governments.. Only the Treaty of Ver-
sailles had enticed him into sharp criticism, and as a 
rejection of the treaty.-establishnient was ·common at the 
time, this attitude did not annoy the Allies but endeared 
him to the Germans. The German cha!ge d'affaires in Wash~ 
i~gton noted this as one reason for Welles's selection. 
The President could "count on a sympathetic reaction in 
Berlin, owi~g to his [Welles'.sl .sharp attacks on the Ver-
sailles Treaty and its consequences for Germany. 112 Isola-
tionists were enchanted by a speech .Welles had. given two 
years ~go. He had rebuked those of his countrymen who 
wanted to interfere in the affairs of Europe. Though he was 
not considered isolationist or pro-Axis, he was welcome to 
the most difficult. groups at home and abroad, and not dis-
liked by others. 
1Luigi Villari, Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini 
(New York, 1956), 248f. 
2Documents on German Foreign Poli·cy, ser. D, vol. VIII 
(hereafter citedas DGFP, .D, VIII), 603. 
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There m~ght have been some doubt in the b~ginni~g 
about a proper choice for an envoy. Stephen Early, the 
President's secretary, said sendi~g a businessman instead 
of a diplomat was considered. Joseph Alsop--who often had 
inside information from the White House--reported that the 
President talked with Bernard Baruch, and even tho~ght of 
the. ge~grapher Isaiah Bowman, :President of the Johns Hop-
kins University, who had been a member of the Inquiry and 
had been present at Versailles. 1 If Bowman were sent, this 
would indicate that a revision of boundaries was expected 
as a result of the mission. Observers would conclude that 
the President had a compromise peace in mind. 
While the search for an envoy went on, Welles was ab-
sent from Washi1:1,gton, attempti~g to cure an attack of in-
fluenza. He returned from his vacation in the South on 
February 1, and after his return there was no doubt left who 
2would. go. 
Welles was the apparent choice. 3 Although there were 
. grave doubts about the mission itself, .there was little 
about the emissary. Sumner Welles seemed to have the ap-
pearance, the ability, and as a h~gh official in the admini-
stration, the gravity needed for such an undertaking. 
1 Alsop, 85. 2Pratt, I, 3391 Alsop, 84. 
3Even Hull admits that if anybody should have. gone, it 
should have been Welles. 
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* * *
Upon the announcement of the American plan,· rumors 
swept thro~gh European capitals. "Well informed sources" 
offered a host of "stories behind the scene .II For a few 
days the Welles mission had captured the headlines. Most 
newspapers claimed special knowledge of the President's 
thoughts, and they offered exact details of the administra-
tive reasoni~g. Some knew of complete peace plans. Only a 
few restrained from reporti~g rumors in absence of any 
facts. 
President Roosevelt's announcement came as a surprise. 
Nothi~g of the or~gins of the idea had penetrated to the 
American public or to the press. How was the idea really 
conceived? The story has remained obscure ever since be-
cause not even the closest participants ~gree. Welles 
offers a version which is contradicted by the recollections 
of his superior, Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Welles 
wrote that in early January 1940 the President called him to 
the White House and informed him of the trip which seemed 
to be· planned already to the last detail. Welles did not 
recall any initiative by himself; he rather p(?rtrayed him-
self as loyally fulfilli~g the President's orders. Hull 
disputed this view. He claimed his subordinate went behind 
his back to the President on several occasions and pleaded 
with Roosevelt to be sent abroad on a special mission. A 
third, official, version of the ·mission's ·or~gins was 
believed by nobody: It claimed that the President, his 
Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary developed the 
idea of a mission to Europe .jointly and in harmony. 1 
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The accounts of the .Secretary and of the Under Secre-
tary were both written wheri the·ir relations had developed 
to hostility. On Hull's insistence Welles had been ousted 
from office in 1943 'and replied by sharply ·criticizing the 
Secretary of State. Hull's already intense dislike ·in-
creased. In their subsequently published reminiscences, 
both ·tried to justify their own actions while degradi~g 
the other's.· In consequence,. _their versions are one-sided 
but not completely improbable. There is reason to assume 
that Hull's account reflects the truth,· and that .the idea 
of the· mission was bro~ght up by Welles.· Sumner Welles,· 
indeed, often took his bold schemes directly to the Presi-
dent, thus avoidi~g their rejection by Hull. This habit 
had caused close observers like Secretary of the Interior 
2 Harold Ickes to_ guess that the proposal stemmed from Welles. 
It was certainly like him to. go directly to the President 
with a plan such as the European mission. 
1sumner Welles, The Time for Deci:sion (New York and 
London, 1944), 73. Cordell Hull, The· Metn:oirs of Cordell 
Hull (New York, 1948) ,· 737. The President's secretary, 
Stephen Early,· in a White House press conference: London 
Times, February 15, 19 40, · 8. 
2 I ck es , I I I , 13 8 • 
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Since the idea had or~ginated between Welles and the 
President, Roosevelt was the only other person who knew the 
real author of the proposal.; but the President refused to 
take an unequivocal stand. While Welles was in Europe, 
the President remarked to Breckenridge L01;1g, Assistant 
Secretary of State, "that the idea of Welles' trip had come 
to him as an impulse. 111 He hardly. could have ·said anything 
else without disavowing the Under Secretary. Hull relates 
how the President had told him that the idea or~ginated 
with Welles and that "he was sharply critical of the fact 
that Welles had not consulted with ·me [Hull] be.fore maki~g 
h . . ..2 t e suggestion. If that were so, why did the President 
not inform Hull immediately of the proposal? Why was the 
Secretary of State kept in the dark? Why was he informed 
only after the decision had been: made? Hull's story seems 
to be ex~ggerated. One. can try· to infer ·President Roose-
velt's real attitude from earlier actions, and the posi-
tion he had taken: at the time of the or~gin of the idea. 
Such a consideration cannot determine with ·certainty who 
was the author of the proposal, but one can try to find out 
if there is any probability that the idea stemmed from the 
President rather than Welles. 
1Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge 
(Lincoln, Nebr., 1966), 64. 
2Hull, 737, 1230. 
17 
President Roosevelt was willi~g to take a hand in 
shaping Europe's fate. In 1933,· .af.ter two months in office, 
he had sent to the. governments of the world a plea for a 
universal non-~ggression pact. At the height of the Munich 
crisis he dispatched notes ·to leadi~g European statesmen 
urgi~g them to preserve peace. He even contemplated arbi-
tration, despite Hull's opposition to the plan. In April 
1939, in stro~g messages to the European dictators, the 
President had demanded.g~arantees for smaller nations 
against aggression, and in A~gust a last verbal effort fol-
lowed. But idealistic requests and polite letters did not 
impress Hitler, who tho~ght of r~giments and devisions not 
ethics. 
The outbreak of the war placed the United States in an 
awkward position. Americans did not want to be drawn in; 
but too much was at stake to leave the Europeans c.ompletely 
to themselves. One solution would be an American-instigated 
peace. Roosevelt never lost interest in peace and in per-
sonal involvement with the shape of the post-war world. 
Peace-making, however, presented equally difficult problems. 
The United States wanted to be a partner at the conference 
table without. getting involved in the deal. Since the 
European peace would shape the future of the world, Ameri-
cans wished their interests to be respected, but without 
havi~g to share the responsibilities. Yet, the considera-
tion of American wishes would necessitate American 
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participation in the n~gotiations and make an involvement 
in European affairs probable. This thought had stirred 
controversies in the administration. Some had wanted to 
talk peace at almost any risk; others, such as Hull, had 
advised restraint. The President and Welles were inclined 
to a more dari'.!-1,g policy. Amo~g the population, advocates 
of peace had become bolder in their demands and deeds. 
Thro~ghout the winter the President and the Department of 
State had been besi~ged by individual pacifists and peace 
societies who u!ged action before the war would became more 
violent. Certain of these people proffered splendid, 
foolproof schemes, in most of which their own appointment 
as secret agents between_· governments played an important 
role. Businessmen, such as Thomas C. Watson of Interna-
tional Business Machines and James D. Mooney of the General 
Motors Corporation, b~gan to show up at the Rei·chskanzlei 
to have lunch with Hitler or to talk with his underli~gs. 
Axel Wenner-Gren, Swedish industrialist, inventor, and 
philanthropist, made the journey from Goering's htinti~g 
lodge to Washington frequently. These men returned from 
their meetings enthusiastic peace advocates. They were con-
vinced of Germany's desire for peace. 1 Outside pressure 
also mounted. Goeri~g, second to Hitler in the Nazi 
1 DGFP, D, VIII, fn. to 656. 
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hierarchy and known opponent of the war, reportedly tried 
several times to induce the President to. mediate. 1 Neutrals 
demanded that President Roosevelt do somethi~g. Ki~g 
Leopold of Belgium hinted to Ambassador Joseph E. Davies 
that he hoped President Roosevelt would renew his efforts 
for peace. 
M.. t 2inis er. 
A similar request came from the Finnish Foreign 
The President did not reject these appeals and 
listened himself to many se·If-styled mediators. 
On December 23, 1939, the President undertook a per-
sonal intervention. The churches had remained amo~g the 
few effective international o~ganizations worki:,;ig for peace. 
Roosevelt selected representatives of the main de:tiomina-
3 ·
tions · and sent them identical mess~ges ·in a first effort 
to explore the. grounds for a constructive post-war settle-
ment and to mobilize American and world opinion. These 
mess~g~s can be. considered as the first step in an effort 
which culminated in the Welles mission. 4 More· important 
was the President's decision to appoint a personal represen-
tative to the Vatican. He wrote ·the Pope on December 23, 
1william L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge 
to Isolation (New York, 1964), .1st ed., 1952, 247f., 254, 345. 
2r bid., 255. 
3These were George A. Buttrick, President of the Federal 
Council of Churches of Christ in America, Pope Pius XII, and 
Cyrus Adler, President of the Jewish Theol~gical Seminary in 
America. 
4cf. Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Muni·ch ·to Pearl Harbor. 
A Studyin the Creation of ForeignPolicy (NewYo.rk, 1950), 
176. 
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19 39, .to explain that this decision was undertaken "in 
order that our parallel endeavors for peace • • •· may be 
assisted. 111 Before the envoy to the Vatican, Myron c. 
Taylor, left for Italy, the President told him that he had 
been consideri~g the bases on which peace should rest. He 
asked Taylor to take soundi~gs on the possibility of an 
early termination of the war. 2 
Peace was on President Roosevelt's mind in early 1940, 
and he apparently was in the mood to intervene ·in the 
European war. A close observer has commented: "The ·role 
of peacemaker was certainly co~genial to Roosevelt. 113 In 
connection with ·the Taylor mission he had expressed his 
hope that peace m~ght be restored by spri~g. He b~gan to 
take other practical measures.· Under a general order from 
the President, Hull was busily creati~g a special State 
Department Committee to study ques·tions of peace terms and 
post-war reconstruction. 4 Adolf A. Berle, Assistant Secre-
tary of State, believed "that the President's mind was still 
worki~g towards tryi~g to summon a. general peace. conference 
1Letter printed in· no·cuments on American Foreign Rela-
tions, 1939-1940 ,· 367-369. 
2survey of International Affairs 1939-1946. Arnold 
Toynbee, ed., The Initial Triumph of the Axis (London, 1958), 
454. ~ 
3Langer and Gleason, 255. 
4 cf. 28f. 
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before the b~ginni~g of the spri~g drives. 111 On January 9, 
1940, Roosevelt announced he had formulated. general peace 
objectives which he r~garded as essential to any just and 
lasti~g peace. He had confided these to leaders of Ameri-
2can Protestant churches. under a ple~ge of secrecy. 
Some action, the President knew, had to be taken soon, 
or it would be too late. Once the_ great battle in the west 
b~gan, any chance for a n~gotiated peace would be lost. If 
the President wanted to undertake a peace move, the possi-
bility for success had to be explored immediately. The idea 
of sendi~g a special envoy to Europe surely did not seem 
strange to the President. He had a habit of relyi~g upon 
personal diplomacy--much to the displeasure of his Secretary 
of State. Myron C. Taylor's mission was the latest of many 
instances.· The thought of sendi~g Welles to Europe could 
have spr~g from President Roosevelt's mind. Thus, the 
idea was, in some form, on the minds of both Roosevelt and 
Welles, and it might have or~ginated from either side. It 
does not matter who said the decisive first word. 
Hull was not the only one who was annoyed by the Welles-
Roosevelt plan. Neither Co~gress nor State Department offi-
cials had been informed. The President feared'for the 
1Ibid., 350. 
2New York Times; January 10, 1940, 1. 
se·credy of the ·enterprise •1 But .the. concerned diplomats 
felt left out and tho~ght :they had lost the ·:trust of the 
Pres·ident.. Both,. the Ambassador .to St. James ,· Joseph 
Kennedy, and the ·Ambassador to France, William c. Bullitt, 
were in Washington in February. They were res·en:tful be-· 
cause ·they had not been consulted and also because ·the 
Welles mission necessarily appeared a ·criticism of their 
efforts.· Since the· President announced that Welles· was 
goi~g for the sake of information, one had to conclude 
that the ·r~gular dipl·omatic representatives· had failed to 
inform the President .·to his satisfaction.· Their r~ge 
caused Kennedy and Bullitt .to. speak out bluntly, and in a 
few days the newspapers were filled with ·reports. about 
dissent in the<State Department. 
The ·situation in the State Department soon was an open 
secret. Shortly after the ·announcement of the ·mission the 
chief of the· Washi~gton bureau of the Chic~go· Tribune wrote 
the story of the ·Hull-Welles dissension. Reports appeared 
in newspapers all over the country. They ass·er.ted that 
Welles· had s~~gested the· ·mission to the ·President who ap-
proved almost offhandedly,. glad to be able ·to do somethi~g 
for his ·friend. Most State Department officials appeared to 
1This ·concern for se·crecy was characteristic for the 
President's planning. Before ·the Atlantic Conference, for 
example, not even the participants were informed of the 
proceedi~gs until shortly before the mee·ti~g. 
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be skeptical of the mission. These stories soon reached 
such dimensions that the P;J::"es.ident or Hull had to publish 
an official denial. Hull rel.uctantly issued a statement 
to the press in which he spoke of his ~greement with the 
President, and he even attributed to the Under Secretary's 
personal abilities some acclaim. But in all the praise 
for Welles he does not even in this statement deny expressly 
any ·disagreements between the Under Secretary anq. himself. 
To all insiders it was apparent that he resented maki~g 
such a statement. He himself remarks dryly "to quiet such 
rumors I issued a statement," His heart was not in his 
words. 1 
Kennedy protested vehemently to the President. 2 Bul-
litt openly expressed criticism of this way of superseding 
r~gularly accredited diplomatic representatives. 3 He was a 
seasoned diplomat and an old friend of Roosevelt. Therefore 
he saw his role not simply as that of a normal ambassador; 
1Hull, 738f.; New York Times, Feb. 15, 4; London Times, 
Feb. 15, 8; Pratt, I, 341; U.S. Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States {hereafter cited as F.R.), 
1940, I, 8:Chicago Tribune, Feb. 14, 1940, 1; Alsop,-4; 
Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father, the Story of 
Joseph P. Kennedy (New York, 1964), 286; Harold J. Ickes, 
The Secret Diaries of Harold J. Ickes, 3 vols •. ~New York, 
1954), III, 138. . 
2Whalen, 2 87. 
3Ickes, III, 138. 
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he liked to consider himself as a special adviser to the 
President. Postmaster General James Farley had. gotten the 
impression that "Bullitt was. closer than anyone in the 
diplomatic service to the President." 1 Fellow diplomats 
observed that Bullitt r~garded himself as the President's 
' 2principal counselor on European affairs. Welles was sup-
posed to have his sphere of influence in Latin America. 
When Roosevelt sent Welles to Europe without informi~g 
Bullitt, the Ambassador concluded that Welles had violated 
an ?!greed division of functions. He had already left France 
when the embassy was informed of the Welles mission. 
Cha!ge d'affaires Robert Murphy was ~'greatly disturbed" when 
he beard the news. The inunediate .subordinate of Bullitt 
knew his chief and his notions well, and feared the Ambas-
sador's reaction. 3 Indeed, from then on a bitterness devel-
oped between Bullitt and Welles which did much to impair the 
functionii;ig of the State Department. The hostility hurt 
both. Welles was aware of Bullitt's a~ger and believed the 
rumors of dissension in the State Department "had all el}1an-
ated from the vitriolic to~gue of Bill Bullitt.1' 4 
1James Farley, Jim Farley's Story; the Roosevelt Years 
(New York, 1948), 19-;r:-
2Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden 
City, N. Y. , 19 6 4) , 35. 
3Ibid. 
4Israel, Long Diary, 58. It seems that the former 
Ambassador did much to bri~g about the final ousti~g of 
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Welles •·s failure .to inform the Secretary of State had 
by far the· severest effect. The relations between the two 
top officials of the Department of State. had never been 
cordial. Welles was Roosevelt's prot~ge. Hull had accepted 
him reluctantly and only because he was the President's 
choice. After his election Roosevelt had recalled his old 
friend from retirement and offered him a job as Assistant 
Secretary of State. When Under Secretary William Phillips 
insisted in 1936 on bei~g sent to Rome as Ambassador after 
Breckinridge Lo~g had res:Lgned the embassy, a lo~g delay 
arose in filling his ·post. Assistant Secretaries Sumner 
Welles and R. Walton Moore had e~g~ged in bitter contention 
for the appointment. Moore was an old friend and prot~ge 
of Hull. He had already served several times as Acti~g 
Secretary of State and was Hull's choice for the openi~g. 
After six months a compromise .terminated the deadlock. 
Moore ~greed to Sunmer Welles's appointment as Under Secre-
tary of State. For Moore the .rank of Counselor--equal in 
salary and rank, but not in actual power and responsibility--
was revived. Phillips tho~ght that .this arrangement was "a 
serious disappointment" to Secretary of State Hull. 1 
• v' 
Welles. Welles even regarded William Bullitt as the or~gina-
tor of the rumors about Welles's homosexuality which caused 
his dismissal. Bullitt at least seems to have helped to 
spread them. Israel, Long Diary, 58, 324; Murphy, 35. 
1Phillips, 185f. Graham H. Stuart, The Department of 
State (New York, 1949), 328. 
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When Hull had become Secretary of State·he had estab-
lished a number of innovations ·in departmental administra-
tion. He authorized the Under and Assistant Secretaries to 
see the President in his stead. He hoped to delegate some 
of his own duties and to accredit more prest~ge and practice 
to his subordinates while ·encour~gi~g them in their work. 
Usually the visits were of a technical nature and on close 
instructions by the Secretary. At first this system worked 
well. But, as Hull later complained, .Welles increasi~gly 
"abused his trust" by. goi~g over his head to see the Presi-
dent without instructions from him and "undertaki~g in one 
way or anothe·r virtually to act as Secretary of State. 111 
Roosevelt was not innocent of this development. Rather, he 
encour~ged Welles in one way or another. 2 
Welles's disloyalty would not have been so serious if 
he and the Secretary had not differed so much in their 
policies and their character. Their dis~greements ·forced 
Welles to turn with his schemes· directly to the President. 
He could not find a sympathetic heari~g from his superior. 
But Hull was the more ~ggravated since the result of Welles's 
conferences with the President was ·frequently contrary to 
his policies. 
Hull was cautious, scrupulous in explori~g all the 
ground, and slow to· ·.come to. conclusions. He was ·critical of 
1 Hull, 202. 2Pratt, Hull, I, 19. 
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any proposal for which he was to assume responsibility--
even the President' s--and did not lack the courage to op-
pose a SUCJgestion. The Secretary of State was not incapable 
of reachi11g a decision, tho'llgh he often needed a lo~g time 
to make up his mind. Im~gination and creativity were not 
his stro11g points. His or~gin in rural Tennessee and his 
career in Co~gress had influenced him deeply. As a former 
Senator and one of the major links of the Roosevelt adminis-
tration to Co~gress, he was aware of the mood in Washi11gton 
and minded co~gressional trends and ways. Welles, in con-
trast, had been born into a wealthy urban family, educated 
at top schools in the· East. Diplomacy was his entire ca-
reer and natural calli11g. He had a quick and perceptive 
mind and was_ given to daring ideas--"possibly a little on 
the too dari~g side. 111 Assistant Secretary Breckinri~ge 
Lo11g, who was an intimate of Hull, accused Welles of doil1g 
blindly whatever the President said without thoro'l.lgh consid-
eration and in disregard of possible da11gers. 2 Welles later 
complained that Hull "wanted to rely on the li11ger-and-wait 
policy of a domestic politician, with .the result that instead 
of shapi11g events he had permitted events to shape him. 11 3 
1 Israel, Long Diary, 210. 
2Ibid. 
3wal ter Millis, ed. , The Forre·stal Diaries ·. (New Yo_rk, 
1951), June 13, 19 46. 
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Welles desired to shape events, even at the· risk of creat-
i~g a dangerous situation. 
The dive~gence in character. led to friction. Welles 
felt impeded by Hull's caution. He was ·frustrated by the 
lack of appreciation and the. rej·ection of his plans. Hull 
saw in Welles the restless, ,evil spirit of the Department 
who replaced the friendly atmosphere of cooperation amo~g 
his collaborators .J,ith the spirit of competition and sus-
picion of each other. The Secretary of State saw in Welles's 
actions an attempt to seize. upon his own job and res·ponsi-
bili ties,· and he feared the division of the Department in 
a "Hull faction" and a "Welles ·faction. 11
Hull was not the man to counter.act Welles's endeavors 
v~gorously, but neither was he willing to surrender his 
position. As a former southern officer and leader of a 
Tennessee. company of infantry in the Spanish....;American war, 
he had much feeli~g of personal honor and pride, and felt 
offended by Welles's actions. Tho~gh ·he was jealous of his 
prer~ga ti ves as ·the President Is chief adviser on forergn 
policy, he could not prevent his bei~g pushed more and more 
into the bac~ground. As the situation in Europe and the Far 
East. grew more menaci~g, .the President started to devote 
more of his time to forergn policy. Gradually he became 
his own Secretary of State surrounded by a circle of undif-
ferentiated advisers who were close to his person and 
policies. The subchiefs in the State Department felt that 
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the 'decisions were made in the White House. They came to 
consider themselves as Hull's equals and b~gan reporting 
directly to the President. 1 · Other departments began to 
play a role in shapi~g fore~gn policy, especially the 
Treasury under Henry Morgenthau, and Harold Ickes' Interior 
Department. 
· If the President seemed to prefer to deal with Welles 
and others rather than with Hull, Robert E. Sherwood blamed 
Hull himself for this development. Hull was extremely 
jealous of his reputation as one officer of the administra-
tion who had not committed any conspicuous blunder. 
However, in times of desperate emergency when 
drastic, daring action had to be taken quickly, 
Roosevelt was.bound to become impatient with anyone 
whose primary concern was the maintenance of a 
personal record of "no runs-no hits-no errors." To 
an ever greater extent Roosevelt .bypassed Hull to 
deal directly with Sumner Welles, or to assign 
what should have.been State Department functions 
to the Treasury Department, the wa2 Department, or to any other agency or individual. 
This may be unfair, but undoubtedly Hull was a cautious 
Secretary of State who was easily deterred by the prospect 
of impediments and dangers. The President called for 
Welles's advice partly because of Hull's caution and lack 
of imagination--he offered no daring and bold schemes which 
could impress somebody like President Roosevelt--and partly 
1Ickes, III, 216f. 2Sherwood, 135. 
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because he ·usually. gathered all the advice he could, and 
formed his own opinion afterward. As he became increasingly 
interested in fore~gn affairs he consulted more opinions 
and asked for more. counsel. Hull, formerly nearly the sole 
presidential adviser on fore~gn policy, found himself as 
one of many. Now the President himself made the decisions 
where Hull had been free to act on his own duri~g the early 
years of the Administration. Since his advice proved not 
as co~genial to the President as other people's, it was not 
sought and accepted as often as would have seemed natural in 
his position. Sherwood, indeed, holds that the President 
"placed. greater dependence on Welles's judgment. 111 Hull's 
task was reduced to that of an administrative head of the 
State Department while the ·shapi~g of foreign policy and 
the action in fore;Lgn affairs were decided upon elsewhere. 
An indication of the shift in the. conduct of fore~gn 
relations was the President's practice of sendi~g special 
envoys abroad as his personal representatives. Their number 
increased rapidly. The State Department felt cut out, and 
its diplomats in the concerned countries felt offended. 2 
Hull resented these initiatives and frequently expressed his 
displeasure but without effect. 
Hull's scorn centered more and more upon Sumner Welles 
for the Under Secretary was partially responsible for the 
2Hull, 200. 
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declini~g influence of his own. department. In his efforts 
Welles used what Hull lacked,_ good personal relations to 
the President. Hull's subordinate and his superior were 
connected by a lo~g-time friendship. Welles had grown up 
in the same city as the President who was eleven years 
older. They were born into the same social milieu and had 
attended the same preparatory school and college, Groton 
and Harvard. They had come socially into contact early in 
their lives. Welles had been one of the pages at Roosevelt's 
wedding. When Roosevelt became President, he recalled his 
friend who had lived some years in retirement. Welles soon 
became a close adviser of the President and a. frequent 
guest of social events at the White House. He b~gan a 
meteoric rise. Hull never became a member of Roosevelt's 
inner circle. Their relationship remained formal. The 
Secretary of State detested social events. The President 
looked upon Hull as a political asset and as an able adminis-
trator; he regarded Welles as a personal friend. Welles was 
one of the few "professional" diplomats whom the President 
admired and trusted. 
President Roosevelt's close association with Welles 
was "unquestionably the most lasting and most deplorable 
element in the distant relations between the White House 
and its next-door ne~ghbor to the west," Robert E. Sherwood 
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later observed. 1 Phillips, Welles's predecessor as Under 
Secretary remarked: 
At any rate the relations between the Secretary 
and his new Under-Secretary were strained from the 
start, which demoralized the internal administration 
of the department. The friction was undoubtedly 
augmented because of Welles'· personal relations 
with the President, which permitted him direct 
access at all times to the White House, a privi-
lege which he often used without first consulting 
the Secretary. Unfortunately it was typical of· 
Roosevelt to let such matters slide until they 
developed into really serious situations. The Hull-
Welles feud adversely affected our foreign relations 
for several years. 2 · 
Hull himself complained to James Farley: "I don't see the 
President very often. Most of the details of the department 
are handled through Sumner Welles. 113 
These developments had been in the maki!).g before Welles 
was sent to Europe and continued afterwards. Before 1940 
probably not even those concerned had recognized to where 
this trend would lead, tho~gh it was already apparent that 
there existed a strain in the relations between the Secre-
tary and the Under Secretary. In February of that year 
the alienation became evident. The Welles mission marks the 
point where for the first time a major decision had been 
made without consulti~g the Secretary, and where a major 
diplomatic action had been undertaken against the outspoken 
1Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New Y~rk, 
1948), 135. 
2Phillips, 186. 3Farley, 341. 
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will of Cordell Hull. For the first time, also, he decided 
to hand in his res~gnation. Welles's trip to Europe marks 
a milestone in Hull's career. From this time on Hull lost 
increasi~gly control over fore~gn policy. This was not a 
sudden revolution but had been lo~g in the offi~g and 
developed further after Welles's return. The Welles mis-
sion is its first manifestation and h~gh point. 
The choice of Welles for a mission to which Hull was 
opposed was unfortunate. By 1940 antagonism between the 
two top officials in the State Department had already too 
far developed. They had already quarreled on earlier oc-
casions. The first major clash came in 1937. Welles pro-
posed an international conference; Hull was opposed--
" almost hysterically," as Welles later said,1 Hull had his 
way. A year later it was Welles'·s turn. Duri~g· the Czech 
crisis Bullitt and Welles urged the President to make a 
personal appeal to the heads of the European states which 
were most deeply concerned. Hull was not outrightly opposed 
but he could not see how any good would come of such action. 
The appeal was sent, but Hull had the satisfaction that not 
much. good came of it. 
Then came the Welles mission. 2 Hull realized how deli-
cate his position had become. He saw that either he would 
1welles, Time, 66. cf. 28. 
2Ickes sees the Welles mission in direct relationship 
to the Hull-Welles feud: Hull had been more active lately. 
Welles feared he would be obscured. He proposed his 
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have to submit quietly to Welles's increasi~g independence 
in deali~g with Department affairs, or that he would have 
to pick up the_ gauntlet. He decided to accept the chal-
lenge, but acted half-heartedly. He restricted himself to 
verbal complaints and did not compel the President to make 
a choice by pushi~g his res~gnation. 
* * *
Welles's mission was not the first such ·effort. Some 
precedents were recent and still fresh in the minds of many, 
Americans and Europeans, Axis and Allies. Friends and foes 
of Welles's enterprise used precedents to support their 
arguments. Welles and those who took part in planni~g the 
mission minded these examples and tried to avoid their 
errors. 
European mission to break his isolation and move again 
towards the center of the stage (Ickes, III, 138) ·• Basil 
Rauch connects Welles's appointment as Chairman of the Ad-
visory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations and the 
Welles mission with his feud with Hull. Hull appointed 
Welles as Chairman subsequently to the President's decision 
to send him on the European mission. Rauch characterized 
Welles's appointment as chairman as an attempt by Hull to 
"stake down" in the State Department the Under Secretary's 
activities. Since Welles thus was already a specialist 
for the post-war settlement, it would seem more, .. ·1ogical 
that he would be sent on the mission. Besides being il-
logical, this thought does not take into account that Welles 
had been temporary chairman of that Committee since it was 
founded lo~g before the Welles mission was considered. 
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The Allies ·liked to think back to Colonel House's 
visits, but his memory was bitter to the Ger.mans. Woodrow 
Wilson's intimate had approached the President in Fall 1914 
with a proposal to bri~g about peace through his acquaint-
ance with Arthur Zimmermann, _who was then German Under 
Secretary of Fore;i_gn Affairs.· Wilson not only had approved 
of these private n~gotiations by House but had helped to 
conceal them from Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan. There were Other similarities. As ·in 1940, none of 
the belligerents appreciated the idea of an American media-
tion at the moment. Sir Edward Grey, the British 'Secretary 
of Fore~gn Affairs, had done what he could to dissuade 
House. But House remained obstinate. Grey's fears proved 
. groundless. He was relieved when he discovered that House's 
sympathies were fully on the side of the Allies.· The 
Fore~gn Secretary had beeri afraid that the Triple Entente 
would have to agree on war aims--that would have badly 
affected their unity--or that the level of demands would 
alienate the American public. House did not push peace. 
The British even succeeded in persuading him to remain in 
England until the first German defeats would have occurred. 
After two weeks in London he finally left for Berlin where 
he stayed for fully three days. He did not even bother to 
. go to Vienna. Returning to Allied territory, he stayed 
another three weeks in London after spending a week in Paris. 
The result of six weeks under Allied and three days under 
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German influence was that Germans could not consider Ameri-
can mediation impartial any lo~ger. Colonel House •·s diary 
proved German suspicions r~ght. In Paris he had promised 
that in case of an Allied victory the United States would 
not intervene, but in case they were losi~g ground they 
could count on the Americans--a statement hardly suited to 
bri~g anybody to the. conference table--and in London he 
promised Grey that·President Wilson would insist on a peace 
favorable to the Allies. No wonder that Welles hastened 
to remind the Axis and isolationist groups that he had di-
vergent aims. He took care to point to the. differences 
between his trip and House's. His;'.;mission was made public; 
he was a h~gh official in the administration; he had no 
known biases. Furthermore his mission was announced as 
bei~g only for the sake of ~· gatheri~g information." 
The crisis over the Sudentenland had resulted in an-
other awkward parallel, the Runciman mission. Like Welles, 
Lord Runciman traveled as a private citizen, though as one 
apparently with the backi~g of his. government. Chamberlain 
had planned to send him as an arbitrator, but French pressure 
had caused a cha~ge of mind. He appointed Runciman "mediator 
and adviser," and instructed him to get Great Britain out of 
a dilemma which was similar to that of the United States in 
1940. Czechoslovakia was threatened with engulfment by 
Hitler. Britain considered her as a friendly nation, and 
she was France's ally in the cordon sanitaire. Both had an 
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honorable obl~gation towards her, since the Czech ·state had 
been an Allied creation of Versailles. The former Allies 
felt obl~ged to save her, but wanted to avoid an armed 
confrontation with Germany. Runciman saved British honor. 
His recommendations for a just settlement went further than 
Hitler's demands. The British could drop the Czechs with 
easy conscience, since Runciman's mission had established 
that German demands were justified. Welles later was to 
call it "absurd" for it ."disclosed an incomprehensible lack 
1 of realism in the British government. 11 Was the Welles 
mission two years later based on a more realistic attitude? 
Welles was to advise in 1944 that the only realistic policy 
of the Runciman mission would have been a threat to use 
force ~gainst force. Was that what he had in mind in 
1940? Or would his report look like Runciman's, which in 
its outr~ght. grant of German demands "at least ••• had the 
merit of simplicity 11 ?2 
* * *
Welles was a firm believer in:multinational ~greements. 
He had already once shown what he considered the solution to 
the problems of the world. After the failure ·of the Brussels 
1welles, Time, 36. 
2winsto~ s. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 
1948), 300. 
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conference, and after Hull had sounded out Co~gress and 
found that a repeal of. the neutrality law was not possible, 
Welles had come up with a plan which was kept se·cret until 
he made it public in his book in 1944. He proposed the 
President should call a meeti~g in the White House of the 
diplomatic representatives of all nations on Armistice Day, 
November 11, 1937. To this audience Roosevelt would de-
liver a message calli~g for international cooperation and 
disarmament. Roosevelt could be won over but Hull was 
opposed. The Secretary insisted Chamberlain be .. consulted, 
confident the English leader would join him in opposition. 
As a result, _the proposal was dropped. 
Welles's faith in an international conference was not 
shared by other advisers in the State Department. After 
the Polish campa~gn American-inspired peace in Europe was 
~gain the topic of a lo~g meeti~g of senior members of the 
State Department on October 8, 19 39. After a thoro~gh 
discussion they reached the conclusion that the time and 
occasion were not propitious for any move on the part of the 
United States. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle 
noted in his diary: "The consensus of .the meeti~g was 
that while.peace ought to be made, now was not .the time • 
• For the moment we must wait, but the time might come 
and m~ght come very soon. 111 
1 La~ger and Gleason, 255. 
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The United States wanted to. be prepared in case·peace 
came. President Roosevelt requested Hull at the end of 
December 1939 to create a special State Department Commit-
tee to study questions of peace terms and post-war recon-
struction. This conunittee, which carried the non-committal 
name "Gommittee on Problems of Fore~gn Relations" concerned 
itself mainly with post-war problems. On January 15, a few 
weeks after its formation, an economic subcommittee had 
already completed outlines for an economic settlement. 
Welles presented these to the President. The plan was to 
form a basis for n~gotiations with the neutral powers. Sub-
sequent discussions profoundly modified the scheme. 1 
The political questions posed more problems, and solu-
tions did not come easily to the committee. Its members 
could not reach any ~greement on American fore~gn policy. 
President Roosevelt also reconsidered ·the situation but he 
did not present any conclusive solution. On January 9, 
1940, the President announced that he had formulated general 
peace objectives which he said he r~garded as essential. 
He admitted himself that these were "peace ideals," not 
practical proposals. The President refused to be more 
specific, probably because Woodrow Wilson's. ghci~t was 
1The speed with which this plan was drawn up is not· 
surprising if one considers that economic cooperation on a 
global scale had been one of the main aims of Hull's foreign 
policy since 1933. · 
haunti~g him. He did not want to create ·another Fourteen 
Points.1 
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At the· ·same time the ··President announced that the 
United States would under.take no peace campa~gn in the near 
future. In l~ght of Welles's ·later story that the Presi-
dent approached him with ·the Plan of the mission in early 
January, this statement is ·surprisi~g. Either the President 
was less ·than frank, _or the Welles mission was not planned 
in connection with the establishment of peace, or Welles 
was not supposed to leave soon. The latter see:rris most 
probable since Welles went on a vacation, and Hull did not 
yet know of the plans. The .idea of a European mission at 
that tim~ seerris to have been v~gue and not of_ great concern. 
But duri~g Welles·•s. vacation it apparently took shape in 
the Under Secretary's or in the President's mind. Upon his 
return on February 1, Welles· became furiously active pre-
pari~g his ·trip. Welles himse·lf claims that the Pres iderit 
requested him to undertake ·the mission without delay. 2 
Hull and the. cabinet were informed duri~g the first days of 
February. On February 9, the President made the plan known 
to the public. 3 Those who had been opposed to a multi-
national approach and American involvement had to. give in 
1New York Times, January 10, 1940, p. 1. 
2welles·,: Ti~-74. 
3welles,· Time, 73; Hull, _737; New York Times,: Feb. 15, 
p. 4. 
41 
to the fait accompli. Welles's and the President's predi-
lection for an international solution had carried the day 
by a surprise attack. 
Since it was now decided that Welles would undertake 
the mission in the immediate future, a conception of his 
aims had to be worked out. The planni~g up to that point 
had been for the most part based on the assumption of co-
operation with the neutrals. The key question was whether 
the United States should form a neutral front for peace, or 
whether it should proceed alone. Cooperation with ·other 
neutrals would_ give a peace campa~gn more momentum but the 
United States m~ght be embarrassed by discussions about 
such topics as the British blockade, or she m~ght even_ get 
involved deeply in an international enterprise in which the 
United States, as the most powerful neutral, would have to 
bear the burden of the decision of others. The solution 
was to limit the scope of neutral action to a consideration 
of'. common policies in the post-war settlement. The exclu-
sion of war-time problems banned the da~ger of bei~g forced 
to anti-British measures, or hostilities with the Axis 
through ·some commitment to a common neutral front. The 
Welles mission offered an opportunity to show American inter-
est in peace and her concern for the position of the neutral 
states without havi~g to eng~ge in unwanted discussions with 
o:ther neutrals_ •. ,Those who planned the mission did not have 
to mind other neutrals' special interests. 
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Little is known of the discussion and preparations for 
the mission. The planners were under immense pressure of 
time. Welles had to reach Europe before broad-scale fight-
i~g began. A spri~g offensive was expected daily and 
surely would come as soon as the weather permitted. Prepar-
ations were hurried alo~g. 
There was a series of conferences between the Presi-
dent, Hull, Welles, and Ambassadors Kennedy and Bullitt. 
Kennedy had returned to Washington on February 12, just 
before final decisions were taken. On February 16, Welles 
had a last conference with Hull, 1 and just before departing 
2 he had a final chat with Kennedy. The discussions were 
restricted to this small group of insiders. Perhaps that 
was fortunate. To reach agreement amo~g those five was 
difficult enough. They never revealed the substance or the 
result of their conversations, but they could not have 
discussed much duri~g those two weeks. Since three of them 
were opposed to the concept of the mission itself, not many 
concrete positive plans ·could be expected. Judgi~g from 
later events, especially the public announcements and 
Welles's own reports of his conversations with fore~gn 
1The Secretary admitted afterward that there had been 
no occasion to take up details. If they had no time to take 
up details at this late occasion, they probably never reached 
any decisions about them. 
2Newsweek, XV (February 19, 1940), 16. 
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statesmen, it seems safe_ to assume that Hull and the Ambas-
sadors used the occasion to limit the scope of Welles's 
mission. Hull himself attributes such a development to his 
influence. 1 The result was that Welles's order told him 
what not to do rather than what to do. The_ gathering of 
information was the only_ goal upon which they could agree. 
Welles was explicitly forbidden to make any proposals or to 
enter into any commitments. When the President informed 
the Cabinet shortly before the public announcement, he 
explained that the Under Secretary "would_ go without any 
specific instructions. 112 Publicly, the President, Hull, 
and Welles also repeated several times that Welles would 
not present any proposals and was not authorized to make any 
commitments in the name of the United States. The visit was 
solely for the purpose of information. American diplomats 
overseas were told that Welles was sent only to advise the 
President and the Secretary of State "as to present condi-
, 3 
tions in Europe." This pronounced aim was noncommittal 
and obviously intended to fend off criticism. The important 
questions remained unanswered: information in what respect 
and for what purpose? 
1 Hull, 738. 
2Ickes, III, 138. 
3F.R., 1940, I, 4. The same formula was used in the 
announcement of the mission. 
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* * *
The next step was the diplomatic preparation of the 
mission. Fore~gn governments were hastily informed a week 
after Welles's return on February 8; the next day President 
Roosevelt announced Welles's visit before the concerned 
governments even had a chance to voice opinions. The 
President played on the certainty of world-wide public in-
dignation if some. government should refuse to welcome the 
American representative. The European states did not ap-
preciate this blackmailing arra~gement, but they rec~gnized 
the inevitable. 
The Soviet Union was neither included in Welles's 
itinerary, nor was she among the neutrals with whom Hull 
had. gotten into contact. The United States apparently 
assumed that if there were to be a settlement, it should 
be--like Munich--without the Soviet Union. Welles later 
explained that the President had felt that the agreement 
of the previous August between Germany and Russia made a 
visit to Moscow useless. 1 It might have been profitable to 
visit the Soviet Union. Besides Italy,·Russia was the only 
major European power which remained neutral in the Western 
',I
European war. Most of Germany's fore~gn supplies, which 
were indispensable for her war effort, were either furnished 
1welles, Time, 73f.; Sherwood, 137. 
by the Russians or transported thro~gh Russian territory. 
As one glance in Mein Kampf could have shown, Hitler was 
susceptible to the dangers of a war on two fronts. The 
Soviet Union was not a formal military ally of Germany, 
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and the non-~ggression pact of August 1939 had shown haw 
fast she could cha~ge her policy if advant~geous. In con-
trast to Italy Russira went her own way. Obvious snubs, 
such as ·~gnori~g her, could only help push the Soviet Union 
:closer to Germany at a time when France and E~gland could 
use every ally. The only practical reasons preventi~g 
Welles from_ goi~g to Russia were American public opinion and 
· the possible inconveniences of a journey to Moscow in 
winter. The Kremlin sounded a sour note. The Red Star 
presented Welles as a warmo~ger who was bei~g sent by the 
"American plutocracy" to speed up the consumption of war 
materials and thus increase Wall Street's profits. _Trud, 
published by the trade unions, regarded the mission as a 
preparatory step for the entry of the United States into 
the World War. Trud saw the difference to the House mission 
in Welles's aim: he wanted to prolong the war. Stella 
Rossa, the o~gan of the War Commissariat, emphasized the 
capitalistic aspect of the mission. Welles, the paper 
claimed, came to find out what compensations the United 
States could extricate for the support given to the Allies. 
The aim of the United States in extendi~g the war was to 
to replace Great Britain and France in their overseas 
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possessions and influence. American imperialism wanted to 
see the war continued "to the last drop of English, French, 
and German blood. 111 
Other governments busied themselves attempting to in-
duce Welles to talk with them. The Polish government in 
exile and Anthony Drexel Biddle, the u.s~· Ambassador still 
accredited to it, tried to convince Welles of the necessity 
of conversations. The Vatican made it clear that a visit 
to the Pope would be welcome. Even exiled Ukrainians sent 
2Welles ·a demand for an independent state in the new Europe. 
The only. government to be consulted before the mission 
was undertaken was Great Britain. This action in itself 
was hardly frank to the other countries. If it had become 
prematurely known, Welles m~ght have been considered partial 
by the other nations. Chamberlain was strongly opposed to 
the idea of Welles's trip. In a lo~g letter to the Presi-
dent he explained that such a mission would only raise 
false hopes. The Prime Minister was not convinced that the 
President's regular representatives could not provide all 
1The Italian Ambassador in Moscow wrote a long report 
on the Russian reaction in which he treated many Russian 
newspapers: DDI, IX, 3, 404. See also: W. H. Shepards and 
W. o. Scroggs-;--¥he United States in World Affairs, 1940; 
published for the Council on Foreign Relations · (New York, 
London, 1941), 13; New York Times·, Feb. 18, 40; Feb. 25, 25; 
Feb. 29, 5. . 
2New York Times, Feb. 18, 40; Feb. 21, 2; Feb. 29, l; 
F.R., 1940, I, 9. 
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the needed information. At the end of his letter Chamber-
lain comes to the heart of the matter: "I must frankly 
admit a. good deal of anxiety lest the effect of this move 
however carefully presented should be to.cause embarrass-
ment to the demo·cracies from which Germany • will reap 
advantage. 111 Chamberlain feared for unity among the Allies 
and that public opinion inside the. various countries would 
be ill affected by discussions about the problems of peace 
or war and about the· aims of the present· str~<Jgle. On the 
other hand, he did not want to annoy the President to whom 
this scheme seemed so important. He ~greed in principle, 
but made a final attempt to reduce the importance of the 
trip by demandi~g Welles attempt to mediate the Russo-
Finnish Winter War also. Thus attention would be diverted 
to the Eastern war. Chamberlain requested peace should not 
be mentioned in the public announcements. He did not want 
to have anythi~g to do with the procedure ·of the affair 
itself. Apparently he wanted to avoid bei~g drawn into 
the enterprise. He doubted that the undertaking was neces-
sary and tried to convince the President that rumors of an 
inuninent German offensive were a prop~ganda tri'ck by Berlin. 
He urged President Roosevelt to think the matter over. 
Peace would not be any more difficult to secure later. In 
another message he explained that he was specifically worried 
1 F.!., 1940, I, 1-4. 
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lest the Welles mission ruin the Allies'· current plans for 
operations in S~andinavia. 1 The British leader was. given 
no chance to discuss the matter further. On February· 8 
the ·other governments were informed, and the next day the 
mission was announced by the· ·President. Chamberlain could 
do nothi~g but to state. to the House· of Commons that His 
Majesty's Government were ready to welcome Mr. Welles and 
to take him fully into their confidence (Cheers). 2 
The ambassadors of the other nations were informed by 
Welles personally. He ·rushed from embassy to embassy, and 
insisted that the ambassadors should be briefed in person. 
The French Ambassador, Count Rene de Saint-Quentin, was ill •. 
3That did not keep Welles away. The German charge d'affaires, 
Hans Thomsen, was not at home. Welles had Thomsen's valet 
call his master, .and asked that he immediately return. 
Welles ·then described .to Thomsen the ·purpose of his mis-
sion. 4 He insisted on these home calls for reasons of 
se·curity. The haste and secrecy made the mission appear 
dramatic and important. 
1Langer and Gleason, 362. The Allies considered at 
that time a military intervention in Scandinavia. They 
wanted to cut off iron ore transports, which went from the 
Swedish 'fields around Kiruna to the ·German Ruhr. They also 
hoped to be able to aid Finland in the Winter War. 
2London Times,· February 14, 19 40, 8. 
3Alsop, 86. 
4or. Hans Thomsen to the ·author, September 21, 1967. 
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All the. governments expressed willi~gness to receive 
Welles. Count Galeazzo Ciano, .Fore~gn Minister of Italy, 
replied as soon as he was informed that the Italian. govern-
ment would be. glad to furnish Welles with the information 
he would require. He asked for further details of the stay 
in Rome--which could not be given as there were none--and 
offered to entertain Welles duri~g the Italian visit. He 
wanted to know what m~ght please the American envoy. Welles 
coldly replied that owi~g to the nature of his mission as 
well as because of present conditions in Europe he would 
prefer not to accept any entertainments while in Europe. 
He asked only that he be received by Ciano and Mussolini 
immediately after his arrival in Rome. 1 
Welles asked assurances from the German charged' 
affaires before his departure that Hitler and Ribbentrop 
would receive him in person. No answer came. The Germans 
were at a complete loss what to do. From this came one of 
those rare occasions when Hitler asked Mussolini's advice. 
On February 10, Michele Lanza, third Secretary of the 
Italian Embassy in Berlin, noted in his diary that the Ger-
man Fore~gn Office had wanted to know what the.""Italians 
would do with Welles. On February 14, the American cha~ge·· 
d'affaires in Germany, Alexander Kirk, reported that the 
Wilhelmstrass~ still did not know how to treat Welles. On 
1 F.R., 1940, I, 5, 7, 8. 
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February 15, the Italians informed the German Foreign 
Office that Mussolini would receive Welles. The Fore~gn 
Office was relieved and notified the Italians that in this 
case Hitler would also welcome the Under Secretary. The 
same day the State Departmerit·was informed that the German 
Government would receive Welles, tho~gh ·it was not specified 
with whom he would. get a chance to talk. 1 Alexander Kirk, 
the responsible American diplomat in Berlin, had no more 
information. He complained several times that he was left 
completely uninformed by the Germans as well as by the State 
Department. Hull did not even tell Kirk whether or not 
Welles would be received in Berlin. 2 The diplomatic prepa-
ration also lacked order and planni~g. 3 
France's answer came promptly. Charveriat, Director 
of Political Affairs of the· Fore~gn Office, _told Robert 
Murphy, .the American cha:1='ge d' affaires in Paris, _that the 
·1F'.R., 1940, I, Bf.; DGFP, D, VIII, No. 598. Leonardo 
Simoni-(pseud. for Michele Lanza}, Berlin, Atnhas·s·a:ae 
d' Ita·1:te '1939-1943 ·(Paris, 1947} , · 83f. 
2F'.R., 1940, I, 8-10. 
3Another account of the ·confusion in the diplomatic 
preparation of the Welles mission is given by George F. 
Kennan. Kennan was sent from Berlin· to meet Welles in 
Naples·. He ·was supposed to advise him on European, especi-
ally Soviet, affairs. Kennan recalls: "Mr. Welles seemed 
unaware ·of my presence and evinced no interest in my views 
on Russia. So little did I enter into the ken of the party 
that on leaving Rome for Berlin they forgot me entirely." 
(George F. Kennan,· 'Memoirs ·1925...:.1950, Boston, 1967, 116). 
This incident also reflects--welles's haughty attitude. 
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French ·Government had "extreme sympathy for Mr. Welles 
personally" but expressed "reserve as to the purpose of his 
visit." 1 The reaction was essentially the same everywhere. 
All. governments were willi~g to receive Welles,· all--
except Berlin--expressed admi·ration for Welles personally, 
all promised full cooperation--~gain except Berlin--but all 
expressed their doubts as to the purpose of the mission. 
Apparently none was ·fond of the mission, but none dared to 
annoy the United States. All we.re nervous because nobody 
knew what Welles's function was. 
As will be recalled, the State Department was hardly 
in any better shape. When Hull talked about the mission 
on February 9, he did not know how lo~g Welles· was. goi1:1,g to 
stay in Europe, nor with whom he would have conversations. 
After a talk with the President on February 13 ,· he hinted 
that a more extended round of visits m~ght be made; Upon 
leavi~g New York, Welles ·still denied that he would visit 
the Pope; When he stated, "I am leavi1:1,g the Rex at Naples 
and go directly to Rome. After. that nothing is definite," 
he probably was r~ght. On February 27, he ·still did not 
know if the Pope would receive him on his return to Rome. 
On March 4, when Welles was on his way to Paris, Hull 
claimed he was unable to say whethe·r or not Welles would 
1 F.R., 1940, I, 6. 
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talk with the Polish ·Government while he was ·in Paris .·1 
The planni~g could not be continued while Welles· was 
in Europe, though it seerris that the President and Welles· 
had ~greed that the Under Secretary should send brief con-
fidential rep·orts of a general nature in a private code . 2 
Security problems made it necessary that he should keep the 
details to himself. Upon his return he ·was to inform the 
President in an elaborate· report. 
On February 17, Welles left America on the Italian 
1 1 •. . 3 iner Rex. He had final talks with ·Breckinri~ge Lo~g, 
Assistant Secretary of State ·and former Ambassador in Rome, 
and with ·Joseph P. Kennedy. He was :accompanied by his 
wife, .his personal valet, 4 Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the 
European Division in the· State. ·nepartment, and Lucius 
Johnson, .a yo~g diplomat whom he had chosen to be his 
secretary. Welles· was not quite ·well whe·n he left. He had 
some ·sort of influenza, _whi.ch ·had caused his ·leave of 
absence in January. Duri~g the· hectic weeks since,· he had 
1New York Times, _1940,. Feb. 10, p. 2; Feb •. 18, p. 1; 
London· Times, 1940,. Feb. 15, p. · 8; Feb. 28, p. · 8. 
2·New York Times, Mar. 7, _1940, p. · 7. 
3The use of a foreign ship brought immediate protests 
by American shipping interests.· · 
4His valet was,· of course, a genuine Englishman and 
had to be left in Italy si n::e ·the·· Germans might have con-
sidered him an enemy alien:. 
not recovered completely, and he was not to do so during 




Sumner Welles arrived in Naples on February 25, 1940, 
and inunediately proceeded to Rome to call on the Italian 
government. The Italians were well pleased with his ar-
rival "if for no other reason than that for once ·Italy had 
been accorded priority over Germany in the itinerary of an 
influential fore~gn statesman. 111 He was. greeted with 
elaborate floral decorations ·in Naples. ·and Rome, and the 
Italian. government extended to him all the. courtesies ·for 
which he could have hoped. Welles soon made it clear that 
he had not traveled 4000 miles for a round of. cocktail 
parties. Immediately after his arrival he e~g?t,ged in inter-
views with politicians and fore~gn diplomats. Duri~g this 
first visit his Italian counterparts were restrained and 
cautious. Since Rome was Welles first stop-over, they did 
not know how his mission would develop and tried to avoid 
any exposure. 
Mussolini's appearance "profoundly shocked" the Under 
Secretary. He found him looki~g fifteen years older than he 
1 La~ger and Gleason, 363. 
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actually was,· and "labori!,lg· under some tremendous strain." 
Welles tho~ght he knew the. cause of this ·state of near ex-
haustion: the Duce's trouble was "physical unquestionably, 
for he has procured a new and yo~g Italian mistress teri 
days ?1-go. 111 Ye.t, .the atmosphere was friendly; Welles was 
· d · h 1· · d c· 2impresse wit Musso ini an iano. "Mussolini is a man 
3of genius,11 he reported to President Roosevelt, and he 
supposedly told Mo~genthau that Mussolini "was the. greatest 
man that he had ever met. I' 4 He left Italy apparently hope-
ful of some success. In Berlin, .his next stop, .he declared 
himself enthusiastic about his visit to Rome. His. conversa-
tions there, he said, were the l'bes·t guarantee for the suc-
cess of his mission. 115 When he returned to Rome two weeks 
later, Welles found the situation noticeably relaxed. He 
was less restricted: the pres·s· was ·favorably disposed 
toward him; even Mussolini had cha!,lged--tho~gh he still had 
his mistress·.· He seemed to h.ave thrown off some. great 
we~ght, and was much more relaxed. Not the ·new mistress but 
1 F.R., 1940, I, 28. 
2see for example Welles's introduction to"Ciano's 
Diaries. 
3F.R., 1940, I, 113. 
4Ickes, Secret Diaries, III, 464; similar praise: 
ibid., 216. 
5S. . 1mon1, 92. 
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fearful uncertainties· had caused the strain. Now the de...; 
cisions had been made. Britain had finally proclaimed the 
coal blockade; more important, _Ribberi:trop had come to Rome 
to inform him about Germany's plans;· and in a few hours 
Mussolini was to meet with ·.the Fuehrer himself. l 
The fascist leaders were astonishi~gly frank. Ciano 
inve~ghed bluntly against his German colle?igue ,· Fore~gn 
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, .and he did not hide his 
ant~gonism to Mussolini's pro-German policy. 2 But the 
Italians made it cle·a:r that hostility .. to Germany's plans 
did not mean f avori~g the 'Allies-:-tho~gh Ciano used the 
occasion to tell his visitor all the ·se·cret news ·from the 
meeti~gs with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Most of this informa-
tion was already known, but Ciano' s ·indiscretions were 
perhaps more impressive since they were passed so.openly 
to the second man in the State Department. 
Duri~g this second visit to Rome,· Welles ·found time 
and opportunity to call upon the two h~gh non-fascist 
authorities in Rome--King Victor Emmanuel and the Pope. 
Both conversations were held in a friendly atmosphere, but 
revealed nothi~g of importance·. 
1 Cf. chapter on Italian Neutrality. 
2Elizabeth Wiskemann,· The Rome-Berlin Axis, a History 
of the Relations between Hitler and Mussolii:ir(New York, 
194~_202, holds that Ciano's difference with Mussolini's 
opinion can only be explained by his belief that Germany 
would be beaten, and that he then could persuade the Allies 
to accept him as the Duce's successor. 
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Welles left Italy on February 2 8, .rested for a day in 
Zurich, and arrived on the morni~g of March 1 in Berlin. 
In Germany the American Under Secretary caught a cold. 1 
This was, however, .no indication of the atmosphere of his 
talks, tho~gh his impressions·duri~g the first few days 
were unfavorable. The more he saw of Germany, the more he 
was disgusted. 2 Relations between the United States and 
Germany certainly were icy eno:ugh for Welles· to catch ·a 
cold. Hitler unwilli~gly had_ granted the interviews in 
Germany, and only because he saw no way to avoid an encoun-
ter. Roosevelt, who had dealt a blow to Germany in a speech 
just before Welles left, used the situation to offend Ger-
many again. Welles carried a personal letter by the Presi-
dent to each of the other three heads of_ government, but 
not to Hitler. The snub was obvious, since Mussolini had 
proudly displayed his ·letter, and everyone expected that 
Hitler would receive a similar mess~ge. 3 
Welles was satisfied with his talks in Berlin, despite 
the strained relations. Apparently he did not. get "the 
1simoni, 93. 
2rn his report he meticulously picks out every little 
instance and incident to demonstrate his annoyance. He com-
plained, for example, that his hotel did not put out an 
American flag, while it displayed the. colors of "so-called" 
Slovakia, though the Protokoll-Abteilung in the Fore~gn 
Office pointed out that the Slovakians were on an official 
visit, while Welles's stay in Berlin was unofficial. Welles, 
Time, 91; New .York Times, Mar. 2, 3; DDI, IX, 3,· 417. 
3welles, Time, 85; Schmidt, 475. 
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impress·ion that he landed in a lunatic asylum" as an Ameri-
can journalist had wishfully hoped. 1 The first impression 
he received was that a war was under way. As he. drove from 
the station to his hotel the air-raid alarm sirens b~gan to 
shriek. However, there was nothi~g to fear since it was 
only a test. Otherwise he was received with punctilious 
courtesy, and every mark of honor. He was accorded a chance 
to talk with ·everyone with whom he requested interviews. 
No fore~gn statesman before .Welles. had been. given a more 
comprehensive_ glimpse of the Nazi leadership. This was the 
more amazi~g, because Hitler and the Fore~gn Office r~garded 
him with distrust. 
Hitler had prepared thi~gs carefully for the American 
visitor, .and briefed not only those· Germans who were to meet 
Welles but also his Italian allies. Germany's southern 
partners were asked to. show .unity in .action with Germany, 
and to further German aims by convinci~g Welles. ·that the 
United States had nothi~g to lose by a German victory; on 
the contrary, the'y could_ gain freedom of the seas. For 
the Germans Hitler personally wrote a memorandum. He must 
have attached. great importance to Welles '·s visiJ:, for only 
on the rarest of occasions did he write instructions in such 
a way. These guide lines were followed by all except Dr. 
1william L. Shirer, The Rise and the Fall of the Third 
Reich (New York, 1960), 686. -- -- -- -- - --
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Hjalmar Schacht and State Secretary Ernst von Weizsaecker 
who informed Welles· ·of their existence. 1 The result was 
that everyone ·made similar statements,· .sometimes word by 
word. It is reasonable to ass·ert that the only one ·who en-
joyed this procedure was ·Paul· Schmidt, the interpreter. 
One of Hitler's orders was not kept by any of the Germans 
with whom Welles conversed. They violated Hitler's ·first 
rule--that Welles should be allowed to do the ·talki~g. 
Tho~gh they dominated the conversations,• the Germans re..; 
mained reserved and defensive,·. in accordance with Hitler's 
wishes.· 
The· main point of Hitler's directive was that not 
Germany but the Allies had declared war. Germany had no 
other aim bU:t peace. Since only the Allies had war aims, 
they had to be asked for those.· Hitler claimed he. could see 
no justifiable reason for·the ·Frerich ·and British declaration 
of war. But he knew what his enemies· had in mind: the 
annihilation of Germany. Germany had no desire ·to destroy 
either Great Britain or France but it wanted security against 
the des~gns of the Allies.· Their determination to destroy 
Germany itse·lf had to be des·troyed. Hitler even had pre-
pared a tenipti~g treat for the· Americans: Nazi Germany was 
not opposed to a freer world economy. The autarchy policy, 
1weizsaecker was loosely affiliated with the resistance. 
For conversation with Schacht.seep. 117~119. 
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the Chancellor claimed, had been forced upon Germany but 
she wanted to participate ~gain as ·"a sound partnerll in a 
world of free economies. He advised his subordinates to 
avoid annoyi11g specific questions like Poland and Czecho-
slavakia. Finally, Welles· :should be left with the· ·impres-
sion that Germany was determined to win this war. This is 
in essence what Sumner Welles was told over and over ~gain 
though ·in different forms.· Rudolf Hess needed half an 
hour to play the· ·record, Goer.i11g three·.1 
One of these lectures m~ght have beeri eno~gh. Un-
doubtedly, Welles tho~ght so. The first monol~gue was ·de-
livered by. the ·Fore~gn Minister. Joachim von Ribbentrop 
sat at his desk, and talked with his ·eyes. closed. Sumner 
Welles. concluded that "he evidently envisioned himself as 
the Delphic oracle. 112 Germany's top diplomat surprised 
him with ·his rudeness. In contrast to. Goeri11g, who in-
sisted on conversi~g in E11glish tho~gh his ·E11glish ·was far 
from perfect,. the Fore~gn Minister spoke only German, 
tho~gh he knew E11glish .very well. 3 · Since the· ·outbreak of 
the war Ribbentrop had refused to speak eithe·r Frerich or 
1DGFP, D, VIII, 637; Schmidt,. 475f.; Erich Kordt, 
Wahn und Wirklichkei t. Die Au·s:senp·oTitik des Dritten 
Reiches; Versuch einer DarsteT1ung (Stuttgart, 1948), .239. 
New York Times, Mar. 2, 3; Mar.· 4, 14. · 
2r.;., 1940, I, 34. 
3·Welles could speak and understand German fluently but 
seems to have insisted on conversations in E11glish.· 
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E~glish ,·. probably as his personal. contribution .to Ge·rmany' s 
·war effort. We'lles. disliked Ribbentrop; he· ·was :struck by 
his "very stupid mind. " 
The ·next on Welles'·s ·list was Rudolf Hes·s.· Welles 
considered Hitler's deputy "devoid of all but a very low 
order of intell~gerice" and "patently of abnormal mentality. 111 
State Secretary Weizsaecker was a cha~ge in the routine. 
This "typical example ·of the Germ.an official of the old 
school" appeared to him "sincere ••• and with ·aeep feel-
i~g. 11 Weizsaecker indeed spoke so openly' that he thought it 
wise: ·.to pull the chairs into the ·middle ·of the room and talk 
only in a whisper. 2 
Goeri~g was the last of Welles·•·s German counterparts. 
Welles found him looki!1g exactly like 'his phot~graphs·:· "His 
th~ghs and arms were tremendous,· .and his. girth ·was mon-
strous,". and offered eno~gh ·space ·for various emblems, in-
s~gnia, .and a monocle ·da~gli~g from his neck on a black 
cord. However, "his manner was ·simple,. unaffected and 
1F·.R., 1940 ,· I, 34,· 41, 50 •· Newsweek,· xv, 1940 · (Mar. 
11), 2l.- New York Times, Mar. 10,. 28. 
2welles, Time, 112; F.R., 1940 , .. I, .42.. Ernst von Weiz~ 
saecker, Erinneriingen (Muencheri, 1950)., 277.· Maxime 
Mourins, Les tentatives· de· p·aix d'ans: :la· Seconde· Gu·erre 
Mondiale ··1939-1945 ·(PariSi .1949);-65",.holds this to be a 
comedy played by Weizsaecker. Welles's story of this inci-
dent--published in 1944--might have had ill effects for 
Weizsaecker. He read Welles's book during the war and 
recalls bei!1g afraid some devoted Nazi m~ght discover that 
passage. 
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excee·di~gly cordial,· and he ·spoke with. ·:greater. clarity and 
frankness· than any other Ge·nnan official. 111 After. the con-
versation Welles· was treated to a tour of Goeri~g' s 'immense 
hunti~g castle,· Karinhall. Welles·· :recalls havi~g never 
se·en such an irlcredibly ~gly · b'liildi~g. 2 
Most important was,· of course·,- the conversation with 
Hitler. The red carpet was out,· .and a SS-honor. guard stood 
at attention as Welles ·entered the 'Chancellery. He was at 
once ·received by Hitl·er, whom he 'found l'taller than I had 
ju~ged from his phot<Jgraphs.. • • • He :looked in excellent 
physical condition, .and in. good traini~g. 113 · Like ·many 
others before, Welles· was ·enthralled by Hitl:er's ·cha·rm. The 
Chancellor said nothi~g new, .but he: made ·.it sound better 
and more ·promising. Terminati~g the 'inte.rview, .Hitler 
assured Welles.:· "I appreciate ·.your sincer.i ty and. that of 
your. government, and I am. grate:ful for your mission. I can 
assure you that .Ge·rmany's aim, whether it must come thro~gh 
war or otherwise, is ·a: just pe·a:ce. 114 Welles :left the Chan-
cellery favorably impressed with the Fuehrer. 5
1welles ,' Time, 113 .' 
3rbid., 44. 
.2 . 
F.R., .19401 .I, .56. 
4·Ibid.,. 49. 
5This was at least the impression some ·Ge·rmans ·received 
in their later conversations with Welles. Weizsaecker, 44; 
Hjalmar Schacht,· Confe·ss'i'o·ns: :of :"the Old wi·zard" (Boston, 
1956), 366. 
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The Germans viewed Welles with continued bafflement. 
His purpose· remained en~gmatic. He appeared to be intelli-
. gent but not diplomatically versatile. Paul Schmidt, the 
interpreter in the· Wilhelmstrasse, recalls that the Ameri-
can envoy sat through the talks like ·11 a block of ice. 11 1 
Duri~g his German visit, ,Sumner Welles ·felt, he had 
been "most courteously received," and he had found his talks 
very interesti~g. The Under Secretary had beeri most im-
pressed by the ·German belief that the premier allied aim 
was the destruction of Germany. Sumner Welles ·left Berlin, 
) 
he said to Italy's Ambassador Bernardo Attolico, l'moderately 
but not unduly optimistic." 2 
Welles boarded his special salon-car in Berlin's 
Anhalter station on March ·4, .late ·at night, and returned to 
Switzerland where he rested for two. days.· In the. morni~g 
of March· ·7, .he arrived in the· French capital. He found a 
. grim Paris r at n~ght only the major boulevards were l~ghted, 
and those dimly; the rest of the llcity of l~ght" remained 
dark. All places of amusement closed at 11 p.m. and the 
streets lay deserted thereafter. There was "a sensation of 
. general waiting; of an expectation of some dire calamity. 
Amo~g the innumerable persons with whom I talked, .only in 
1schmidt, .4 76. 
2 Simoni, 9 2; Roosevelt Papers, .PSF State, .Welles 's 
Report, conversation with King Geo~ge VI; Weizsaecker, 277; 
New Y~rk Times, March ·2, 3. · 
the rarest instances ••• did I obtain the impression of 
hope or. v~gor, or even, tr~gically eno~gh, of the. will to 
cour~ge. 111 
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In contrast with his experience ·.in the. dictatorships, 
he met a wide variety of people and opinions in Paris.· 
First he visited Albert Lebrun, the President of the 
Republic. The President told Welles the story of his life 
but his memory was evidently faili~g. Immediately after 
his visit to the Elysee, Welles went to see Daladier. Thei·r 
conversation covered a wide ra~ge of topics.· Daladier was 
si~gularly frank in. criticizi~g French fore~g1: policy in 
the years that had just elapsed. Paul Reynaud impressed 
Welles most. He was :then Minister of Finance but succeeded 
Daladier as ·Premier soon after Welles's visit. The French-
man had invited the American to a lunch in his office in 
the Louvre, the former apartment of the Prince Imperial 
under Napoleon III. They discussed primarily economic and 
financial matters but talked also about political problems. 
Welles saw most of the important French politicians. Inter-
esti~gly, most of the Frenchmen with whom he talked looked 
backwards rather than forward. They reviewed.recent French 
history but did not mention France's future. Welles found 
the French statesmen patriotic and honest. Tho~gh sympa-
thetic toward the French, Welles found them lamentably inept 
1welles, Time, 121. 
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and unrealistic. "German prop~ganda," he concluded, had 
"fatally undermined Frerich morale.11 1 In Paris the American 
envoy also met the Polish.government in exile. General 
Sikorski impressed him "as a man of character, of int~grity, 
and of patriotism, but as being without any particular 
intellectual ability. 112 Contrary to his reception in 
Berlin social events were o!ganized in his honor. 3 · The days 
in Paris proved to be enjoyable; but more important was 
Welles's visit to London. On March ·10 ,. he crossed the 
channel in an airplane.. Of the three bell~gerent capitals, 
he found London affected least by the war. Neverthe.less, 
Welles tho~ght it completely. cha~ged. At nights. the city 
was under total blackout. Most of the private. houses had 
been closed, and the atmosphere refl.ected the war mood. 
Welles met in the British capital a. great number of 
people presenti~g different opinions. The Amer.icans had a 
hectic time. Welles went from official luncheon parties to 
dinner parties in his honor, while ·his entour~ge paid visits 
to n~ght clubs "where we drank beer and ate bacon sandwiches 
1welles, Time, 133; Murphy, 36. 
2F.R., 1940, I, 72. 
3The· only dark spot on his days in Paris was the after-
ma th of a visit he paid .to Leon Blum, the premier of the 
front populaire. It is notable that almost three thousand 
letters--most of them in insulting terms--were received by 
the American Embassy condemning Sumner Welles ·for thus 
honoring a Jew by his visit. ·welles, Time, 129f.; Murphy, 
36. . ~-
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with the Duke of Devonshire. 111 In spite of all these 
activities, Welles found occasion already on his second day 
in London to call on his personal tailor in Hanover Street 
to order half a dozen suits. 2 Outside his professional 
duty he also enjoyed meeti~g 'many of his old friends. 
The social events presented Welles with ·a vast variety 
of opinions, as 'they enabled him to meet with a_ great num-
ber of people and listen to their view of Britain's prob-
lems. This would not have been possible if he had had 
merely private interviews as in Berlin. Often, however, 
the talk was non-political, tho~gh ·.characteristic for the 
situation. At a dinner party,_ given by Chamberlain, the 
topic was how much sleep everyone of those present needed, 
and how he got it. 3 
Most important were, of course, the interviews with 
top. government officials.· Prime Minister Neville Chamber-
lain did not fit Welles's picture of him. He. gave the 1 im-
pression of physical stre~gth. "The dominati~g features were 
a pair of large, very dark and pierci~g eyes, and a low and 
incisive voice.I' He had none of the "puzzled hen 11 effect 
1Nancy H. Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers, Selections 
from the diplomatic correspondence of Jay Pierrepont Moffat 
1919-1943 {Cambri~ge, Mass., .1956), 298. 
2Welles, Time, 13lf.; Newswe'ek, XV, 19 40 (Mar. 15) , 2 8. 
3Hooker, Moffat Papers, 302£. 
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which Welles had expected. 1 Chamberlain seems to have been 
favorably impres·sed by his visitor for he ·showed him 
thro~gh 'the 'room where he kept the souvenirs of his ·father. 2
Chamberlain's Fore~gn Secretary, Lord Hali·fax, .looked like 
his phot~graphs. Welles was at once 'impressed with his "in-
nate ·sincerity," his ·determination "to pursue the • r~ght 1 " 
and his "es·seritial .'goodness,'." tho~gh he ·thought that 
"one. can question the ability of his ·intellect. 113 · 
Whe·n Welles· went to see· Winston s. Churchill in the Ad-
miralty, he·· found him "sitti~g in front of the· fire, smoking 
a 24-inch ·c~gar, .and drinki~g a whiskey and soda. It was 
quite ·obvious that he had consumed a. good many whiskeys 
before I arrived. " After the· preiiminary courtesies· 
Churchill commenced an address· which lasted exactly one hour 
and fifty minutes,· and duri~g which Welles· was never. given 
the opportunity to say one wo·rd. 4 Unfortunately for Welles, 
Churchill's speech was mainly a rehash of his just published 
I 
book on recent history which Welles· had already read. 
Welles· met not only those· who were in power, but also 
old timers ·like Lloyd George,· .now 77 but little ·changed, 
"alert, mentally very keen, and minutely familiar with ·every 
detail of both British 'domestic affairs and British ·fore,?-gn 
. l[. R. , 19 4 0 , I , 74 f.
3Ibid. , 73 •· 
2·Ihid. , 91 • 
4Roosevelt Papers, PSF State, Welles '·s report. 
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relations. ,.l He was also visited ·by James Maxton, leader 
of the small group of independents ·in Parliament, 11 a sinis-
ter looki~g individual. with: ·.very loi;ig ha·ir falling 
about his shoulders, _and the eyes and the mouth ·of a 
fanatic. 112 Sumner Welles· met most of the :cabinet members, 
and ne·arly everyone who played s·ome· role ·in Great Britain. 
The only ones· who were denied a· chance .to se·e him were the 
Nationalist members of the Northe·rn ·Ireland Parliament. 
They showed some ind~gnation--tho~gh ·they of course blamed 
the British-.-that We-Iles· ·refuse·d .to discuss with ·them the 
most pres·si~g problem of the·. ·time:· the· union of Northern 
Ireland with Eire.·3 · 
From E~gland Welles· ·flew back to Paris where he met 
Daladier and Reynaud once ·more.· He ·returned to Rome 
shortly before the scheduled meeti~g betwee·n Hitler and 
Mussolini on the ·Brenner, and awaited Ciano' s· ·report on 
the ·proceedings in the Alpine ·railway station. Inunediately 
afterward, on March ·20 ,. he boarded in Genoa an Italian 
liner headed for New .York. 
Thro~ghout his trip he ·remained silent, with ·.the result 
that journalists continued produci~g false ·news and rumors. 
Welles's mission proved to be a zenith ·of journalistic 
·1r. R • , 19 4 0 , I , 8 5 • 
2Roosevelt Papers, _PSF State, Welles '·s report. 
3New·. York· T · · M 14 · 8imes ,· . ar. , . • 
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im~gination and inventiveness·.· Some were, howe.ver, con tent 
with watchi~g for non-political events. connected with the 
mission. French ·reporters used the Occasion to invent a 
"Welles.-cocktail. 11 Chief i~gredient: ice water. Others 
discovered that he traveled with .at .least fourteen:. different 
suits. It was observed that he could beat all previous 
records by maki~g a complete .. ch~ge Of. clothi~g in 5 minutes 
50 seconds • 1 Such 'abilities bro~ght him the_ glory of bei~g 
first runner.-up in the 1940 .race for the bes.t-dres·sed man. 
Only Ki~g Geo~ge VI. surpassed him, _and this because the 
Ki~g was ·~ • • the per.feet example of how .to wear British 
uniforms •·112 
1Newsweek,· _XV, 1940 (Mar. 18) , 22 •. 
2 Ihid., April' 8, 6. 
CHAPTER .IV 
LOST CHANCES 
All of Welles·' s ·conversations ·in Europe were kept 
secret, and only little actually leaked out •. Even states-
men had to speculate about Welles's talks in other. coun-
tries, _and they had to adjust .their policy accordi~gly. 
Misinterpretations of Welles. '·s ·real purpose led to. confu-
sion and had effects which Welles neither expected nor 
wanted. Spectators and diplomats. asked if Welles's 
announced aim was his :real aim or if he had other_ goals. 
Many tried to influence .the American Under Secretary in 
order to further their own des~gns and to reap advant~ges 
from his visit. It was apparent that the situation in 
Europe and America offered many possibilities for a special 
envoy. 
What were Welles's real ambitions, what chances did he 
pass by? For which results. did he strive, and what were 
the actual effects of his mission? Which ·were,,.planned and 
wanted, _and which were consequences which the Under Secre-
tary had neither foreseen nor desired? Welles's journey 
showed that the mission of a si~gle and influential emissary 
has stro~ger effects than a diplomatic move thro~gh r~gular 
channels. A special envoy receives ·far more attention; 
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every action, every word we~ghs heavier and causes ·deeper 
apprehensions and _hopes.· Governments react nervously and 
hastily. What did the. visited nations expect, .and how did 
their expectations affect their policy? Speculation upon 
Welles '·s ·intents had sometimes important practical results. 
Sumner Welles· opened all his ·conversations with a 
stereotyped formula, sayi3?-g that he had come ·solely for the 
purpose of information. The.great number of people whose 
varyi~g opinions Wel~les so~ght s~g-ges·.ts that information was 
indeed one .of the .. thi~gs ·for which he .looked. Some tho~ght 
that Welles really aimed at Hitl:er. and Mussolini for American 
diplomats had not had access to the dictators for several 
years. Welles·. could provide fir.st-hand reports. on the. con-
cepts of the Italian and German heads ·of state." The Presi-
dent himse·lf told Assistant Secretary of State Br.eckinri~ge 
LoJ?,g that the ·visits to Paris and London were ".just window 
dressi~g. 111 But-Roosevelt could not expect that Hitler or 
Mussolini would present Welles· with ·a view.which differed 
essentially from that_ given by. their Fore~gn Ministers to 
the r~gular diplomats.· This and the intensive talks ·in 
London and Paris ·show that. gatheriJ?.g information in Rome and 
Berlin was not Welles's only aim. 
There is an immense variety of opinion about Sumner 
Welles'·s undeclared aims or aim duri~g his mission. 
l 1· L o· 64 Israe ,· ~ ·1ary, • 
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Diplomatic, .military, .Political, and economic purposes are 
mentioned. In the:ir yearly publication the Council on 
Fore~gn Affairs re.ached the conclusion that .Welles.'s mis-
sion was :just a clever way of snubbi~g Stalin .for maki~g 
war on Finland. 1 Herbert Feis ,· :economic advise·r to the 
State Department,: believed that IIMr. Welles's miss·ion 
initially had as a major purpose ·.the: fo~gi~g of the neutral 
bloc. 112 · Feis does not explain why Welles should visit for 
that purpose bell~gerent rather. than neutral. countries.· 
One of the redurri~g themes is :the interpretation of 
the mission as an attempt to delay the imminent German 
of ferisi ve .in the west. 3 The. two· most. concerned nations, 
the French and the Germans,· .tho~ght immediate.ly of this 
possibility, one ·hopefully,: .the other suspiciously. As 
with most other supposed aims it .is. difficult to. establish 
what were Welles's actual intentions. He ·never talked abou.t 
these ideas; but this ·does not mean that he. did not consider 
them and had all of them in mind duri~g his conversations. 
An indication of an attempt to delay the .German offen-
sive m~ght be his ·frequently meri.tioned hope for a peace move 
1u.s. in World Affairs, 12 ;. rather a pompous way of 
showing Stalin one's dislike.: There surely were less illus-
trious and more explicit means to reach .that aim. 
2ta~ger and Gleason, 365fn. 
3President Roosevelt gave .this as the second reason 
for the Welles mission to' Breckinridge Lo~g, .Israel, Long 
Diary, 64. · 
in the near future. He.expressed this expectation ex-
plicitly only in Germany and Italy, :the. countries which · 
would decide about the Offensive.·. However, he did not 
include those· remarks tn the report on his ·conversations.· 
They are presented. OI?-lY in Ge·rman and Italia~ memoranda. l 
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As we do not have ·equivalent Frerich ·:or British sources, we 
cannot know if he said the same thi~gs there. These . 
remarks,· .furthermore,· are· ·reported only by subc,rdinates who 
had a special relationship to Welles:· Hans Heinrich · 
Dieckhof f, .the last Ambas~:ado·r in Washi~gton ,· .and Weizsaec}<er 
who had impressed Welles· with his ·frankness.· Weizsaecker 
was the only Ge·rman who tho~ght that the idea should be 
taken seriously and that ~the. ·western offensive ·should be · 
delayed. 2 
Hitler suspected at once ·.that Welles·. had come ·to put 
him at a disadvant~ge by delayi~g Ge·rman action. He '.fre-
quently mentioned that Welles had crossed the Atlantic with 
that purpose in mind. Mussolini was ·informed about Welles·' s 
intent in Hitler's letter of March· ·.a, for which ·Ribbe·ntrop 
himse·lf played the ·deli very boy. He wrote his ·friend, "I 
1For a discussion of the sources see Bibli~graphical 
Essay. 
2weizsaecker, 276. 
3·DGFP, o, VIII, 663,' 664; Trial of the Major War 
Criminalsbefore the Intern·ational MiITta'ry Tribun~ 
Nuremberg {Nuremberg, 1947-1949). (quoted as IMT), XXVIII, 
409, Jodl Diary; Ulrich ·von Hassell,· The Ha·s·se·11· Diaries, 
1938-1944 (Garden City, 1947), 121. 
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need not assure you, .Duce,. that quite apart ·from this, 
Germany's decisions are.governed exclusively by military 
considerations and therefore cannot be affec.ted in any way 
by influences· of that kind. 111 The ·Fuehrer acted accordi~g-
ly. Ge·rman' s preparations were not in the ·.least affected. 
The diaries ·of Halder, Chief of Staff of the A·rmy, .and 
Alfred Jodl, Hitler's director of operations ·in the H?-gh 
Command of the ·Armed Forces· :(OKW) ,· :reveal no hesitancy about 
pres·si~g forward with ·.the :attack schedule.· The·re :are only 
two instances·. which :could be interpreted as an ,influence 
of the. Welles· miss·ion on Ge·nnany's. planni~g: on March ·1, 
the day Ribbentrop had had his ·inte.rview with Welles, 
Hitler. gave. ·the final order for 11.Wes·e·rueb.~g, ": the ·occupa-
tion of Norway and Denmark, .. and on March ·2-.-Welles·. had been 
at the Chancellery--Jodl noted in his. diary that Hitler 
had spoken "very pointedly"· about the necessity. for ~'great-
est acceleration" in the North.". It is possible that Hitler 
waited with these decisions until he knew what Welles· 
bro~ght; but by that time 'planni~g and weather forecasts 
had reached such a st~ge that ·the final decision for the 
attack had to be made, and the attack i tse·lf soon had to 
follow. The exact date ·for the operii~g ·of operations was 
not set until a few weeks ·later. 
1oGFP, D, VIII, 663.· 
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It does. not see·m likely that these· ·.aecisions have been 
influenced by. Welles's· :j.ourney.. .Welles· ·could hardly have 
hoped so. If Hitler was bent on: conquest,· .he ·wo:uld attack, 
peace ·offer or no peace offer. If he· ·was willi~g to. n~go-
tiate ,· Welles· would have had to: pres·.erit s·ome: :conclusive 
hope ·for succes·s.· He 'did not :and could not. A delay of 
Ge·rman action would have been: use·ful only if th:ro~gh ·it the · 
most opportune moment for an offens'.ive·. ·.could have been by-
pass·ed-.-the ·.time after the· ·spr.i!).g ·rains and sto'rms. · But 
Welles rushed thro~gh ·Europe ·.and arrived hack in the· 'United 
States· be.fore the best .time.· :for .an attack had ev.eri .c·ome.· 
If he had delay in mind, he had to of.fer. Hitler ev.iderice 
that it would be worthwhile ~to ho.ld hack his armies,· .and he 
o~ght to. have ·str.e.tched his missi·on .over· April and May. 
That he· did not do so is an indication that delay was not 
his aim. 
More ·probable ·was the ·.idea that :the Welles mission had 
nothi~g to do with ·Europe,- .th.at it was meant for home. con-
sumption. The American public was :deeply concerned about 
the European war, .and peace ·was the. des·ixe of the·. ·:vast 
majority. A Gallup poll in early 1940 ·.showed "tjlat,: .tho~gh ·a 
majority was opposed to American entanglement in Europe, 55 
per cent believed that now was the ·time for an international 
conference (with ·American participation} to end the war. 1 
1New\ .York Times·, Mar. 10 , .. 19 40 , .. 2 7. 
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Roosevelt was at the ·same ·time bei~g pressed hard by inter-
ventionists and isolationists.· One ·side claimed he· ·meddled 
too much ·in European affairs, _and th tis was dr?t9gi~g the 
United States. ·gradually into an undesired war; the· other 
side claimed he did not do eno~gh; The ·peace ·move,· one may 
a~gue ,·. was meant to quiet both; The :inter.veritionists would 
see ·that the ·President was willi~g to do somet}:li~g about 
the European war, .and theTr opponents could be. ·convinced 
that the Pres·.i:dent did not intend to' make the United States 
a bell~gerent.· The road would be free· ·for a third term. 1 
Isolationists· :remained unconvinced of the ·Pres·ident' s 
good intentions. Within twenty-four hours after the· an-
nouncement Senator Hir·am Johnson declared the 'United States 
should mind its -own busines·s· ·instead of seridi3:1g ·11 a rovi1:1g 
listerii~g post" across: ·the ·Atlantic. "Pres·.iderit Wilson 
tried that, ;too,". he said, "and without much ·success.·" Sen-
ator Bennett C. Clark of Missouri. declared his dislike of 
"rovi~g ambassadors,·". everyone of whom "has ·got us into 
trouble.1' 2 
1one magazine ·writer had even figured out Roosevelt's 
plan. Welles,· he. ·calculated, would return fr·o'm Europe ·1ong 
before .the 'Democratic convention at Chicago. He would pre-· 
sent the Pres·iderit with ·a pe·ace 'plan of i'disarming simpli-
city ,11 the ·President would season it to his -own gusto, and 
of fer it to the country as a feasible ·proposal that nee·ded 
perhaps six months ·cooking for a happy conclusion. After 
pulling off this culinary feat, a third term would be re...: 
garded as mandatory by more ·than half of the electorate. 
Living A'ge, CCCLVI II, March . 19 40 ,·. 4. 
2chic~go· Tribune,· Feb.· 10 ,. 1940 ,.· .2. 
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Interventionists ·saw in the Welles mission a chance to 
further their ambitions f·or peace.. Senator Key Pittman, 
chairman of the 'Senate committee on fore:i-gn relations, went 
a step further than the· Pres·iderit. On March .10 'he broad-
cast an appeal for a th:i.rty. days' armistice .to allow media-
tion. 
Europeans were not unaware of the. domestic aspect of 
the Welles· mission. Ambassador William Bullitt reported 
that Frerich Premier Daladier tho~ght that Welles· •·s journey 
must be meant for the ·American publ.ic. Otherwise·, Daladier 
said, the Pres'i"dent would have to be completely ~gnorant of 
the European situation. Leon Blum believed that the Welles 
mission m:i-ght be a prelude ·to Roosevelt's announcement of a 
third term candidacy. In their se·arch for Welles's purpose 
the Germans. gave Amer.ican domestic politics top priority. 
Hans Thomsen, .German cha!ge d' af fa ires in Washi~gton, ex-
plained as early as February· 8, :when he announced Welles's 
mission to his government, that it would have to be viewed 
in conjunction with President Roosevelt's domestic plans, 
· and his preparation for the Democratic Convention. Ribben-
trop, Mussolini, and Hitler assured each ·other" in their 
.
conversations on March 10 and March 18 that this m~ght be · 
the major reason for Welles·' s en:i-gmatic visit. American 
diplomats in Europe explained it in the same way. Robert 
Murphy, at that time cha!ge d 'affaires in Paris,· wrote: 
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"The truth ·was that Roosevelt • • • probably was· ·usi1:1,g for-
e~gn policy -for domestic policy purposes on this Occasion. 111 
There ·is no direct evidence ·to prove that influencing 
the American electorate was the ·real aim of Welles·•s mis-
sion. There is none ·.to disprove .it either. Indeed, neglects 
and defaults ·in planni~g the: mission and the Tack of clear 
aims with ·r~cjard to the European scene su9gest that a suc-
cess- in fore~·gn policy, _be. it peace ·mediation or some ·other 
achieverrierit, was not planned and unwanted. One ·m~ght think 
that all that was ·intended was a. gesture for the ·American 
public to steer free of any ·critici·srn and open the ·way for 
a third term. 
President Roosevelt was :certainly aware ·of the. demands 
of the domestic scene and minded the wishes· ·of the elector-
ate. It is possible that he ·sent Welles ·to Europe with ·an 
eye to the effect of the trip on the ·American voter. One 
should not, .however, disclaim his sincere desire for peace. 
He ·may have hoped that Welles· would produce ·more ·than an im-
pression on the ·American electorate.'. The "dubious mandate 
for Welles may be rather. a default in planni~g than a 
planned default. 
The bell~gererits cared more about possible effects of 
the Welles· mission on their own position than on the ·American 
1u. s. in· World A'ffa'irs ,· _1940 ,. 11; Toynbee,· Survey,· 455; 
Ickes, -III, -X46; New York Times,: Feb. 15, 19 40 ,. 4; DGFP, D, 
VIII, 398, 603,· 665; Malcolm M~CJgeri~ge, ed.,· Ci·a110·1 s· Dip-
1·omatic Pap·ers (London, 1948), 341£.; Weizsaecker, 276; 
Murphy, 38. 
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electorate. They were afraid that the ·enemy side ·might 
derive ·advantages ·from Welles·•-s visit. Rumors flew .that his 
mission was meant as an inconspicuous means to re-·establish 
normal· relations with ·Ge·rmany and exchange ·ambassadors ?1,gain. 
This hope was shared by the Ge:rman side. In their conver-
sations with ·the ·American Ribberi:trop and Hitler. gave ·special 
emphasis ·to the unsatisfactory state of Ge·rman-American 
relations.· Unfortunately, Welles·. could not be moved to 
any. commitment. Only on leavi~g Berlin did he ·say to 
Dieckhoff, who bade him ·farewell at the :railroad station, 
that he ·hoped to see him soon, .returned to his post in 
Washi~gton. Any and all plans ·for an improvement in mutual 
relations were, .of course,· dashed by the German attack in 
the North. 
Far more important (and probable) was Ge·rmany's ·fe·ar 
and Britain's hope that Welles· ·came :to boost Allied morale, 
and to ina~gurate~ closer cooperation between the Allies and 
the United States.· Some hoped he ·would warn Germany to 
restrict her warfare. This he ·actually did--tho~gh V?l,guely--
by recalli~g the precedent of 1916/1917 in his ·talks with 
G . 1 oer1~g. Another thought was that he c·ame too: head off a
German peace move, .but none ·was in the ·works anyway. Gallup 
polls had, however, indicated that 75 per. cent favored· 
1But that was not eno~gh ·.to impress the Ge·rmans in any 
way. 
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n~gotiations when asked if the Allies should meet with the 
Germans if Hitler. offered peace. 1 American publ.ic opinion 
fil':lght be annoyed if the Allies refused once more ·to talk 
with the Nazis.· The Welles miss·ion could prove that peace 
n~gotiations with ·Germany were not ~desirable. 
Many expected some direct encour~gemerit for the Allies·. 
Tho~gh British ·and Frerich ·newspapers and statesmen empha-
sized the unity within and between their countries,· the 
truth was quite dd:fferent. The Allied peoples we:re badly 
divided. Bullitt and Kennedy reported that the French ·and 
British ·we.re low in spirit :and yearned for an early peace. 
Both Ambassadors were convinced that the chances ·of the 
Allies in the_ forthcomi~g campa~gn were not_ good. 2 Military 
preparations were l~9"gi~g. Bullitt demanded all possible 
American support for the sake Of the. Allies.· He himse·lf 
did what he could to ericour~ge his Frerich ·hosts.· James· 
Farley wrote sarcastically: "Ambassador Bullitt was busy 
holdi~g the hands of. Daladier., _Reynaud, Paul-Boncour, Blum, 
and the rest of it.11 3 
Allies and Axis powers realized that ericour~gemerit for 
Britain and France m~ght be a possible res·u1t of Welles's 
mission. Whereas the ·Axis did not take it too seriously, 
1New York Times,· March 10 ,. 19 40, 2 7 •· 
2La~ger and Gleason, 345. 
3Farley, 194. 
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the ·Allies·. ·tried to make ·the best of it. 1 Obvious ·is the 
frequency of the ·term "inquiry" in Allied spee·ches and 
papers,· .es·pecially in the· London· T'itrtes·.: Apparently the · 
Allies· wanted Welles ·to show :the world how evil their op-
ponents and how much better they were. It seemed clear what 
the .result would be. Shortly after the announcement the 
London· Times noted: "The Allies· we.lcome the ·proposed in-
quiry. They ·are ·f~ghti~g ?lgainst the. ·.evils which ·the ·Ameri-
can people. equally abhor." 2 If the Americans finally 
came to realize that Germany was a c·ommon enemy, if they 
could be. made .to recc:,gnize ·what .the·ir responsibilities were 
in this war, the ·res·u1 ts ·of Welles· '·s mission would be bene-
ficial for the Allies.· Even more .important than the· ex-
pected increase· in material support would be ·the immediate 
spiritual effect. The· ·allied peoples· would be· assured that 
they had a b~g brother over the ·.ocean-.-the. difference in 
allied morale ·in early and late· ·.1917 ·showed the ·effects of 
such knowledge. Welles· would only have ·to brand the ·Third 
Re:ich as ·?t<1gres sor and common erieniy unwilli~g to come to a 
reasonable ·.compromise. Chambe·rlain wrote the ·President after 
he was ·consulted about the mission: "We have hitherto felt 
the best method of handli~g this ·diff.iculty is ·to state the 
conditions which ••• are • • • are such ·as Hitler would find it 
1villari, 249; Weizsaecker, .2 76. 
2London· Times·, Feb.· 12 ,. 19 40 , .. 6. 
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impossible to accept. I infer. that this is not ·far from 
the President's tho~ght •. 111 The Prime Minister apparently 
hoped to increase British ·preSt~ge thr.o~gh American diplom-
acy. But the Pres·ident did not want to repeat the errors of 
the First Wor.ld War. He had said "no Colonel House busi-
ness, II and Welles kept to it.. Nobody was condemned publicly, 
no promises were made, no statement issued to boost allied 
morale. Such .unneutral acts would not have been wise. 
After the House mission, American prest~ge as an honest 
and impartial broker m~ght have be·en. completely lost. 
Hitler tried to forestall a prop~ganda effect in favor 
of the Allies by his frequent attempts to prove that the 
Allies were the true warmo~gers; the German White Book on 
the outbreak of the war, published at the time of the 
Welles mission, and Hitler's. dir.ecti.ve for the talks with 
the American are explicit examples of these endeavors. The 
Germans were afraid that Welles might aid the allied cause 
in some other ways, too. Dr. Hans Thomsen, the German Minis-
ter in Washi~gton, had prepared a rather complete· rundown 
for his Fore~gn Office of possible results of the Welles 
mission. One of his points was:· "This informatory trip 
suits the purposes of the British ·Government very well in 
order to convince Roosevelt how essential energetic aid by 
the United States is •••• On that account it is an open 
1 [.R., 1940, I, 2. 
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question whether the ·or~ginal idea for this trip or~ginated 
"th 1· • d E 1· h .. . . . ·111 wi Rooseve t or is · ue to 3:1g is .1n1 tiative. The 
British needed American support but their im~ge in the· 
United States. ·could well use· :some ·refurbishi~g. A.3:1glo-
American relations had reached their lowest point in early 
1940. 
Duri~g the 'first few weeks of the war violations of 
neutral r~ghts had not aroused much opposition in the United 
States. The public was outr~ged ~gainst Germany; British · 
measures were believed to be. ·only temporary, .and did not 
cause serious harm to Amer.ica. But as the. ·war dr?t9ged on, 
as victory seemed farther than ever, .the British ·t~ghteried 
their control of the seas,· .and Americans increasi~gly b~gan 
to feel the consequences of the war. .Quarrels and contro-
versies reached a climax over British mail inspections. In 
early 1940 .an American transatlantic plane was held up during 
its refueli3:1g stop in the Bermudas. The European mails were 
taken off and censored. Duri~g the· first week of February 
even stoutly pro-allied papers publishe·d outr~ged reports 
accusi~g the British ·of havi~g taken letters off American 
planes on the Bermudas at bayonet point. The ysame week the 
pro-British Senator Key Pittman demanded economic retaliation 
~gainst Britain for her violation of American r~ghts. The 
~gricultural lobby of the southern and midwestern states. grew 
1DGFP , D , VI I I , 6 0 3 •· 
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increasi~gly annoyed with 'British restrictions on imports 
of ~gricultural_ goods,· particularly tobacco. After havi~g 
already been. cut out of the ·central European market by the 
British blockade, .. they were hit hard by British import 
limitations. Refusi!lg to understand that Britain had to 
use her scarce ·dollar funds :to. buy guns :instead of c~gars, 
they pres·sed the State Department for action. 1 
At the· Same time ·American confidence ·in an allied vic-
tory declined. While Welles·. was :still in Europe, _betti~g 
in New York was 60 ·.to· 40 ·on a Ge·rman success. Ambassador 
Kennedy had the .. ·same opinion. He told everybody "that 
Germany would win, that e.ver.ythi~g in France ·and E~gland 
would_ go to hell, and that his one ·.interes·t was ·in savi!lg 
his money for his children.Jl2 Opinion in the State. Depart-
ment was divided, .but many officials anticipated .a German 
victory. "Berle [Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. 
Berle] has probably_ got definitely in his mind that Germany 
is. goi~g to win this war, 11 his colle~gue Breckinri~ge Lo~g 
noted in his diary; and he himse·lf thought "that we do have 
to take into consideration the .possibility of a German 
3·victory." Tho~gh ·most realized that a Ge·rman·· victory would 
1Langer and Gleason, 3555; Toynbee, Survey,· 450; New 
York Times, Feb. 19,· 8. 
2 Ickes ,· Secret Diaries, III, 14 7. 
3IsraeI,· Long Diary,· 7lf. 
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bri~g d~gers,· .few were willi~g to run risks. to avoid a 
German success. The situation did not :seem perilous eno~gh 
for the interests. of the United States. When Bullitt :re-
turned to Washi~gton in early 1940, he remarked, ."This 
country is ·still in the mood of E~gland before Munich."" 1 
The Allies had frequently complained about the atti-
tude of the American public. Welles's mission aroused new 
interest in European affairs. Great Britain and France 
realized their chance,- .and used the :situation to remind 
Americans of their moral obl~gations. As early as Febru-
ary 19, the London· Times remarked that the American people 
did not se·e the ·extent of their responsibilities.· The 
Times expressed the hope that Welles. would realize those 
duties,·._and enl~ghteri his fellow .countrymen. 2 Of course, 
he -did not. He said nothi~g .at all. Nor does his -report 
for the President and the ·secretary of State. indicate in any 
way that he advocated an increase in aid to the Allies. An 
improvement in British...;Amer.ican relations was apparently not 
on his mind duri~g his European journey. His mission as 
such was aqmittedly a boon to the British cause as it 
directed American eyes ~gain to. the European war, and the 
problem of war aims. Hardly anybody had sympathies for 
Germany's desire for conquest. Thus the mission offered an 
1Alsop, White Paper,· 87. 
2London·· Times, Feb. 12 ,· 6. 
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opportunity to point out :the. ·.common interest of the United 
States and the Allies·.. Yet this :renewed interest in Euro-
pean affairs m~ght have be·en only temporary, ·_and could 
evaporate· rather quickly. The :Ge·nnan :attack in the North · 
two weeks ·after Welles'·s return did much more .to r·emind 
Americans ·of the :stakes· ·in Europe.· It se'enis ·safe .to assume 
that Welles· was not sent :to Europe ·to increase: ·sympathies· 
for the 'Allies·,· and that :the. ef.fect of his· miss·ion in that 
r~gard was no more ·.than minimal. 1 
1There ·is one ·instance where Welles· ·gave his opinion 
on the outcome of the war. Ciano reports it: Before ·1eaving 
Italy Welles met a relative ·of his,: _Blasco d'Aieta, whom he· 
told that Ge·rmany would be exhausted within a year, even if 
no of ferisive .·would be. ·under.take·n. "He·. ·considers ·the war 
already won by the Frerich and the English; The United 
States ·is ·there with ·.all the weight· of her. powe·r, .to guaran-
tee .this victory. II (Hugh Gibs'on' ed. , . The: Ci'ano· Di'a:ri'es 
19'39:-19,43,· New York, 1946, 223). As d'Aieta was not con-
cerned with formulating Italian foreign policy, and as there 
is no direct testimony, while neither circumstances· nor 
possible motives· of Welles, \d • Aieta, .or those ·through ·whom 
the story was related to Ciano, :are known, .the ·.author feels 
.justified in not attributing a high ·ae·gree of importance to 
this statement. · · · 
CHAPTER V 
ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 
Possible des~gns by Welles to stre~gthen the Allies 
did not bother the Germans as much as a potential attempt 
to weaken their own alliance with Italy. Apprehensions 
about a break-up of the Axis as a consequence of Welles's 
visit attributed to a reconsideration of German fore~gn 
policy. The Germans were aware that Welles's. greatest 
chance m~ght be to cha~ge Italian policy. 1 Welles himself 
realized in retrospect: "Only in Italy was it remotely 
conceivable that the policy of this. government m~ght have 
some concrete effect. If by some means the United States 
could prevent Italy from actually taki~g part.in the war 
the outcome of the war m~ght be less certain than 
it seemed. American influence in Italy might have we~ght. 112 
Italy was the center of attention in early 1940. Both 
sides as .well as the neutrals saw Rome as possessing crucial 
1several historians still hold that Welles's real pur-
pose for this mission was to keep Italy from entering the 
war. E. Wiskemann writes (p. 139) : · "More precisely his 
journey was intended to counteract Germany's pressure upon 
Italy to join into the war." Or Angermann (p. 192) "offici-
ally to gather information, mainly.however to keep Italy 
from entering the war." Also, Pratt, Hull, I, 345; Newsweek, 
XV , 19 40 (Feb • 19 ) , 16 • 2 •. )
2welles, Time,. 76£. 
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we~ght in the war. Tho~gh .formally allied with Germany, 
Italy had not joined Germany when war broke Out, and even 
continued to supply the Allies with .essential war materials. 
Memories of 1914 and 1915, when Italy had been one of the 
Central Powers but ended up on the .side Of the Entente, were 
still fresh. Italy's neutrality was vital for the Allies. 
France could concentrate her troops at the German border, 
and, more important, British .supplies would not be enda~gered 
between Suez and Gibraltar, but the .stro~g Italian navy 
could become a menace for British :sea-power in the Medi ter-
ranean. Italy was equally important .to the Axis as a 
threat to France and the Mediterranean route •. It was also 
a source of material supplies and moral support •. If the 
Allies could break~up the Axis they would have ·won a major 
victory before the military battle .started. 
Duri~g recent years Italy had proved valuable in two 
other respects which m~ght attract an American envoy. 
Italian leaders often received information about the plans 
of their ally which they passed willi~gly alo~g to those 
concerned. The.west was uncertain about German des~gns 
and military preparations, and Italy was the-place to find 
out what the Germans were .scheming. 
If Welles had peace in mind, Italy was again the place 
to start a peace campa~gn. Mussolini was supposed to be the 
only fore~gn statesman who had influence on Hitler. He was 
credited with saving the peace in 1938 when upon his 
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s~ggestion Hitler. called the Munich conference. Further-
more, Italy seemed to be the. only major European power with 
a genuine interest in peace •. 
As all sides were well aware of Italy's importance at 
this point of the str~ggle,· a competition for her favor 
developed which ·reached its climax duri~g the Welles mis-
sion. While the American travel.ed thr.o~gh Europe,· Mussolini 
decided Italy's future.·. Welles's first visit to Rome was 
followed by hectic diplomatic activity, especially by the 
Germans.· The American had hardly left the Italian capital 
when German Fore~gn Minister. von Ribbentrop announced a 
I 
surprise visit with only a few days notice. Not even a 
week after the German had cleared out of town, Welles 
returned for another round of talks.· He had not been the·re 
a day when Hitler decided to surrunon Mussolini to .an immedi-
ate meeti~g. Welles· was one of the few who knew. what was 
goi3:1-g on when Mussolini sneaked thr.o~gh a side entrance 
into the railway station and into his special train to meet 
Hitler secretly in the Brenner pass. A few hours later he 
was informed by Ciano of the proceedi3:1-gs just before he left 
for Washi3:1-gton. The series of conferences bet:ween the leader-
ship of the Axis and Sumner Welles duri3:1-g a few days time 
was h~ghly dramatic, and led most observers to believe that 
a matter of irrunense· urgency and importance was discussed. 
It offered, indeed, a. great opportunity for the American 
envoy, for relations between the Axis partners had reached 
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their nadir in early 1940. In December 1939, Fore~gn 
Minister Ciano had accused Germany of havi~g broken the 
pact of steel, since Hitler had not. consulted the Italians 
before the· attack on Poland. In early 1940, Hitler re...; 
ceived a letter by Mussolini. Il Duce advised peace, for 
Germany would be unable .to win a war. His friend's words 
made Hitler burst out in r~ge.. He ref.used to answer. At 
first the Italians were not much bother.ed. Later in Janu-
ary they allowed therriselves the luxury of. careles·s·ly 
transmitti~g a warni3:1g of an imminent German invasion to 
Be~gium. The ·mes·sage was promptly intercepted by Germany. 
As time sped on and the Germans remained cool, Mussolini 
grew worried about his ·relations with Hitl·er, especially 
since the western powers were becomi~g increasi~gly hostile 
to Italy. Furthermore, he :seems to have been afraid of a 
German attack on Italy in. case Hitler m~ght have doubts 
about the attitude ·of his southern ne~ghbor. Berlin re-
mained quiet. Mussolini was kept uninformed and_ grew more 
1 nervous. He "ba~gered the Ambassador and Military Attache 
in Berlin to find out somethi~g of. the ·Ge·rman plans. 
1schrriid t, 4 7 4 f. ; Has sell, _10 7; Weizs.aecker, _2 7 3f. ; 
Toynbee, Survey, 232; John L. Snell, Il'lus·ion· and Nece·ssity; 
the diplomacy of global war 19:39·-19"45 (Boston, 1963)', 57. 
Mussolini's letter is printed in DDI, IX, 3, 3 3 ,· in the 
original Italian and in DGFP, D, _VIII, 50 4, .in English. 
Its exact date has not beeilas yet established •. 
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[He] was extremely annoyed at bei~g kept in the dark. 111 On 
February 24, the Italians ·thought it wise to inform Germany 
that Italian non-belligerence did not affect the "intimate 
friendship" of the two countries.· On February 26, Ciano 
sent an irritable letter. to. the .Italian Embassy in Berlin 
aski~g why Hitler did not answer Mussolini's letter. When 
Welles· arrived in Europe both Axis partners seemed ready 
for reconciliation. The· best chance to spl:it the Axis 
would have been a month earlier; but that was not known by 
anybody except the Axis ·leaders. Still, the problems in 
their relationship remained. The possibility for a disin-
t~gration of the 'Axis had be.come ·apparent in January or 
early February, .when it was decided that Welles should 
2travel to.Europe. 
If Welles came to tear the ·Axis apart, he should have 
informed the British of his plans. He had just arrived in 
Berlin when Great Britain announced that Italy would. be put 
under a coal blockade. On February. 7, Mussolini had stopped 
all sales ·of war materials to Great Britain, a~guillg that 
3· Italy needed them herse·lf. On March 1, the British announced 
that in retaliation all shipments of German co'al to Italy by 
1Pietro Badoglio, Italy in ·the· Second World War {New 
York, 1948), 13.· 
2onI, IX, 3 ,· 392; Toynbee,· Survey, 229; Kordt, Wahn, 
239; Villari, 248; Badoglio, 13;' Wiskeniann, 193..;195; Ciano, 
Dia·ries, 215; Ciano, Di'p'lomatic· p·apers, 336. 
3ciano, Diaries, 205. 
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sea would be cut off. For anybody who wanted to keep Italy 
neutral this was an unwise· measure. Mussolini was reminded 
painfully that he was a "prisoner of the Mediterranean," 
as he put it in his ·conversation with Welles. He concluded 
his only chance to break out of this prison was ·a German 
victory. Ciano noted in his diaries:· "The measures ·taken 
on the .. coal question are the sort that will serve to push 
Italy into the ·arms ·of Germany, II and a week later--on the 
eve of Ribbentrop• s. visit to Rome_.-Ciano relates ·that Mus-
solini felt humiliated by. the. coal blockade. "In the ·1ast 
few days his hostile .attitudes toward the Allies has become 
more pronounced. The tho~ght of war dominates him. 111 Even 
pro-allied Italian circles,· such ·as ·the royal court, were 
disappointed about Britain's attitude. 2 
The ·Germans,· already ~gitated by Welles's visit to 
Rome, saw their chance. Immediately, several specialists 
boarded a train to Rome to discuss overland transportation 
of the needed coal. All available ·trucks and railway 
facilities were mobilized in a_ grand display of German 
friendship. The Ge·rmans '· unselfish ·concern for Italian 
welfare made them even offer to put the German press at the 
Italians' disposal for attacks ·on Great ·Britain. Ciano saw 
1ciano, Diaries, 214, 218. 
2Shirer,· Third Reich, 687;, Kordt,· Wahri, 239; Ciano, 
Diaries, 216; Toynbee, Su:rvey, 2 31; Hooker, Moffat Papers, 
304. 
thro~gh the· ·German des~gn: "The. game of Berlin is clear. 
The Germans :are tryi~g at any cost to embitter relations 
between us :and London.111 However, .Mussolini and the· 
Italian public opinion were impressed. 
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Welles was probably familiar with the circumstances, 
since the Department of State. had treated Italy in recent 
years with special care, and had sent some of its bes·t 
diplomats to Rome. The present Ambassador; William Phil-
lips, .had been Under Secretary of State.. His predecessor, 
Breckinri~ge Lo~g, had become Assistant Secretary of State 
upon his re.turn to Washi~gton. Mussolini had been the· 
addressee of several personal mess~ges by President Roose-
velt. One m~ght :assume that Wel.les attributed special im-
portance to his visit to Rome, .and to the problem of Italian 
neutrality.. 
The conversations duri~g his first trip to Rome warrant 
little to support that opinion. Tho~gh he spoke about 
American pleasure with the Italian policy of neutrality, 
Welles did not stick to this point and did not take ·it up 
later. In his interview with Mussolini he handed the Duce 
a personal letter from the President, a missive r~gardi~g 
which much has been made. Welles himse·If wrote later: "The 
letter to Mussolini was of outstandi~g importance.. In it 
the President,. emphasi:zi~g the satisfaction which the United 
l . .• . . 215 Ciano,· Diaries,· . . 
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States. ·government would derive from a continuation of 
Italian neutrality, had expressed his very emphatic desire 
to meet personally with the.chief of the Italian. govern-
ment. 111 The President, Welles. explained, believed he could 
convince Mussolini in such a meeti~g to stay out of the war. 
This view was adopted by most other writers. Actually, the 
text of the· letter does not .justify the attachment of. great 
importance to it. The· relevant pass~ges ·in the few lines 
Roosevelt wrote are: "At this. grave moment I deeply hope 
that this ·excha~ge of views betwe.en us may be of real value· 
to Italy~ to the United States, and to the future of the 
world. 
"I still hope to meet you some day soon. 112 It is dif;.. 
ficul t to find a "very emphatic desire II in that. 3 In any 
case, Mussolini did not hear anythi~g more about.this pro-
posal after Welles had left. 
The President's letter had one effect which might have 
been useful. Mussolini apparently was flattered by the idea 
1welles, Time, · 85. 
2F.R., 1940, I, 29fn. Conversation itse·lf in: F.R., 
1940, I,-29; DDI, IX, 3, 395. 
3The proposed meeting was not necessa~ily meant as an 
attempt to convince Mussolini of the advisability of remain-
ing neutral. The course of the talks ·seems rather to indi-
cate that Welles and the President had a common action for 
peace of all neutrals in mind. In his first conversation 
with Ciano Welles asked the Foreign Minister directly what 
he thought of the present chances of the Italian proposal 
of August 31, 1939, when Mussolini had suggested a general 
conference to keep peace. r.R., 1940, I,· 23. . 
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that the President of the United States. desired to see him. 
When Ciano translated this pass~ge he b~gan to smile openly, 
and seemed very pleased, and approved the idea. 1 Nonethe-
less, _the importance :attached to this ·letter is justified 
neither by. its contents nor ·by the. action which followed 
it. 2 One writer noted about Welles's success in Rome: "The 
upshot of Sumner Welles's ·inte.r.views with Ciano and Musso-
lini on 28 February was that Mussolini nibbled a little at 
Welles'·s s~~gestion for a conunercial treaty,.n 3 and that was 
all. 
The German. government had watched Welles·' s. visit to 
Rome with apprehensions about the future stability of their 
alliance.. They were afraid les·t Italy should associate 
itse·lf too close·ly with ·.the. United States. On- February 19, 
General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, 
noted in his diary after a conversation with Weizsaecker: 
"Italy: Uncertain. They would really prefer doi~g business 
with us, but they remain willi~g to. do business with the 
other side, too." 4 The party. also worried about their 
1 [.R., 1940, I, 29. 
2Ibid., 115; Villari, 249;. Phillips,· 261; Charles· Callan 
Tansil!, Ba'Ckdoor to_ War;- the· Ro·osevelt Forefgn· Policy 1933-
1941 (Chic~go, 1952f; 576. 
3·Toynbee,· Survey , 2 3 3 f.
4Arnold Lissance, ed., _Franz ·Halder, Dia:ry, MS, III,· 85. 
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fascist partner. The ·party 1'ideol~gist," Al·fred Rosenbe~g, 
eX:pres·sed in his 'diary anxiety about Welles·•·s sojourn in 
Rome and the· ·solidarity of the· :fascist moveirien·ts •1 The 
Fore~gn Office ·was afraid Welles: would stre~gtheri anti-
Ge·rman. circles· ·in :Italy in cooperation with ·the ·Holy See. 
Italy and Ge·rmany would be split,: :and Italy· might slip 
gradually ·from neutrality: to the si:de ·of the· 'Allies·. 2 
Hitl·er wanted to restrict Italian liberty of action as ·far 
as possible, .and tried to get the Axis hack on a common 
line.· The Fore~gn Office ·warned the 'Italians that Welles 
m~ght ·try to break Italy away ·from Ge·rmany by. the rtdecoy" 
of neutral cooperation. Italy and Ge·rmany, the ·Italians were 
u~ged, must ke·ep in touch .{i contatti· ·fra Italia e ·Germani 
sone necessari} • 3 · 
Germany did her bes·t .to retain these: ·close: ·con tacts. ·4 
The Italians· received special information about Welles· 1 ·s 
treatment in Ge·rmany. S It was even· reported that Hitler and 
1Hans Guenther Seraphim, _ed.,· Das: Po·Liti'.s·che: T·agebuch 
A'lfred Ro·s·enbe·rg·•s (Berlin, .1956), diary entry of 3.III.1940. 
2Kordt,· Wahn, .239'f.; Shirer,' .Thi:rd Rei··ch,'· 683. 
",I''.3 . 
DDI, IX, 3,·386. 
4The American charge 'd'affaires· thought the sudden 
change in the ·German attitude toward Italy so important and 
obvious that he reported it to Washi~gton. r.R.·, 1940, I, 
. 8. 
5noI, IX, .3,· 477. 
Mussolini di·scussed the. comi~g of Welles·''S ·trip over the 
telephone ; 1 On -February 2 3 ,· _Er.ich ·Kordt, a h~gh ·official 
in the Wilhelms·trass-e·,' showed up at the '.Italian Embassy, 
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and asked for an ·inte.rview.. He· ·.reminded the ·.Italians that 
Italy and Germany we.re ·two powe:rs .devoted to the same ·aim, 
which ·should be ·rerriembe·red in the. important upc·omi~g events. 
Rome and Berlin, he :said, _must :reach ·~gree·merit about a c·om-
mon la~gu~ge with which ·to' mee·t ·the ·American envoy. And 
theri the Ge·rman came to the ·.point: IIIt is impossible to 
conquer without combat. 112 There could be ·no succes·s·es ·for 
Italy without a Ge.·rman victory.· Ge·rmany furthermore dis-
played a sudden courtesy: :toward .Italy which ·must have 
pleased Mussolini. The. ·embassy in Rome was· upgraded, two 
new ministers plenipotentiary were ·appointed, one by. the 
name of Otto. von Bisma·rck ,. the'._ :grandson of the Chancell·or. 
The Ge·nnan pres·s· was suddenly full "Of praise ·for Italy--and 
full of little hints that her. place was at Ge·tmany's side. 3 ·
To all· appearances·, Italy was once ~gain the· most es:teemed 
ally. 4 
Des·pite these efforts the ·additional courtesy "Of the 
visit of the ·German Fore~gn Minister was not welcomed. In 
1New York Times,: Feb •. 13 ,· _17. 
2DDI·, _IX,' 3 ,· 3 86. Simoni, .. 86;_ 88. 
3' .
Cf.· Voelkischer Beobachte·r, _Feb. 21., _3;' Mar-. 11, 1; 
Mar. 13,· 1.
4simoni, _90, _98;' DGFP,, D, VIII, 655fn; New, Yo.rk Times,· 
Mar. 13 ,· 4. 
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contrast to Welles's visit, nobody--except possibly 
Mussolini--looked forward to see,i~g the. German. The 
Federale encountered some difficulty. when he ·tried to 
gather the obl~gatory erithusiasti.c crowd for Ribbentrop's 
salutation, _and that one proved rese·.rved. 1 Ciano himse·If 
tried to persuade .the Duce to stop Ribbentrop from comi~g, 
b t . . 2 u in. vain. 
Ribbentrop made ·.it very. clear that Germany would con-
sider no solution other than a military. victory. The offen-
sive was 'imminent; France :would be. conquered in three ·or 
four months·... Italy's place ·was ·inevitably at the· ·.side of 
Germany. Ribbentrop bro~ght with him the lo~g awaited 
letter from Hitler--more than ·ten times as lo~g and cordial 
as Roosevelt' s--in which Hitl:er . .ver.y shrewdly played on 
Mussolini's des·ire ·for conquest and on his. ·combative .zeal. 
At the same time Ribbe·ntrop pres.eri.ted the .. Italians a 
beautifully bound copy of the .German White Book on the out-
break of the war, and he. talked much ·.about the 11 sinister 
role of the American Ambassadors Bullitt,: Kennedy, and 
Drexel Biddle II who had advised Poland to oppose .Ge·rman plans. 
Since Amer,ican counsel had had ill effects fof Poland these 
remarks are an implicit warni~g ~gain.st trusting the American 
envoy. Ribbentrop told the Italians that the White Book 
1ciano,· o·iaries,· 218. 
2Ibid., 217. 
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contained proof of the ."monstrous war_ .guilt of the United 
States.·" In reality Americans possessed 11 a boundless· will 
to destroy" the authoritarian r~gimes.· Italy should not be 
fooled; her destiny lay with .Germany. 1 Ribbentrop supported 
his a~gumerit with ·a portrayal of the inunense number of 
German divisions at :the western border, and spiced it with 
dreams of victory and conquest. 
The .Ge·rman Fore~gn Minister. had no doubt about the out-
come of the western campa~gn. Italy would have. :to make her 
decision soon. Mussolini was at first restrained but the 
prospect of military_ glory. caused a swift ch~ge of mind. 
In his second conversation with.Ribb.eritrop, Mussolini 
showed readiness to join Italian with German a·rms. Ribben-
trop was surprised at his success, since he had expected 
only a_ general ple~ge ·of Axis ·solidarity .• 2 Ciano remained 
opposed and had been so ostentatiously reserved thro~ghout 
. 
Ribbentrop's visit that the German Fore~gn Minister felt 
compelled to complain to his Fuehrer ab.out Ciano' s. cool 
attitude •. 3 
Ciano's doubts had some influence on Mussolini, and 
his enthusiasm cooled off after Ribbentrop had left. But 
1 DGFP, D, VIII, 665. 
2F.R., 1940, I, 102; Hooker,· Mo·ffat Papers, 304; 
Ciano,-Diaries, 218f.; Wiskerriann, 196; Schmidt,· 477; Kordt, 
Wahn, .240; Toynbee, Survey, 236. 
3DGFP, D, VIII, 667; F.~., 1940, I, 97; Phillips, 256. 
the basic problem remained: Italy was a prisoner of the 
Mediterranean, and Mussolini, :confirmed in his belief in 
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the m~ght of German arms,• considered a German victory more 
than ever the ·only solution to Italy's dilerrima. 1 Ribberitrop 
and Hitler were content with ·.the. talks,· thO~gh Hitler tho~ght 
it necessary to deepen the new .. under.standi~g · a few .days 
later by his meeti~g with Mussolini. Hitler's military 
intimate, General Alfred Jodl, noted with ·relief in his 
diary: "Duce· bleibt bei der Stan·ge.1'2 Ribbentrop's visit 
had reinforced the Axis. 3 
By the. ·.time Welles :returned to Italy, the·. ·coal blockade 
had been ·o~ganized, the Axis had bee·n: reinforced, .and peace 
talks were. goi~g on between Russia and Finland. This ·com-
plicated situation became h:Lghly. dramatic while he was ·in 
Rome. Welles· had hardly been teri minutes· ·in the Palazzo 
Ch~gi, .whe.re Ciano resided, when reporters ·saw Hans Georg 
von Mackenseri, .the German Ambassador, ,arrive. The German 
left the Palazzo after a few minutes,· and took off to Ber-
lin, leavi~g behind him a tidal wave of rumors. Actually 
his visit had served the preparation of the Brenner rneeti~g. 
At this -second meeti~g betwee·n Welles and the Italians 
the problem of neutrality was not touched upon. Ciano 
1ciano, Diaries,· 219f. 
2Jodl Diary, IMT, XXVIII, 412; 
3ciano, Diaries, 219. 
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again spent much time inve;Lghi~g ~gainst Ribbentrop. He 
instructed the American about the. conversations with the 
German Fore;Lgn Minister, and wh.at he had learned about the 
Ge.rrnan plans.· He ·asked him to wait for further info'rmation 
until the Brenner mee·ti~g w~s ·over .• 1 A peace move remained 
the topic of the·. day, since apparently the. concern about 
neutrality had faded away. All Welles·. did to r.evi ve .the 
idea was to repeat the ·s~ggestion of a Roosevelt-Mussolini 
meeti~g. 
The Bren·ner. meeti~g did not .justify. the. h~gh hopes 
for peace :it had aroused, nor was the Welles·. mission one of 
the ·major points of discussion.· Hitl.er explained the German 
view of the. situation, .boasted abo.ut Ge·rman stre~gth,·. and 
made clear that he. tho~ght a Ge·rman. victory the ·only possi-
bility for a settlement. Mussolini realized that Hitler was 
determined to attack." He ·made an attempt .to have ·the 
decision delayed three or four months in order to give Italy 
time ·to prepare. Hitler answe.red evasively. Italy, he 
said, should join at the ·most opportune moment. This time 
he frequently praised Mussolini's ·decision of September, 
1939, when he had remained neutral. 2 Apparent:ly Hitler. was 
1New York Times, Mar. 17, .1, 36; Hooker, Mof:f:at Papers, 
30 3; Phillips,· 2 6 3; Israel,· Long Diary, 6 9; London Times , 
Mar. 18, · 8. 
2Mussolini had explained his attitude with the unpre-
paredness of the Italian forces. Apparently he wanted to 
wait to see how the war would develop. 
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not so much ·interested in havi~g Italy join German military 
efforts.1 as ·in keepi~g her from formi~g close·r ties with 
the Allies.· In this he succeeded. To the surprise and 
dismay of his advisers,· Mussolini expressed in stro~g words 
his decision to join Hitler at an opportune moment. Though 
this still left him a way out in case Germany should not do 
as well as he. expected--Ciano relates· how Mussolini had 
confided to him that this was the: reason why he insisted on 
determini~g the time of Italy's entry into the war himself--
the Axis-alliance had never been as :stro~g as after the 
meeti~g on the Breriner. 2 
After. his return from the Alps,· .Ciano informed Welles 
about the meeti~g. He ·.told him that .it dealt mostly with 
Axis affairs.· He ·put him at ease about .a possible German 
attack. After the· ·incident of the inte.rcepted.warni~g to 
Belgium, _Hitler showed more ·caution in displayi~g his plans 
to the Italians. He had left them with the impression that 
the offensive would not be launched duri~g the next few 
'k 3 wee s.· 
It is difficult to establish how far Welles·' s mission 
influenced German policy. Obviously Ge·rmany was not sure of 
1some of his military advisers had recognized the 
southern ally m~ght turn out to be a burden·. 
2ciano, Diaries, 222. 
3'· Ibid. , 224; Phillips, 203. 
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her southern partner; and equally obviously she had to do 
somethi~g about the relationship before the spri~g offen-
sive b~gan. One cannot say whe:ther Welles 's visit prompted 
Ribbentrop's and Hitler's travels south.. They m~ght have 
come if Welles·. had never. set foot on Italian soil. The 
talks reveal little about the direct causes ·for their visits. 
The Germans tried to make sure .that .Italy would stand by her 
ally,· .and do nothing detrimental to German· interes·.ts •· 
Welles is mentioned only glanci~gly. It could, however, 
hardly be ·expected that Ribbentrop or Hitler openly would 
display German anxieties about American influence in Italy. 
One ·cannot establish ·.to what d~gree German anxiety over 
Italy was increased by Welles· •·s. visit, .but doubtless it made 
t . . . 1 a s ro~g impress·ion. It :at least reminded the Germans that 
Italian support could not be . .taken for. granted. 
If Welles had wanted to loosen the Axis ·ties, .his 
mission was an utter failure. While he was in Europe the 
relations between the two. definitely improved. 2 The ·press 
in both countries ·~gain b~gan to praise ·.the partnership. 
Hitler was content with ·this development. To his. generals 
he "emphatically reiterate[d] .his ·confidence ·;in Mussolini. 113 
1DGFP, D, IX, 1; . Ciano, ni·aries ,· 223f.; Hassell, 124; 
Schmidt, :479; of special value for this-question is Michele 
Lanza's diary._ The Italian diplomat in Berlin was naturally 
a diligent observer of the German attitude and their 
· anxieties ·over Italy. Simoni, 10 3f. 
2Toynbee, Survet, 239. 3Halder, Diaries, III, 132. 
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Welles did gain, .however,· .an excellent impression of the 
Italian attitude ·toward Germany. Ciano was very ·frank, and 
Welles ·left Rome well informed about the ·personal relation-
ship among the· .Italian leaders,- and the relationship between 
them and the ·Germans.· Mussolini, .of whom Ciano said "when 
the Duce is with 'the Ge·rmans ,· .he hedomes. excited, nl was ap-
parently stro~gly pro-Ge·rman,· and .turned irrational when he 
was under Hitler.' s ·influence;: Ciano showed. ·great disl·ike of 
Germany, .and wanted to keep Italy out of the ·war. "A German 
victory would be the·. ·.greates·t disaster for our country," he 
noted in his diary. 2 But he ·was: ·conten·t to obey the Duce 
and to follow orders.· The Duce's mood had chaJ1.ged rapidly 
duri~g Welles· •·s stay in Europe. When We·lles· first met him, 
he was sufferi~g under some ~strain; btit the. American found 
Mussolini· in.· good '·humor on his ·re.turn, .and_ growip.g more pro-
German every day. Tho~gh Ciano told Welles·. ·that ."notwith...: 
standi~g this fact, Mussolini would never. enda~ger the 
position of Italy," 3 Welles :realized that Italy would move 
as Mussolini alone determined, .and he had been impres·sed by 
German m~ght and British ·res·:trictions. 4 When an opportune 
moment arrived Italian action could be ·expected. It would 
come not out of sympathy for the fellow fascists of the 
1ciano, Dia·rie s, 2 O 5. 
3F.R., 1940, I, 98. 
2Ibid., .216. 
·4rbid. , 113~115. 
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North but out of dreams of military_ glory, conquests, and 
breaki3:1g bonds ·imposed by the 'Allies· •1 
Continued Italian neutrality as a result of Welles '·s 
visit would have been a. great success.· The Italians them-
selves, as well as most other powers,· were aware of their 
favorable ·position. Welles noted in his report: "The 
chief reques·t made of me by the Pope, .by his Secretary of 
State ·[cardinal M~glioneJ, and by Count Ciano, .was for me 
to u~ge the· President to utilize his influence with Musso-
· 2lini to keep Italy out of the ·war,". and Ciano told him 
after the. Brenner meeti~g "that he believed the most impor-
tant thi~g for me ·to learn was that Italy would remain 
3·
neutral." . Welles himse·lf became later aware of this 
h ' .4 c ance. But the talks theni.se.lves warrant little concern 
about Italian neutrality at the time. There were a few 
remarks about it--often the topic was introduced by. the 
Italians--and Welles· ·expressed the pleasure of the ·American 
government and people with ·netitrali ty. 
But could American sympathy. compete ·with Hitler's 
promises of. glory and conquest? After he had left Italy, 
Welles· ·realized that somethi~g more had to be. done; In 
the conclusions to his ·report Welles advised the President 
1ciano, ni·aties ,· .220, 222, .225; Phillips,· 256, 264; 
~o~oke r, · Mo·f:fa t p·ape rs , 3 O 4 • 
2F·. g_. , 19 40, I, .115. ·1Ibid. , 114. 
4welles, Time,·. 76f. 
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to take practical step·s toward impr.overrierit in .relations.· 
"A close· ·relationship with ·.Italy is ·feasible. 111 He pro-
posed that America_ns should .avoid usi~g the term "fascism" 
in attacki;ig totalitarian forms 'Of_ government. A. great 
American pavilion at the World Exhibition planned for 1942 
in Rome would also do much.'2 Notwithstandi~g the ·fact that 
journalists. ·could hardly be f'O·rced to abstain from ·criti-
cizi~g Italian fascism, one ·has to ask:· Would such measures 
do to counterbalance ·the breaki~g-operi of the ."Mediterranean 
prison, n and the 'promise· ·of North A·f:r.ican colonies? The 
rapid sequence ·of conferences· 'amo~g the '.Italians and the 
Germans,· .and amo~g the Italians and Welles·,· had off·ered 
the ·Amer.ican envoy a. good chance :to drive ·a ba~gain, to 
outbid the ·Ge·rmans ,· or at least to hint at ·the ·possibility 
of outbiddi;ig them, for an attempt to keep Italy. neutral 
would have involved--as in 1914/1915--a ba~gaini~g with · 
promises. In World War II the ·offer had to be ·even· more 
attractive, .since 'this time '.Italy had a dictator whose· · 
ideol~gical and political. views established a close connec-
tion with ·the German side;. But Welles was not allowed to 
give any promises.· 
American sympathy alone could not sway a Mussolini 
whose head had been filled by .. ·dreams 'Of military_ glory by 
1 [.~., 1940,. I, .116. 
2 Ihid., 115. 
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Ribbentrop and Hitler. All· ·later and more sincere ·and 
realistic efforts :to kee·p Italy neutral ·failed in this 
point. The ·Americans we:re ·always :outbid by Ge'r:many--until 
German power failed to impres·s the :Italians any lo~ger. 
CHAPTER VI 
WELLES MEETS SCHACHT 
Apprehensions and hopes ·of the ·Europeans had proved 
futile. Welles· proved to be not concerned with ·minor 
problems. Those· ·issues had all one ·common origin, and if 
this source of all evil could be ·eliminated, _all these 
worries and anxieties would disappear. An erid to the war 
seemed to solve all problems of· Americans and Europeans. 
Welles ·did not bothe·r with any .othe·r aims but this one. 
Peace ·was the ·only subject for which ·he ·showed interest. 
He discussed it at le~gth with ·all politicians whom he met, 
everi with the Germans,· al th6~gh .Hitler had advised avoid-
i~g the· topic. 
In Germany, indeed, he had a stra~ge ·adventure which 
m~ght have led him .to success in his peace endeavors. But 
he would have had to cope with ·circumstances to which the 
disti~guished diplomat was not used. At a tea party_ given 
in his honor by charge 'd'affaires· Alexander Kirk, he met 
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Germany's famous economist. 
Schacht had become a mysterious f~gure. One of the 
most respected and admired financiers in the ·'twenties, he 
appeared to be the· ·economic and financial archite.ct of Hit-
ler's ·rearmament pr~gram in the 'thirties·.· Then, b~ginning in 
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1938 he faded into. the hac~ground. He was dismissed as 
president of the· Rei'chs·hahk and as Minister of Economics. 
It looked as if Schacht had incurred Hitler.' s wrath. 
Stra~gely, nothi~g happened to him. He still roamed freely 
in Berlin and Germany, and even remained a member of 
Hitler's cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. Therefore, 
it was hard to believe that he had fallen into di~grace. A 
journey to India nourished rumor9 that Schacht had become 
one of Hitler's top secret ~gents,· employed in arcane n~go-
tiations to revolutionize the world. 
By the ·time Welles undertook his miss·ion, Schacht was 
affiliated with the German resistance movement. As Hitler's 
ambitions became ·more evident the Minister of Economics 
b~gan to dis~gree with the Chancellor. He .contacted major 
opposition leaders,· especially Carl Goerdeler. _However, he 
remained outside their inner councils, partly because he 
did not want to. get involved in anythi~g risky. He tho~ght 
the conspirators acted rather uncautiously and was ·especi-
ally critical of Goerdeler. Schacht also was too ~gocentric 
to put up with a subordinate role in the already well estab-
lished leadership of the resistance.· The. conspirators for 
their part were suspicious of Schacht because of his early 
affiliation with the Nazis. In consequence ·there was little 
effectual cooperation, but Schacht ranked h~gh in the con-
spirators' plans. In the preparations for the putsch during 
the Czech crisis of 1938 he had played a major part, and he 
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was supposed to become a member of the new_ government. 
After the failure of these· ·plans, ;Schacht had the impres-
sion that he was bei~g watched by. the Gestapo. An attempt 
to convince the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von 
Brauchitsch, _that he o~ght ·to arrest Hitler resulted in a 
threat of his own arrest. By 1939 Schacht had some doubts 
about the. conspiracy, and withdrew from the scene. But he 
kept himself informed about the activities of the. other 
opponents to Hitl·er, _and they we.re aware of his movements. 
Hitler's domestic opposition had watched Welles's 
arrival with hope as well as fear. The. Conspirators hoped 
to win the German armed forces over with Welles's help. 
They were convinced that a· ·coup d'etat could only be suc-
cessful if the :army was on their side. The leaders of the 
opposition beli.eved the .generals would turn against Hitler' s 
' '
war plans if some. great and powerful f~gure such as the · 
President of the United States would guarantee a just peace. 
Brauchitsch and especially Franz Halder, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Army, seemed ready to take action 
against Hitler; but they were ·afraid the Allies m~ght use 
the temporary turmoil resul ti~g from a coup d'·' ·etat to attack 
Germany, or to extort a peace even harsher than Versailles. 
If Welles would. guarantee that the power and the· prest:i,.ge 
of the United States would be. connni tted ~gainst such an out-
come, the conspirators hoped, the.generals would at last 
1overcome their doubts and act. 
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They anticipated Welles's mission to Berlin at :the same 
time with ·anxiety. Prop~ganda-Minister Joseph .Goebbels 
m~ght make use ·of the American. diplomat's. visit .to. explain 
to the Germans that .the United States accepted Hitler as an 
honest statesman, and were willi~g to make a. deal with him. 
Hitler would. gain in prest~ge; his popularity would rise to 
unprecedented he~ghts if Welles's mission resulted in 
another Munich. A peace ·settlement of any kind would make 
an overthrow of the ·Hitler r~gime impossible .in the near 
future. 
The conspirators tried everythi~g to keep the Nazis 
from havi~g.another success. They used their connections 
with Alexander Kirk, .the ·Amer.ican. charge d 'af faires ·in Ber-
lin, in an attempt to convince the American diplomat that 
peace n~gotiations with Hitler would serve no useful pur-
2pose. Then. they. tried to. have Welles's route cha~ged. They 
s~ggested he should. go to Paris ·and London before. visiti~g 
Berlin. Talks in Paris and London, they hoped, .would make 
Welles realize ·that a visit to Berlin was useless. 3 
1John w. Wheeler-Bennett, .The Nemesis: of Power, The 
German Army in Politics '1918-1945. 2nd ed.-(London, New 
York, 1964), .486. 
2Gerhard Ritter,· Carl· Go·erdeler. und die Deutsche Wider-
standsbewegung (Stut~gart, 1954)., .2so-.·.- --
3This was mainly Carl Goerdeler's idea. He was already 
acquainted with Welles from earlier. visits in America (Ritter, 
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These· attempts were unavaili~g, doomed to failure from 
the b~ginni~g. Once ·the. government of the. Urii ted States had 
decided to send Welles to Berlin, it could hardly abandon 
the plan because some ·obs.cure .f~gures in Berlin tho~ght it 
inopportune. Since Welles's visit appeared inevitable, the 
conspirators tried to: use ·.it for the·ir purposes.· They 
b~gan to realize that it offer.ed a. great chance. The opposi-
tion leaders hoped to get into .contact with the. ·Amer.ican 
government .thro~gh Welles's mediation. They had for some 
time tried to establish connections with Washi'.!lgton, through 
Kirk as well as ·thro~gh emissaries· whom they had man~ged to 
send to the· United States· •·1 
Of all the ·.resistance '.leaders,· Schacht had be·en: most 
active in these attempts.· Thr.o~gh 'his ·former position and 
his acquaintances ·in h~gh ·positions he· had excellent connec-
tions with ·.1eadi'.!lg meri in fore~gn countries.· In 19 33 ·he had 
been in Washi~gton as the ·Ge·rman representative ·in the· 
preparatory n~gotiations for the ·world economic conference. 
There he had had conversations with Roosevelt, Hull, and 
161) • Hassell, .112 •. Maxime Mourins ,· Les c·omp'l'ots ·centre 
Hitler (Paris,· 1948), 103.· 
1The last attempt had been the· journey of Adam von 
Trott zu Salz who persuaded some famous German refugees 
like Kurt Riezler, secretary and intimate of former Chancel-
lor Theobald van Bethiriann Hollweg and State Secretary to 
President Ebert, to prepare a memorandum on war aims and 
peace terms.· This was sent to the 'White House· and is believed 
to have been read by Sumner Welles· before .leaving. (Wheeler-
Bennett, Nemesis, ,486-488.) · 
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others. He hoped to make use of these. connections when he 
busied himself with ·:prepari~g peace feelers after the out-
break of the war. On October 16, .19 39, he tried to induce 
the President to act as mediator for peace.. His letter 
remained unanswered. In early November he informed Kirk 
that he would like to be invited to undertake a lecture 
tour in the ·united States as an inconspicuous ·camoufl~ge 
for his true aim: political conversations in Washington. 
All his attempts to establish ·a connection with ·.the Roose-
velt administration were rej.ec.ted. An effort to. get Hitl·er 
to send him on a mission to America failed, presumably 
because Fore~gn Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop did not 
like the idea. 1 
Sumner Welles had been informed about Schacht's activi-
ties. When he came to Berlin he knew that the Reichniinister 
wanted to. get .into contact with American authorities, and 
he also knew that the opposition wanted him to meet one of 
its representatives while in Berlin. Ulrich ·von Hassell, a 
German career diplomat with close. connections to Kirk, 
desired to make sure that "Sumner Welles was properly indoc-
trinated in Rome, and that he should afterwara get correct 
impressions of the situation here. 112 He invited Kirk to 
1Earl Beck, Verdict on Schacht,· a study- in the· problem 
of political ~'guilt." Florida State University Studies, No. 
20 (Tallahassee, 19 55) , ch; 10. Wheeler-Bennett, Pt. III, 
ch. 4; Langer and Gleason, 258; Hasse11· ot·aries, 109; Ritter, 
235-240, 495. 
2Hassell, Diaries, 112 •. 
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breakfast ."to put him on the· r~ght :track." Hassell urged 
Kirk to have Welles meet with .someone outside the Nazi 
hierarchy. He ·everi s~9gested two: Erwin Planck, son of the 
physicist Max Planck and former State Secretary in the 
Chancellery, _and. Johannes P.opitz, _Pruss·ian Minister of the 
Interior. Hassell pressed the same point when he met an 
emissary of Lord Halifax in Arosa. 1 
The· .. conspirators suffered under pressure of time. The 
military leaders had .to be ·won over before Hitler issued 
the final order for the attack in the. west. Once German 
troops were e~g~ged in full .scale f~ghti~g, _the. generals 
could not be moved to join in a putsch ~gainst their 
Supreme Commander. Everythi~g seemed to center on Welles's 
visit. The. generals, most .of whom were opposed only to a 
"criminal war" and not inclined to interfere with the poli..;. 
tical rulers,· became hesitant about the overthrow of Hitler. 
They had received the impression that the Allies were ready 
to n~gotiate. If peace was in s~ght, Hitl:er o~ght to have 
his chance. The renewed qualms -of the military leaders 
made the conspirators the more e~ger to explain the situa-
tion to Welles, but their hopes ·of contacti~gu: Welles ·seemed 
to come to nothi~g. Yet, to everybody's surprise, Welles 
asked to see Schacht. 
1Hasse11,· Diaries, _114, 117. 
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The ·Reichniinister was jubilant. His. vanity. was 
immensely pleased. After a lo~g time of obscurity, he was 
suddenly pushed into the limel~ght ~gain. The conspirators 
were doubtful since Schacht was not a member of their 
inner circle,· and Welles was not willi~g to meet any of 
them. 1 
The Fore~gn Office,· and especf.ally Ribbentrop, were 
displeased. Ribbentrop disliked Schacht, and thought him 
da~gerous • · The Fore~gn Minister was not the· only one in the 
Nazi leadership who knew of Schacht's objections to the 
regime; It must have seemed stra~ge that the Amer.ican wanted 
to see--besides the Chancellor and the Fore~gn Minister--
just Schacht. The financier had by. that time apparently no 
influence on Hitler, and did not take part in shapi~g German 
policy. This was known to the Amer.icans •· They had already 
tried to find out Schacht's opinion, but Ribbentrop had suc-
cessfully stopped any attempts by Schacht .to meddle in 
2·American policy. Now he was confronted with a situation in 
1There is one source which claims that Welles saw Goer-
deler in Berlin. Gerhard Ritter, a former member of the 
opposition and its eminent historfan,· reports~·that Baron 
Palombini, who was also affiliated with the conspiracy, told 
him orally that Welles had a conversation with Goerdeler. 
He also reported that they met again in Stockholm in 1942, 
where he~-Palombini--was also present (Ritter, 252,495,515). 
It seems rather strange that Palombini should be the only 
source for so important meeti~gs. 
2In December, 1939, Schacht had been invited to write an 
article for Foreign Affairs on Germany's attitude toward the 
present conflict. Schacht checked with Ribbentrop who de-
manded that the article be submitted to him for censorship. 
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which an American diplomat came himself and wanted t9 see 
Schacht. 
The Fore~gn Minister tried consequently to pr.event a 
tete-a-.tete between Schacht arid Welles. He .invited his 
cabinet colle~gue .to a luncheon to be_given honori~g Sumner 
Welles. At this occasion both of them could be watched. 
Stra~gely, this luncheon was cancelled; possibly because 
the German authorities studiously avoided any social event 
or relaxed atmosphere •1 The ·problem of Welles's ·request re-
mained. Ribbe"ritrop apparently was ·determined to ~gnore the 
American's expressed wish ·until Minister Kirk took steps of 
his own. He invited Schacht .to a tea party. in Welles's 
honor. Ribbentrop could not cancel that. He tried a new 
tack by u~ging Schacht .to take an interpreter of the Fore~gn 
Office alo~g. Schacht declined the offer, _expressi~g his 
confidence that Welles would speak at least one of the three 
Schacht preferred not to write anything at :all. A few weeks 
later he received a similar offer from the Christian Science 
Monitor. This time he bypassed the Foreign Office and went 
directly to Hitler. He requested not only permission to 
publish in American journals but to ·travel in the United 
States. Hitler seemed favorably inclined, but wanted to 
discuss ·the matter with Ribbentrop. Schacht heard nothing 
further. · 
1The Italian Ambassador in Berlin reported that there 
were no social events planned: DDI, · _IX, 3, 417. Even when 
Welles visited Goering in his hunting castle outside Berlin, 
for a conversation and round-trip which lasted more than six 
hours covering both lunch ·and dinner. time, he was not even 
offered a snack--though the gluttonous Luftwaffe chief was 
hardly opposed to eating. · 
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major European la~gu~ges. Ribbentrop next :took the problem 
to· Hitler. The Chancellor reacted more calmly than had his 
Fore~gn Minister. He sununoned his Minister without Port-
folio, whom he had not seen for quite some time, to brief 
him on Welles's des~gns. The conspirators tho~ght the 
briefi~g "most remarkable, if only because Hitler was 
forced to summon Schacht beforehand,. thus contributi~g to 
Schacht's triumph • ." 1 The instructions were in line with 
Hitler's own. conversation with Welles on March 2 ,· _but Hitler 
wanted to make sure that the Amer.ican did not. get any wrong 
ideas, and requested that Schacht report about his talks 
after Welles had left Berlin·. 2 
Nazi concern about the. conversation proved to be ·with-
out cause. The resistance was disappointed. It is not 
clear what Welles had in mind when he requested the inter-
view with Schacht. Apparently he was only interested in 
post-war economic problems; it is doubtful whether Welles 
had any intention to contact the conspirators thr.o~gh 
Schacht. For some reason he wanted to see Schacht the genial 
economis.t and financier, not Schacht the. conspirator and 
o~ganizer of a putsch. Schacht had somethi~gvelse 'in mind. 
In a dramatic scene he looked around for hidden microphones, 
1Hassell, Diaries, 121. 
2DGFP, D, VIII, 643; F.R., 1940,. I, 56: Schacht, Con£es-
sions, 364-366; Beck, 147f:-
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and confided to Welles in a whisper: "If what I am goi~g 
to tell you now is known, I will be ·dead within a week." 
Then he described the· conspiracy, explaini~g the hesitancy 
of the. generals and their need for assurances "that Germany 
would not be treated as she had been in 1918. 11 He said, 
"If such a_ guarantee as this ·could be obtained • the 
movement would be ·pushed to a succes·s-ful conclusion." He 
refused to give any names·.·1 Welles knew of the ·existence 
of this ·opposition, and he knew .that the Army High 'Command 
was connected 'with ·it, and was ·consi:deri~g a putsch. 2 Icy 
as always,· he remained uncommunicative." Realizi~g that he 
was ·losi~g out, Schacht asked Welles· to get him an invita-
tion to a neutral country or to. give ·a series of lectures 
at some American university. Welles advised him rather to 
persuade Hitler to send him abroad. After this attempt 
also came .to nothi~g, Schacht asked if, at least, he· ·could 
keep in touch ·with Welles.· ~gain he ·was disappointed. 
Welles referred him to the American embassy in Berlin as 
the proper place ·for. contacts with ·the_government of the 
United States.· Schacht responded that every cable sent by 
the American embassy was immediately read by YGe·rman decoders. 
Welles rejected Schacht's apprehensions, stati~g that the 
1 F.R •. , 1940 ,. I, 57. 
2Ibid., 109; La~ger and Gleason, 247, 255. 
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United States had various ways for transmitti~g confiden-
tial cables. 1 
The conversation from which so much was expected had 
turned out to be a dud. Tho~gh Schacht was encour~ged 
because Welles had not rejected outright his attempts to 
remain in touch with him, _and tho~gh the. conspirators noted 
1The ·story follows Welles's confidential report (F.R., 
1940, I, 57). This account has been written shortly after 
the event. There are two later. versions of the conversa-
tion. Earl Beck (147f.} based his report on Hassell's 
diaries and Schacht's memoirs as well as on a letter of 
Sumner Welles ·to him. He states that Schacht just managed 
to give Welles some note about the German opposition. ·As 
this story is neither in Hassell's diaries nor in Schacht's 
memoirs, he must have received that information from 
Welles.· Most surprising is Schacht' s own account ·(confes-
sions, 367} • He remembers only flatteries Welles ·supposedly 
said to him. According to him the conversation was mainly 
about economic matters. Schacht states that Welles sought 
his advice about the economic problems of the post-war 
world. This was, indeed, the reason Welles had.given to 
Ernst von Weizsaecker, Secretary of State in·the German 
Foreign Office, when he had requested the conversation 
with.the financier. In regard to the resistance movement, 
Schacht just mentions that he made no secret about his 
opposition to the war. All three ·versions probably contain 
some truth. As more persons than just Schacht and Welles 
were present at the lunch, they presumably did not have 
much time undisturbed by others. During these moments they 
might have talked about the conspiracy·; while others were 
present, economics might have been their topic. What each 
writer has selected for his presentation of the interview, 
reflects his character and purposes. Welles ~apparently 
thought Schacht's economic opinions unworthy to report, 
either because the financier presented nothing noteworthy, 
or because the post-war economic settlement was at this 
stage not Welles's real interest. More difficult is the 
problem why Schacht did not report his remarks on the resis-
tance movement, but that is of no immediate concern for our 
topic. Simplifyi~g, one m~ght say that Schacht's aim was 
to sell his book. Cooperation with the enemy in war-time 
might smell like h~gh treason and annoy possible buyers. 
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that he had said the dismemberment of Germany was not in-
tended by the United States, 1. the practical results were 
nil. 
The. generals--the decisive ·factor--remained unim-
pressed. Indeed, Welle.s's visit had an unintended effect 
in favor of the Nazis, for the .. generals were confirmed in 
their belief that the western powers considered Hitler as 
the only partner for n~gotiations. · To the dismay of the 
opposition, Welles·' s trip to Berlin enhanced Hitler's 
prest~ge. After Welles'·s return to America had bro~ght no 
peace, military circles were more convinced than ever that 
the real aim of the Allies was the destruction of Germany, 
a super-Versailles.· The. conspirators could still not. guar-
antee that the Allies would not use a temporary German 
weakness to this end. 2 
Thus it looked to the conspirators and the. generals. 
The affair presented itse·If to Welles in a different l~ght. 
Schacht was, t0 say the least, .a dubious character. On 
Marcil 4, 1940, while Welles· was still in Berlin, Newsweek 
reported that Schacht was far from havi~g broken with ·Hitler. 
~ 
The magazine stated that he was e~g~ged in some secret and 
important tasks. Though Welles 'knew about the resistance 
1Hassell, 121: Ritter, 495. 
2wal ter Goerlitz, His·tory of the German General Staff 
(New York, 1959), 370. 
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movement, he. could not be .sure what role Schacht played in 
it. It has to be remembered that State Departmen·t and 
White House had repulsed all earlier attempts by the finan-
cier to_ get into contact with ·.the American authorities. 
Besides,· the Venlo incident--where .two. British intell;Lgence 
officers had been lured into. a trap by a German Secret 
Service · (si·cherh'e·i:tsdienst) major who pretended to be a 
conspirator--showed that one had to be. careful in deali~g 
with people who claimed to. be emissaries -of a conspiracy. 
A diplomatic incident was ·easily provoked. Plans and ac-
tions ·of the conspiracy remained mostly unknown. Before 
Welles arrived in Europe, Newsweek reported that there was 
no indication of any resistance movement, particularly none 
1 within the· Army. Bernardo Attolico and Vicomte Jacques 
Dav;tgnon, the Italian and Be~gian Ambassadors in. Berlin, 
were 'probably the most experienced and bes·t informed diplo-
mats at the time in the German capital. They assured Welles 
that "the internal and army opposition to Hitler ••• has 
now completely died away. 112 
Schacht could offer nothi~g conclusive ·duri~g the short 
conversation. There were no plans, no names,"nO proof that 
1Newsweek, XV, 19 40 . (Feb. 26.) , 9. 
2F.R., 1940,. _I, so.. It is interesting that Welles's 
notes of-his talks with "the·se diplomats treat mainly the 
subject of internal opposition to Hitler. Other subjects 
apparently did not interest him, or did not .seem important 
enough to mention in his report. 
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any. conspiracy ~gainst Hitler existed. Schacht bo.ldly 
asked for assurances for a lljust peace ,I' and for contacts 
with the United States.· The latter had been rej.ected fre-
quently, and there was no reason why they should be. granted 
now. To guarantee a .just peace in case of an overthrow of 
the Nazi r~gime would have gone beyond Welles·•s scope since 
he was not authorized to make any commitments. 'The evi-
dence, Welles explained later, seemed too sl~ght to warrant 
taki~g seriously the ·statement of an individual who enjoyed 
everywhe·re a reputation for slipperiness.· He did not want 
to become involved in an intr~gue with ·such a man • 1 
Geo.'Fge F. Kennan, who served at that time .in the Ameri-
can Embassy. in Berlin, had submitted a memorandum to Pierre-
pent Moffat, Welles's assistant, warning ?-gainst the "siren 
songs o.f. the German conservatives, II especially Schacht. 2 
Similarly, he had warned ?-gainst counti~g on the known 
differences between Hitler and the army leadership. Kennan 
a.'Fgued, assurances of. good ·treatment in case of an overthrow 
of the Hitler r~gime were useless,· since the .evil lay in the 
G . 1 3 erman peop e. 
These opinions of experts reflect the little knowledge 
about Germany's internal situation at that time. George F. 
1Langer and Gleason, 367. Their account is based on a 
conversation between the authors and Welles. 
2Kennan doubts that Moffat read his memorandum. 
3Kennan, 118. 
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Kennan, for example, soon learned more about the opposition 
to Hitler. When he reread his memorandum he was astonished 
about the "puerility of the nosta~gic conclusion." He had 
come to the belief "that the Allies had missed a chance 
precisely by faili~g to deal with the German conservatives 
and the army leaders. 111 Welles's mission offered possibly 
the best occasion for an ~greeirient with Germany's better 
elements;· but few realized that :chance in early 1940. 
What m~ght have happened if Welles had acted otherwise 
can only be_ .guessed. Two weeks after the Welles-Schacht 
conversation, Carl Goerdeler, the head of the. conspiracy, 
had a lo~g meeti~g with Franz Halder, _the Chief of Staff of 
the Army. Goerdeler stressed the necessity of maki~g peace 
inunediately, and pointed to the ."possibility of a favorable 
compromise.1' 2 Halder and C-in-c Brauchitsch might have 
reacted more willi~gly if Goerdeler had had somethi~g more 
to offer than only "the possibility of a favorable ·compro-
mise." The desired_ guarantee-:--given in the name of the most 
powerful neutral--might have convinced the Army leaders that 
the overthrow of the Hitler r~gime would be the ·bes·t service 
to the nation. A less icy final r·ej·ection by Welles m~ght 
have encouraged the conspirators to action. The few minutes 
1 Kennan, 119. 
2Franz Halder thought it important enough ·to make a 
lo~ger note in his diary. Halder, Dia·ry, III, _125. 
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the American envoy spent in private. oonversati.on with 
Hjalmar Schacht .could have led to. the .overthrow of the Nazi 
r~gime; but the probability of such ·a development was 
slight. 
Even if Welles had been·dari~g eri.o'!-lgh to trespass his 
orders so far as to give encour?lgement to the conspirators, 
he still m~ght have had no success. The history of the. con-
spiracy justifies this assumption. The. ·conspirators them-
selves lOJ;1g had been convinced that :action should be taken, 
and it was unlikely that the .further stimulation of a. guaran-
tee. given by Welles· would have moved the·m to finally execute 
their plans. Chamberlain already had expressed a "solemn 
obl~gation" on the part of His Majesty's Government that a 
just peace would be_ granted should the German_ government 
cha~ge. Nothi~g had happened .at that time. 
But it should be remembered that Chamberlain's promise 
bro~ght the conspiracy to the brink of success.· The Prime 
Minister's pledge convinced Brauchitsch. The C-in-C of the 
Army "was prepared to make a final effort with ·the Fuehrer • 
• • • If this failed he would come down on the side ·of the 
conspirators." 1 While the army staff b~gan t~ work out plans 
for the putsch, the general finally found the. cour?lge to_ go 
to Hitler. He told the Fuehrer bluntly that the :army was 
1Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, 469f. 
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opposed to ~c;mression in the west. Hitler turned on 
Brauchitsch with the "full fury of his vitriolic spleen." 
He reminded the army of its ple~ge of obedience, and re-
proached it and its leaders with cowardice. The C-in-C 
left the conversation completely broken. 1 
While the armed forces waited for the order to attack 
in the west, the spirit of opposition died down. A promise 
similar to Chamberlain's but this time. given by the neutral 
and far more respected Americans m~ght have revived it--and 
this time Brauchitsch m~ght not have been so impressed with 
Hitler's fury. Action was more urgent than at the time of 
Chamberlain's pledge. But Brauchitsch was an indecisive 
man. He was not a born revolutionary. Chances are that 
the outcome would have been the same. 
Encour~gement for the opposition, and the promise of a 
just peace might not and probably would not have cha~ged 
anythi~g. But it was the only possibility to come to a 
settlement with a non-Nazi, peaceful Germany. When Welles 
talked with the President about his mission, President 
Roosevelt had said there was one chance in a hundred for 
success. Maybe this was the one. 
1Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, 460-474; Ritter, 246. 
CHAPTER VII 
PEACE 
The incident with Schacht had been unexpected and had 
not impressed the American Under Secretary. Sumner Welles 
preferred to deal with ·the established. governments. rather 
than with ·a resistance movement. He ·tried to reach his aim 
thro~gh ·cooperation amo~g the existi~g European administra-
tions, and had h~gh hopes for success.· IIIt will be ·a very 
important trip--that is, it may be. If Sumner can find any 
willi~gness on the part of the. various responsible offi-
cials of any of those Governments to cease hostilities,· .it 
will be very important, but if he does not find any such 
situation, it will probably mean that the war will continue 
on ad infihi:tum. 111 Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Lo~g 
had rec~gnized the inherent d~ger of Welles's endeavors. 
If Welles, the emissary of the all powerful United States, 
presented himself as peace mediator and failed, most hopes 
for peace mediation would be lost. Intervention by the 
United States was the stro~gest trump in the.gamble for 
peace. 
1rsrael, Long Diary, 58. 
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This risk, notably, Welles took. He left no doubt 
that despite ·all the official denials his aim was to find 
peace "at this juncture. 111 
Peace was what.most people expected of him. Newspapers 
were filled with re~orts ori his pr~gress in maki~g peace. 2 
Even American authorities assumed that he would search .for 
peace. 
,3 '
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt openly said so,. and 
her husband explained in a ·speech on March 16 the bases on 
which a peace should res·t. 
The problem of peace had played a major role in the
preparation of his mission. It had beeri discussed with ·the 
British_ government before his mission was announced and was 
again mentioned by the President in his concludi~g remarks 
to the press about the Welles mission on March 29. 4 Robert 
Murphy, the cha?=ge d' affaires in France, everi. claims that he 
was instructed that Welles would come to Paris ·"on a peace 
mission. 115 
What hope was there for the establishment of peace? 
Welles· apparently thought there was a possibility that a 
1 F. ~. , 19 40 ,· I, 7 3. 
2since Welles did not reveal anything, infallible indi-
cators were used, like his facial expression on leavi~g con-
ferences.· 
3New York Times, Feb. 12 ,. _19 40, 1. 
4 F.R., 1940, I, .1-4, 20 •. 
S h. 35 Murp y, • 
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basis for a settlement m~ght be found. Secretary of State 
Hull, on the other hand, had no such hopes.· "The only way 
to stop his [Hitler'.s] ·.preparations was to. give him every-
thi~g he asked, 11 Hull said, "but .this meant Nazi domination 
of Europe and another war within a few years. 111 Joseph · 
Alsop tho~ght a peace mission to Europe "rather like peddli~g 
Bibles in a brothel. 112 Ambassador Joseph E. Davies warned 
Roosevelt in a personal letter: "They are ·.so 'sot' on both 
sides that it will take .a major reverse on one side or the 
3'other to_ get therri to everi sit down and talk thi~gs over." 
The Pres·ident did not expres·s his ·opinion on the possibility 
of peace publicly, but his "stubborn refusal to deny the 
fantastic report that he ·m~ght .confer with ·.fore~gn statesmen 
was noted. 4 
In September 1939', he had still been stro~gly opposed 
to any mediation. At that time Kennedy had reported a 
British mediation demand. Roosevelt rejected it outr:i-ght. 5 
However, .in his State of the Union Mes·s?t,ge of January 3, 
1940, he had said that the United States would continue to be 
"a potent and active ·factor for the re...;establishnient of 
1 Hull, 738. 
2Alsop, White· Paper,· .86. 
3 .
Letter of Davies to F .D.R., February 10, 1940 ;. Roose-
velt Papers, PSF State." 
4Newsweek, xv, 1940 (Feb. 26), 9. 
5Langer and Gleason, 249. 
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of world peace. 111 His support for the Welles· mission is 
further proof that he was ·interes·ted in the. es·tablishmerit 
of peace, and believed that it m~ght be possible ·to reach 
an ~greement. 2 
An early, discarded draft of the Pres·ident' s announce-
ment of the mission stated that its obj.ect was to ascertain 
whether the bell~gerent powers "will state for the confi-
dential information of the. :President the base·s upon which 
they would be prep:ared to make peace.'1' 3 The Pres·iderit did 
consider talki~g peace with ·.the European governments.· 
Whatever the President's opinion on n~gotiations with 
the Nazis m~ght have been, important for the outcome ·of 
the mission was what Welles considered to be the President's 
opinion. He ·said after the war about his miss·ion: "Roose~ 
vel t was at least willi~g to. contemplate a peace with 
Hitler if. the Fuehrer would submit acceptable terms. 114 
William La~ger, who was. generally well informed and at that 
time possessed close contacts with the State Department, holds 
that Roosevelt was willi~g to talk peace "even, it must be 
1Rauch, _l 79 • 
2Myron Taylor, the President's personal representative 
to the Vatican, hinted to the Italian Ambassador near the 
Holy see, Dino Alfieri, that the United States would inter-
vene, if possible, to facilitate ·a peace settlement. Taylor 
believed that the moment for a peace ·offensive had not yet 
arrived, but might come .very suddenly (potra essere offerto 
subito) after the_ great offensive. DDI, IX, 3, 409. 
3' 4La~ger and Gleaton, _362 •. ·Ibid., 362. 
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supposed, .if this we.re to invo.lve n~gotiations with the 
existi~g German Government." He claims that Iii t was a major 
objective ·of the· Welles mission to explore peace possi-
bilities even with ·a Nazi G.overnment. 111 Americans apparently 
believed the time had come to sit down at the·. conference 
table; but was Europe ready yet? It was Welles's aim to 
find that out. 
Unfortunately, .the failure to reach .a clear conception 
of the desired peace resulted in. v~gue questions by. Welles 
which .called for v~gue answers. Welles avoided a discussion 
of specific stipulations of the intended peace. To describe 
the desired settlement he employed well soundi!).g put unde-
fined adj ecti VeS like ·n j US t f n II lasti~g f n II real In rr Secure I fl 
not "patched-up" or "temporary." Everybody turned out to be 
enthusiastic about a "lasting 11 "real 11 and "secure". peace . I . I
and bitterly opposed to a "patched-up, n or ·~ temporary" 
settlement, but most seemed to have somethi~g different in 
mind. The only. concrete ideas which Welles presented were 
contained in a memorandum on post-war economic relations. 
But, as Hitler pointed out, it was not much use to dream 
about post-war trade while peace was not even in sight. 
Disarmament was another topic of Welles's., and it found en-
thusiasm amo~g his conversational partners. Hitler himself 
was one of the most enthusiastic. He even shed some 
1La~ger and Gleason, 352, 362. 
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crocodile tears over the principle, complainiJJ.g his desire 
had been to build up a happy prosperous Germany but that he 
now was ·forced to build. guns instead of Volksw~gens. The 
German leader's des~gns were not endaJJ.gered; disarmament 
could come only after peace was established. 
* * *
From a traditional point of view the war seemed to be 
over, and the time for a settlement had come. Hostilities 
had broken out over east European territories, the· military 
decision had been made, and now .it was time .to re-establish 
peace by. settliJJ.g the territorial problems accordiJJ.g .to the 
military decision. This point of view had been presented by 
the Germans in October, .19 39, and was adhered to by many 
neutrals. Differences existed with r~gard to boundary 
settlements, and there was a basic problem which was not 
rec~gnized by many in neutral as well as in bell~gerent 
countries. Would a traditional peace settlement as practiced 
before Versailles, a peace based upon the redrawing of 
boundaries and the payment of indemnities, suffice in this 
situation? In 1940 there could not be another Versailles. 
As there had been no military decision between the western 
Allies and Germany, it would have to be a compromise peace, 
most likely at the expense of East Central Europe. Those 
who advocated peace in 1940 with Nazi Germany--and the 
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majority of Americans did--at least indirectly advocated 
such ·a solution. 
The peace would stre~gthen· Germany. The German armies 
-)
were the only ones who had. gained decisive victories, and 
Hitler would demand his reward. Therefore, the Allies 
appeared to. be. opposed to peace ·n~gotiations ·"at this junc-
ture." Seen in the traditional view (not consideri~g the 
relatively new problem of opposition to a certain form of 
governmen·t or new ways of guaranteei~g peace in the .future) , 
the western Allies were not ready and willing to. grant the 
territorial adjustment to whi.ch ·Ge·rmany seemed entitled as 
a result of her. victory. Germany appeared to be ready to 
settle down: to peace while the Allies refused to accept the 
fact of their defeat. 
Since France and Great Britain had rejected Hitler's 
peace of fer of October 6, 19 39, .a paradoxical situation had 
developed. Hitler, the ~<;rgre~sor, increasi~gly emphasized 
his desire for peace, while ·the· speeches of the Allied 
leaders became tougher in their demand for a continuation of 
the war to the total defeat of Germany. The French and 
British ·government had to step up the f~ghti~g spirit in 
their countries. Hitler seemed to have reached his aim, and 
appeared to be satisfied. S~gnificantly, all rumors of peace 
moves claimed German initi:ative, .and even Welles was supposed 
to cooperate with the Germans.· The Allies appeared to be 
the real opponents to peace, and the_ greatest obstacle to a 
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success for the Welles mission seemed to be in the Allied 
capitals; and there Welles discovered a chance .for the most 
surprisi~g concessions.· 
Both western Allies publicly displayed unity and a firm 
determination to f ~ght this war thro~gh to a successful con-
clusion. Few were really impressed with this demons·tration 
of to~ghness.· Amo~g these was the American Minister in 
Paris who reported on February 10 that France was determined 
"that the ·constant peril of Germany • • • must be wi.ped out. 11 
Peace was so~ght by the Allies "by. victory of their arms. 
These are the preliminary. conditions to all n~gotia-
tions .·" 1 On the same ·day Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassa-
dor to Be~gium and now special assistant to the Secretary 
of State, took the· occasion to inform the President in a 
letter from his vacation retreat .in Florida that. the French 
are not "ready yet to be. content with anythi~g short of a 
clean job this time. 112 Welles himself tried.to create the 
im~ge of the determination and v~gor amo~g Allied leaders in 
his war-time book. The French Premier Daladier, he reported, 
told him: "France must f~ght. 113 
The reality was different. Memories ofvthe sufferi~gs 
of World War I, the tremendous success of German arms in 
1 F.R., 1940, I, 6. 
2Letter of Davies to F.D.R., Feb. 10, 1940; Roosevelt 
Papers, PSF State. 
3welles, Time, 12 3 •· 
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Poland, and a winter of constant .fear of invasion had 
strained French ·nerves. Frequent rumors of imperidi~g attack 
and the presence of more than two hundred divisions alo~g 
their frontier, combined with a continual flow of German 
prop~ganda, had demoralized not only the population and. 
armed forces, but also to a la~ge d~gree French leadership. 
The French wanted to see an end to this war. They were 
willi~g to make. concessions.· When Welles mentioned terri-
torial readjustment to Daladier, _the Premier told him that 
"in his own ju~gment there was every reason why the really 
German peoples of Central Europe should live under German 
rule, provided they s.o desired. The City of Danz~g was 
clearly a German city, and it was equally obvious that the 
Germans of the Sudetenland, or of western Poland should be 
afforded the opportunity of uniti~g with the Reich ·if they 
so desired." 1 Hitler could not have asked for more. Welles 
noted: "The Prime Minister made it very clear to me that he 
did not believe that political or territorial adjustment 
would create any insuperable difficulty in reachi~g peace. 
He made it equally clear that whatever he m~ght say in 
public, he would not refuse to deal with thev'present German 
r~gime. 112 Most French ·statesmen shared this view. Paul 
Reynaud, who was to become Premier in a few days,· assured 
Welles "that he believed the ·political and territorial issues 
1 [.R., 1940, I, 63; 2Ibid. 
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now .at stake could be solved without any. considerable diffi-
culty thro~gh n~gotiations between the Allies and Germany. 111 
France was willi~g to concede Germany what she demanded in 
the East. Despite the ·note of confidence ·and to~ghriess in 
public addresses2 Welles ·could convince himse·lf that France 
would not object any lo~ger. to a territorial readjustment, 
that she was ·ready for another Munich. 
Great Britain appeared to be more determined. The 
British ·press, .and public utterances by prominent politi-
cians showed determination to f~ght until the. complete defeat 
of Germany. Newspapers praised allied firmness and unity. 
The frequent rumors of peace ·feelers were discredited as 
Nazi des~gns. The· Germans were ·everi accused of usi~g the 
Sumner Welles mission in an attempt to weaken allied resolu-
. . 3
tion by talk of a patched-up peace •. Over and over ?1,gain 
British papers informed their readers that Welles had not 
come for peace, that President Roosevelt and the American 
4 administration did not want peace now. When Welles ·left 
Berlin, Britishers read that ." the certain ties of this war 
are that ••• there will be no shoddy or illusionary 
1 F.R., 1940, I, 71. 
2on April 3, a few days after Welles had left Europe, 
Reynaud, the new Premier, declared again publicly that there 
would be no peace without a decision on the battlefield. New 
York Times,· April· 4, 19 40 ,. 9 • 
3London Times, .Mar. 11, · . 8. 
4Ibid., Mar. 19,· 8; Mar. 11, 8; Feb. 12, 6; Mar.· 8, 8; 
Feb. 1~; etc. 
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peace.1' 1 This ·determination impressed observers.· American 
pro-Allied papers picked it up. While Welles was in Europe 
a New York Times· ·editorial stated: "Increasi~gly • • . it 
becomes apparent that before this war ends one side or the 
other must be whipped and whipped decisively. 11 2 This 
opinion was supported by. the resolution of public speeches. 
Just when the· world turned its. eyes on Welles'·s arrival in 
Italy and dreamed about an imminent peace, .Chamberlain 
declared in a speech, .apparently intended to obstruct the 
peace talk which had arisen in connection with Welles's 
visit, .. that Britain had "no reason to fear the result of 
this conflict. " The nation, he said, was united as never 
before in its history to f~ght .for one aim: the ·destruction 
f H . tl ' 3 .o 1 erism. 
However, the "phony war" had not been without its 
effects on the British. The tho~ght of peace.grew increas ... 
i~gly popular. In a recent by-el.ection an unknown and 
unsupported candidate had won twenty-four per cent of the 
votes on a simple anti-war platform. The population was 
b~ginni~g to suffer under the war-time restrictions, and it 
grew disenchanted with ·the proceedi~gs. 
1London Times, Mar. 4, .1940~· 7. 
2New Y~rk Times, Mar. 3 ,· IV, 3 •· 
3London Times, Feb. 26,· .8. 
137 
Despite the frequent claims of unity, and the conten-
tion that Welles must have been impressed with the unanim-
ity amo~g British politicians, it seems that ·if anythi~g 
impressed him, it was the disunity of British ·1eaders and 
the wide variety of opinions. In London, Welles had the 
best chance to meet a truly representative ra~ge of tho~ght. 
His ·conversation partners came from the far r~ght to the far 
left, concepts of peace ra~ged from the necessity of complete 
defeat with a subsequent "atomization" and a century-lo~g 
occupation of Germany1 to the demand of an immediate com-
promise.· Any measure would surely find ardent opponents. 
Important were the opinions of those who determined 
policy. The Ki~g made. ·clear that he hoped for a military 
. d f . t' . 2 victory, .an not or n~gotia ions.· His. government was 
split into two. groups:· the former appeasers around Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain and Fore~gn Minister Lord 
Halifax, and the opponents of appeasement, foremost among 
them Winston Churchill., who was ~gain in the Admiralty, and 
Anthony Eden, who had rejoined Chamberlain's. ·cabinet as 
Dominions Secretary. Labor "was not opposed to peace thro~gh 
n~gotiations with any government of Germany.~" 3 · The 
1by which about 70 ·per cent of the Germany of 1940 
should go to its ne~ghbors, while the· rest should be divided 
in four states. 
2Roosevelt Papers, PSF State, Welles's report. 
3F.R., 1940, I, 81. 
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dominions'. governments. let Welles· know .thro~gh ·the Austral-
ian H~gh Commiss·ioner Stanley Melbourne Bruce that .they 
favored a settlement thro~gh n~gotiations. 1 
The Eden-Churchill. group was still determined to make no 
deals with Germany. Welles first met Eden, who told him 
that the only possible solution was II an allied victory, .the 
destruction of Hitlerism, and the .forci~g. upon the German 
people of a. government which ·would pursue policies" in ac-
cord with .the Allies. Any attempt at peace "would put us to 
an unfair disadvant~ge" for a dictatorship could fairly easy 
turn from peace to war and back ~gain. Not so a democracy. 2
Churchill was even more precise:. The ·new peace treaty would 
have to. control Germany's course in the future .for a hundred 
ye.ars. "There could be no solution other than outr~ght and 
3·complete defeat of Germany." Churchill and Eden presented 
an extreme opinion. They did not determine British policy. 
Chamberlain and Halifax were still masters of the situation. 
Chamberlain had been deeply disappointed by Hitler's in-
sincerity. The events after Munich had stiffened his atti-
tude. He seemed resolved to. go thro~gh with ·this f~ght. 
Most historians as well as his bi~graphers ~gree that by 
1940 he was firm in his will to crush Hitlerism, but was 
1[.R., 1940, I, 82. 
2rbid.,. and Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon,· The Eden 
Merooir~The Re·ckoning (London, .1965}, 9lf. 
3!'._.R., 1940, I,.84. 
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wi11i~g to come ·to terms with ·a non-Nazi Ge·rmany. He was 
suppose·d to be uncompromisi~g about :the ·neces·sity of the 
overthrow of Hitler. Indeed, he. ·expressed this ·idea in the 
consultation with ·Roosevelt before· announcement of Welles's 
mission. 1 On February 24 ·chainherlain said that ·Britain for 
its part was -ready to se·e·k ·a se·ttlerrierit with ·any respon-
sible ·and sincere. gover·nment.· After previous remarks· ·about 
Hitler this apparently excluded the ·Fuehrer. 2 . Chamberlain 
made: .cle·ar at :every possible :occasion that :peace ·with 'Hitler 
was neither. considered nor wante·d. 
The ·British ·government had not ch~ged their opinion 
when they we·lcomed Welles·.. In ·the ·openi~g conversation with 
Halifax;- the Fore~gn Minister declared that ·"no lasti~g 
peace ·could be ·made ·in Europe· ·.as ·lo~g as the Nazi r~gime· 
. 3'dominated Ge·rmany." Chamhe·rlain expres·sed himse·lf. much 
more stro!l,gly: "E~gland wa:s determined • • • to defeat a 
Government in Germany which ·was set upon a policy of ·cruel 
4 military conquest." The ·German people had to prove ·its 
wish 'for real peace ·by the ·overthrow Of the Nazi r~gime.5 
But both Prime Minister. and Fore~gn Minister. were ·impress·ed 
with Welles's pres·entation of Getman fee·lingsv~· The Ge·:rmans, 
Welles· told them, were ·convinced that E~gland was bent upon 
·1r. R. , 19 4 0 , I , 2 ~ 4 •. 
3·. [.R., 1940, I, 73.' 
5 Ibid.,: 77 •· 
2L·a·~ger· and 1 · 36 G ·eason, · 3.· 
. ·4·Ibid. ,· 75. 
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the annihilation of Germany. Both immediately denied any 
such 'intentions; but both tho~ght the ·problem over and 
discussed the necessity and des·irability of peace. The 
result was a surprisi~g ch~ge of mind while Welles was in 
London. 
The first indication came ·when Halifax confidentially 
drew Welles '·s attention to the fact that "Chamberlain had 
unde!gone the most harrowi~g human experience of which .a
statesman could conceive as ·a result of the Munich ·episode, 
and that as a result his point of view was necessarily 
affected in all that related to British ·policy toward 
Germany and in particular toward the members of the present 
German Government." The explanation of this ·remarkable 
observation is simple. Halifax was ·convinced of the impor-
tance of the Welles mission. He worked on Chamberlain to 
cha~ge his r~gid attitude.2
In his second conversation with Welles the Prime Minis-
ter told the American Under Secretary that he had thought 
much about the situation since their last meeti~g, especi-
ally about the German fear of annihilation. He admitted 
that the spirit of ve~geance ·after a devastati~g war m:Lght 
be so strong that a just peace would be impossible. He was, 
therefore, willi~g to confirm in a bindi~g statement to. the 
President of the United States that Britain neither wanted 
1[.R., 1940, I, 79. 2Ihid., 87. 
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to destroy Germany nor subj~gate the German people.' No 
future. government would deviate ·:from such .a .solemn pledge. 
It would imply no commitment for the United States as it 
was a unilateral. declaration~ Welles· seems to have 'dis-
trusted the Prime Minister's scheme. He only promised to 
communicate .the British proposal to the President. 1 
Chamberlain grew .even more earnest and emphasized ~gain 
that he had tho11ght a.great deal and consulted a few col-
le~gues about the .first conversation. The res·u1 t of these 
meditations,· he told Welles, was that he would not discard 
"an opportunity of strivi~g for a real and lasti~g peace 
merely because ·the present Nazi r~gime remained in power." 
He "would not be :in any sense .intrans~·gent with ·.r~gard to 
the ultimate frontiers of Poland, .nor with r~gard to the 
boundaries of the ·new Czech state.1' 2 Havi~g. grasped the 
sense of this statement, Welles concluded, "he saw no in-
superable obstacle with .regard to political and territorial 
problems as a basis of peace." 3 Apparently, E~gland was 
at last willi~g to acknowle~ge Hitler's victory and to 
grant him the fruits ·of tha.t military success. 
The major barrier to a territorial se:ttlement had dis-
appeared. There were still the Italian demands but Italy 
was not a belligerent, and the Frerich ·1eaders had expressed 
1Nothi~g ever came of it. 
2[•!•, 1940, I, 88. 3Ibid. , 89. 
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. great willi~gness: to. grant most of Rome•·s· reques·ts,· though · 
Great Britain m~ght still object to a stre~gthened Italian 
position in the Medite·rranean. 
The· exact German demands were 'not known but did not 
seem to. go much furthe·r than what France .and Britain were 
willi~g to yield. There had been general speculation that 
German proposals would include ·a plebi.scite. ·in Austria, an 
independent cz·ech ·state,· .an independent Poland, but both 
without the ·parts with ·a heavy German population, .and an 
arr~gerrient by which ·Ge·rmany could win acces·s: ·to: colonial 
raw materials.· The· ·Ge·rman. government had never expressly 
stated these· ·aims,· but Mussolini to:ld Welles: :that Ge·rmany 
would make .·peace ·on them, _combined with. ·the·. ·conces·s·ion of a 
dominati~g position in Central Europe.'1 Goeri~g aff·irmed 
the·s·e· ·points.·2 Hitl·er indirectly. declared that Ge·rmany· 
wanted to have the historical German Empire res·tored--
thcj'~1gh without Alsace-Lorraine .... -btit did not desire :to domin-
ate non-German peoples·.. One rather ·ominous wish ·was his 
demand for "seduri ty" in Central Europe thr.o~gh disarma-
ment of Poland and the cz·ech ·.state.. This ·reques·t was 
combined with the desire for German "economic h~geiriony" in 
this area, .and what the Germans termed a Monroe Doctrine 
·1F.R., 1940, I, .32. 
2Ihid.·, 53 .' 
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for Central Europe •. 1 These problems, _while serious, m~ght 
have beeri overcome in n~gotiations. There did not seem to 
be any basic difficulties ·in the settlement of territorial, 
political, and economic problems. 
Was Hitler. sincere?. Did he really want peace? He 
had refused to state specific terms -or to bind himself by 
promises.· He had avoided any. commitment by disclaimi~g 
that Germany possess·ed war aims ~gainst E~gland. It was, 
Hitler stated, purely a war of defense ·~gainst the allied 
desire .to annihilate Germany. He had rejected any possi-
bility for peace, a;:rgui~g that the Allies were determined 
to destroy the· German Nation. He had indicated Germany's 
aims in the East but he had not .promised he would abide 
by them--if a promise by Hitler had any s~gnificance. 
Nevertheless ·the intimation of his aims had. given Welles 
confidence. He told Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, that 
his talks with German officials had made him "moderately 
but not unduly optimistic, 112 and he had left Weizsaecker 
and Dieckhoff with .the impression that he saw a chance for 
1Ibid., .38, 48f. For the development of- the idea of a 
German Monroe Doctrine see: Lothar Gruchiriann, National-
sozialistische Grossraumordnung. Die Konstrukticn einer 
"deutschen Monroe-Doktrin. 11 Vier.teljahreshefte fuer 
Zei:tgeschichte, Schriftenreihe,·. v. 4 (S.tut:tgart, 1962). 
2S. . 1mon1, 92. 
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success. ·1 Even the press ·tho:u,gh t the situation improved 
after the Berlin visit •. The New. York Times reported that 
chances had increased from one .in a tho·usand to one in a 
2hundred. 
Hitler had a habit of charmi;ig and deceivi;ig his visi-
tors. There ·is reason to doubt that he meaht what he· said. 
He could hardly have .told Welles·. that he was bent upon 
world conquest. He may have been willi;ig to s~gn a peace 
treaty, .but he surely was not e~ger to do so. He had only 
very hesitantly ~greed to. receive Welles, apparently be-
cause he anticipated that Welles m~ght bri;ig peace. 3 ·
Goebbels'· orders for the press· were meant to nip in the bud 
any popular hope for peace. Yet this opposition to any 
peace talks m~ght have been caused by his firm belief that 
peace was impossible. Defeatism would only support the 
Allies in their endeavor to destroy Germany. Welles was 
much impressed with the conviction of the Germans that the 
war was bei~g fo~ght in self-defense. He certainly spoke 
1 oGFP, D, VIII, .665; Weizsaecker, 277; Welles ·(Time, 
109) claims that he realized already in Berlin "that it was 
only too tragically plain that all dedisions·had already 
been made. "· Since nothing of that is in his ·con temporary 
report, one .can discount· that statement as a later judgment. 
His remarks at the time as well as his consequent endeavors 
in Paris, London, .and Rome show that he did not consider 
his mission a failure after the Berlin talks.· 
2New York Times, Mar. 10, .IV, 3. 
3schmidt, 475; Kordt, Wahn, 239. 
145 
about it" in all his ·consequent conversations in Europe. 
Hitler had pressed the same point in his interviewwith 
James D. Mooney, a self-appointed peace mediator, two days 
after Welles's visit in the Chancellery. He told him that 
as soon as Germany was ·secure :from that men·.ace, peace could 
be concluded. 1 
Since the· offer of October 6, Germany had rejected any 
rumor of a new peace proposal. But it was so obviously in 
an excellent position for peace n~gotiations ·that the rumor 
mills never stopped, and they reached a h~gh ·point while 
Welles was ·in Europe. Diplomats as well as journalists 
believed in a German peace move. Ambassador Davies. ·tho~ght 
Hitler woul.d offer at least the facade of an autonomous 
Poland and Czechoslovakia·. 2 Henrik M. de With,·. Netherland' s 
Minister in Berlin, .told Pierrepont Moffat that. the Nazis 
wanted peace; Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge 
Lo~g expected a German peace offensive with ·.welles as the 
instrumentality; even Mussolini prepared mediation of a 
German offer. 3 The Russo-Finnish peace and Ribbentrop's 
visit to Rome, immediately followed by Welles'·s ·return to 
1Andreas Hi1~gruber, ed. , · Staatsmaenner und Diplomaten 
bei Hitler (Frankfurt, 1967), 83~85. 
2Letter of Davies to F.D.R., Feb. 10, 1940, Roosevelt 
Papers, PSF State. 
3·Hooker, Mo·ffat Papers,· 294; Israel,· Long oi·ary, 69; 
Ciano, Diaries, 211. 
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Italy,. caused a flood of peace stories ·in the press,· ceriter-
i~g around a German effort.• Ambassador Mackenseri's visit 
to Ciano's palace while the Minister conferred with Welles, 
and the subsequent news ·of the Brenner mee·ti~g made a peace 
initiative ·appear imminent~ Michele Lanza, an Italian 
diplomat in Berlin, wrote in his diary, "Everybody thinks 
we are but two steps away from peace .. 11 1 The·feeli~g was so 
general that Mussolini tho~ght--.-des·.pite Ribbentrop's warn-
i~g--that Hitl·er would pres·ent his peace ·conditions on the 
Breriner. 2 After the Alpine talks there seemed to be no 
doubt that the ·topic had been peace and that Hitler had 
sought Mussolini's advice and .support. "It appeared ••• 
that S~gnor Mussolini had this time .scored over his ·col-
le~gue ,II 3 asserted the New Y~rk Times.· One ·of the most 
amazi~g aspects of the Welles mission is the nonsense which 
even the world's most respected newspapers spread as ·the 
truth ·in absence of any solid information. German derriurrers 
were not accepted. Several times German officials denied 
any peace plans,· and the German pres·s· w~ged a violent battle 
·4to repudiate press stories about .such 'plans. 
1simoni, 103f; 2c· · o· · 211 iano, . i·ar:ies , • 
3New York Times, Mar. 19, .1. 
4Toynbee, Survey, 4 5 5; Ciano, Diaries , .. 22 4. Reports 
in London· Times, 1940,' Mar. 12,· 8; Mar. 16,· 8; Mar. 18,· 8; 
Mar. 19, · 8; Mar. 20 ,· 8; New York Times, 19 40 ,· Mar. 18, 6; 
Mar. 19, 1; Mar. 1, 1. 
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German authorities had considered the problem of peace 
intensively. Before Welles's arrival Hitler hardly left 
the Chancellery for several days.· He was· busy medi tati~g 
about the ·situation. When he left his seclusion and went 
to the ·Bren·ner meeti~g·, .Ciano found him much ·1ess· uncom-
promisi~g than had been Ribberitrop. 1 Welles had. gained the 
same impres·sion in Berlin. It meant merely that Hitler was 
the better diplomat; Ribbentrop was nothi1:1g but a mouth~ 
piece, more r~gid and less able .to simulate ·than his master. 
On February 24 ,. the same day that Chamberlain had expressed 
his ·opinion on the European situation, .Hitler made .a speech 
describi~g the ·German position. He declared his ·desire to 
break Britain's power. "I am determined to see this f~ght 
thro~gh,11. he said. He .admitted no possibility of a compro-
mise peace. 2 ~gain, one ·m~ght see ·in this speech ·only an 
attempt to keep public morale high ·.as lo1:1g as nothi1:1g 
definite had developed, .. comparable to Daladier's attitude. 
The address was obviously given: in the intention to counter-
act a possible influence of the Welles mission and meant to 
choke risi~g hopes for peace amo1:1g .the population. But 
Hitler had the same idea expressed in secret diplomatic com-
munications with Italy. The Germans knew of the Italian 
desire for·peace. If Hitler would really have wanted peace, 
1ciano, Diaries, 223. 
2London Times, Feb. 26, 1940, Sf.; La1:1ger and Gleason, 
363. 
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he could have asked his Italian partners to mediate, or at 
least explore the possibilities. Quite to the contrary, 
the Italian Embassy was informed that Germany expected 
Italy to display "great reserve" in case of a new offer of 
d . t· 1 me ia ion. In consequence, the Italian press was ordered 
not to mention peace in connection with the Brenner rneet-
i~g.2 Ribbentrop thought it necessary to inform German 
diplomats on fore~gn posts in a circular about the Brenner 
meeti~g: "Any speculation about a joint peace offensive is 
pointless, because neither Germany nor Italy consider peace 
to be possible." 3 
Hitler himself saw to it that no peace hopes should 
arise in the wrong quarters. On February 2, be.fore the 
Welles mission had been announced, he had said to Magis-
trati, the second man in the Italian Embassy: "I do not 
see any possibility for a rapprochement and I hope that a 
compromise solution will never be attained for it would 
make a new conflict inevitable. 114 Ribbentrop informed the 
Italian leaders while he was ·in Rome that because of the 
Allied will to destroy the Axis, no solution other than war 
was possible. "The Fuehrer does not believe· in the possi-
bility of peace. 115 The: German press was full of threats 
1simoni, 98. 2Phillips, 263; 
3 P IX 7 4s. . . 80 DGF , D , , • 1rnon1 , . •
5ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 341. 
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~gainst the Allies· •1 The_ generals were told that the peace 
offer of October still stood, _and that nothi~g new would be 
offered. 2 The Allies,· of course, _could not accept that. 
After havi~g rejected the offer so emphatically .at the 
time, they. could not .justify the acceptance to their 
people now. 
· . .- The German.s clear.ly were not interested in another 
Munich. Hitler had lo~g believed that a major war between 
the democracies and the. corporate states was ·inevitable. 
He was convinced that Germany would never ~gain find itse·lf 
in such .a favorable position vis-a-.vis E~gland. "To accept 
a compromise peace under. these conditions would make him an 
accomplice of treason," he told an Italian diplomat. 3 This 
time he was resolved to see the f~ght .thro~gh. 
If one ·assumes that Hitler wanted more than the "reason-
able" aims he put forward,the nervousness of the German 
officials becomes understandable.· Munich was also a defeat 
for Hitler. Chamberlain, he felt, _had cheated him out of 
his war at a time when he could have· justified it to the 
German people. Now there was a possibility for another Munich 
in more favorable circumstances than 1938 •. J!itler faced a 
dilenuna. The mood for peace and appeasement was stro~g amo~g 
1cf. Voelkischer Beobachter, _1940, Feb. 26, 2; Feb. 29, 
2 , Mar. 2 O, 2 • 
2Halder Diary, III, 126. 3s·. .1mon1, 95. 
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the Allies and neutrals as well as amo~g Germans. Hitler 
knew there was a. good chance that the Allies m~ght give in 
to his demands;- yet he had decided that the decisive battle 
for h~gemony in Europe should not be. delayed any lo~ger. 
In case of a peace offer he had to. give_ guarantees· for the 
security of his ne~ghbors. If he refused to do so, or if 
he made unreasonable demands--demands which could not be 
justified as a revision of the ." dictat of ·versailles" or 
as necessary for German survival and secur.ity--he would 
lose what sympathies he still m~ght have am01;1g the popula-
tion of the Allies and the neutrals, as well as ·among his 
own people,· especially amo~g. the military circles which were, 
as he knew, still reluctant. If peace was made now, .and he 
~gain broke it, the world would be united ~gainst him to a 
far. greater d~gree than it had been when he declared war 
on Poland. Hitler had as much to fear from a peace as had 
tho.se allied leaders who advocated a to~gh position. 
Hitler.' s fears m~gh t have been Welles 's chance. As the 
Allies were willi~g to n~gotiate Germany's territorial de-
mands, Hitler might have been maneuvered in a position where 
it was either peace or loss of all sympathies abroad, and 
a peculiar situation at home. But Welles was not aware of 
that possibility. He left Berlin, as we have seen, optimis-
tically. Hitler had understood to make Welles believe that 
he really wanted peace. 
* * *
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Welles encountered the main obstacle to success for 
his mission in Paris.· The French.government was most will-
i~g to ~gree to a compromise and yet most unwilli~g to 
s~gn any settlement which lacked one stipulation: ·, secur-
ity. It was only in the l~ght of security that all other 
problems appeared to be minor. If that. great aim could be 
reached, the ownership of a few .square miles in Central 
Europe would not matter. 
A traditional settlement would not do since this was 
not a traditional war. Welles was confronted with ·a cha~ge 
in the. character of warfare. No lo~ger was a military con-
flict "the continuation of politics by other means.·" This 
war was not fo~ght for limited territorial, political, or 
economic aims. The· shift from limited to total war brought 
a cha~ge from limited to total aims. For the Allies this 
struggle was a war to end all wars. Traditional war aims 
were overshadowed by this great purpose. 
The extension of warfare involved the nation as a 
whole. Civilians had become e~g~ged in the war effort on a 
la!ge scale .for the first time .in World War I, and had con-
sequently become object and subject of warfare. Popular 
government. gave the affected population the possibility to 
express their wishes. Those who had to bear the hardship 
and da~ger of war could make their opinions felt. Popular 
pressure for disarmament b~gan long before World War I, but 
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after that experience ·the. demand for security reached an 
unprecedented he~ght. Ever since it had remained the major 
topic of European diplomacy. 
Notably, .when Welles. came to Europe, he hardly touched 
upon the ques·tion of security in Rome and Berlin.· It was 
the French who shoved the problem r~ght under his nose. 
Nearly all of his conversations in Paris dealt at le~gth 
with the question of security, and all ~greed that there 
could be no settlement without lasti~g. guarantees. French 
willi~gness to come to some .territorial ~greement depended 
on their estimate whether Germany '?'ould·keep peaceful after 
further concessions had been. granted, .or whether only a 
German defeat could secure peace for Europe. "France. 
must f~ght until she had_ gained actual security for herself ,n1 
Premier Daladier said, and he expressed the. feeli~gs ·of most 
of his fellow countrymen. This was no war for Poland's ter-
ritorial int~grity. Concessions at the cost of Poland could 
readily be made "but always ·upon one fundamental and essen-
tial basis, namely, that France should thereby obtain actual 
practical, physical security. 112 French political leaders 
were unanimous: "The real problem was • • •. security." 3
1F.R., 1940i I, 63. 
2Ibid., 64. 
3Ibid.,· 71, quote from a conversation with Reynaud. 
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In Great Britain Welles met the same se-iitiment. 
British politicians ·~greed that the primary. goal of this 
war was security. 1 There. could be no peace, no settlement 
without .guarantees· -of security. In London, too, the· dif-
ferences in opinion toward,any settlement reflected differ-
ences in opinion about Germany's attitude toward peace. 
Tho:agh he accepted the idea with much reluctance, Chamberlain 
was willi~g to make ·.another gesture. toward the Hitler 
r~gime.· He. ·continued to doubt whether Hitl·er would, give 
the necessary guarantees.,.2 ·which would have to be the basis 
of any n~gotiations.· Others wanted .to see Hitler and his 
cronies ousted first, and still others beli.eved that the 
evil lay in the. ·character of the German people.· Only a 
crushi~g military defeat and enslavement of Germany for the 
next century could save the world from future ~ggression. 
Security. considerations formed the basis in any case. 
Welles was impressed with this :clamor for security. By 
his second visit to Italy, his attitude had cha~ged markedly. 
Now the Under Secretary put ·the ques·tion of security 
forward with great emphasis.· He was convinced "that the 
fundamental problem at the moment was whether human i~genu-
ity could devise some form of physical security. 113 
lF • R • , 19 4 0 ,'. I , · 7 4 , 7 7 , . 81 , 8 8 , . 8 9 • 
2 Ibid. , , 8 8 • 
3·Ibid., 92, 96, 107. 
His ·~gnorance is astonishi~g. Welles· should have 
anticipated that after Versailles, after the development 
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of the twenties and .the ·thirties, .and after September 1, 
1939, security would not be fo~gotten; yet the French and 
British ·requests seemed to take him by surprise. If he had 
foreseen that security would be a major problem, a logical 
step would have beeri to find out in Berlin what. guarantees 
the German. government was willi~g to. give in excha~ge for 
territorial and economical concessions. In Rome as well as 
in Berlin, .Welles was so preoccupied with the territorial 
settlement that security. considerations were pushed into 
the bac~ground. In Paris and London his hosts insisted on 
dwelli~g upon that question. He did not bri~g it up himself. 
Thci'!,lgh ·he apparently was not prepared for the subject, 
he was not unwilli~g to consider it. He discussed some 
v~gue plan of an international air force .guardi~g the Euro-
pean peace--an idea forwarded by Daladier1--and a scarcely 
less v~gue proposal by Ciano of a European four power pact 
in which three powers would unite in case of·an attack by 
the fourth. 
American considerations on disarmament"·had not included 
a security system; but disarmament without security would 
1President Roosevelt took up the idea later. It figured 
in his talks with the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie.King 
in 19 42, when they discussed post-war problems. (Hooker, · 
Moffat Papers,· 388.) 
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only perpetuate ·the present stalemate in Europe, in which 
both sides could see ·a chance ·.for victory. The addition of 
a stro~g power, namely, the United States·,. to the attacked 
side ·could deter a possible ~ggresSor, and thus. give 
security while disarmament was underway. This m~ght have 
been the ·reason why the topic of a European security sys-
tem was disliked by. American policy makers,· why Welles 
bro~ght up only disarmament, and emphasized territorial 
settlement in his discussions.· Neither mere dis-armament 
nor territorial settlement meant n.ecessarily·a lo~g-term 
e~g~gement of the United States in Europe. American media-
tion in the European.war m~ght lead to such ·a development 
but not inevitably. A security._ guarantee ·automatically 
involved the United States in any European quarrel. 
Europeans were well aware of that, and apparently 
tho~ght that Welles would come up with some new idea. When 
security was discussed in London, Chamberlain asked Welles 
frankly: "What exactly is your proposal? 111 Welles had 
none and he did not want to repeat what the French had sug-
gested a few days earlier. Daladier had explained to him 
what the French. government considered the only possible 
proposal: only the neutral powers could ensure disarmament, 
"and this in the last analysis meant the possibility of the 
use of force by the neutral powers. None of the European 
1 F.R., 1940, I, 77. 
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neutral powers had any military stre~gth whatever, and 
there ·was ·clearly only one neutral power which had the 
military stre~gth ·to assume such responsibilities,· and that 
was the United States." Welles did not like the idea. 
He .at once ·interjected "that the United States would not 
assume .any responsibility of this character which implied 
as a.potential obl~gation the. Utilization of American mili-
tary stre~gth in preservi~g the ·peace in Europe. 111 
It can be ·said that a peaceful settlement was possible 
in early 1940 ,· if a des;Lgn could be found which ·would ensure 
future peace securely eno~gh, and which ·seemed acceptable to 
all nations--provided that Ge·rmany would ~gree ·to any settle...: 
ment at all. Security was :such ·a popular demand that even 
Hitler thought it wise ·to join the. general clamor for it2
and his domestic prop~ganda was effectually tuned to the same 
sound: . the war had to be fought for German se:curity, since 
the Allies wanted to annihilate Germany. An offer of secur-
ity would have been popular amo~g Germans. It was, further-
more, all the resistance ·and Hitler's opposition among the 
generals asked for. A plan for security in combination with · 
an offer for readjustment of the ·pol.i tical and territorial 
1 !.R., 1940, I, .64f. 
2Even more than in the ·conversation with Welles,· this 
idea is emphasized in the interview with James· D. Mooney 
who came to the Chancellery two days after Welles·.· (Hill-
gruber, .83~85.} 
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settlement of Versailles would have been we.lcomed by a 
majority of the· western European population. Conversely, 
any settlement without .security. guarantees was ·impractical 
and would meet the opposition, at the least, of Great 
Britain and France. 
The 'State Department cannot have been oblivious to 
that fact. The British Prime Minister even outspokenly 
pointed to. the problem in the. ~glo-American n~gotiations 
preliminary to. the Welles: mission. Chamberlain wrote the 
President: 
Any peace settlement must include llguarantees 
that the·re would be no renewal of aggression during 
any of our lifetimes. " That .is really the kernel· 
of the difficulty •••• It might not be so diffi-
cult .to devise a settlement •. ·• • • [The] whole 
difficulty is to find some means of assuring 
Europe ·that this could not1be followed sooner or later by a renewed attack. 
That was clear. British public opinion reflected the Prime 
Minister's anxiety. that Amex:.ica m~ght ·try to buy a cheap 
peace which would not endure. Member of Parliament A. P. 
Herbert quipped: "Let America do what .she will about the 
war, but for God's sake don't let her have ·anythi~g to do 
with the peace." 2 Without some scheme for future security, 
Welles could not hope to have success.· 
1F.R., 1940, I, 2. 
2New York Times, Jan. 28, 1940, 4. 
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An international security system was such ·a delicate 
problem that any discussion about it would surely provoke 
controversy, and if made 'public a popular outburst by 
isolationists could be expected, which could not be desir-
able in an election year. President Roosevelt tho~ght the 
American publ.ic was not yet ready for any 1asti~g conuni t-
men·t in Europe. The topic was .avoided or replaced by catch-·-
phrases like "real peace,11 "lasti~g peace,11 and others. 
Welles came ·to Europe without a concrete proposal or any 
new idea. ·If he had hoped to find some practical European 
plans 'Of which he could make use· ·duri~g his ·trip, he was 
disappointed. The ·most concerned European_ governments had 
only one plan: to draw the United States in as a guarantor 
of their security. Otherwise there was only a heap of the 
same catch-phrases Welles had used and the ·creation of some 
new sl~gans which ·were hardly_ any clearer. 
* * *
Welles· hoped for succes·s of his mission des.pi te the 
lack of any plan to ensure security. It seems that either 
consciously or subconsciously he ·repressed .. the problem. He 
did not bri~g it up until France had made ·.it a condition of 
any settlement. His talks in Rome and Berlin reflect his 
belief in the· possibility for the es·tablishnient of peace, 
and show, furthermore, what kind of peace he had in mind. 
He had declared himse·lf II absolutely enthusiastic" about his 
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conversations ·in Rome .and he consider.ed them the llbest 
guarantee for the success of his mission. 111 Mussolini, it 
must be remembered, had stated that peace was possible if 
Germany was. ·granted territorial and political conces·sions 
in the East. Mussolini's· conditions were used by Welles 
as a basis- ·for many of the followi~g conversations. He saw 
in them the foundations for a future settlement; he. con-
fided to Weizsaecker, ."what Mussolini had already told him 
was a basis and a hope,· a point of departure for construc-
tive proposals.·112 Welles accepted the. conditions enumerated 
by Mussolini. As we have .seen, he had reason to do so, for 
the British and the French had also .accepted this terri-
torial settlement. To Hitler he .said: "Personally • I 
could not conceive ·of a lasti~g and real pe.ace. unless· it 
envis~ged as an essential component part a united, prosper-
ous, .and con tented German people .satis fiea'. with .the·ir own 
domain, ".3 ·a point which ·was noted carefully by. the German 
gove rnmerit. 4 
Sumner Welles believed the aims ·of the bell~gerents 
were compatible. In Berlin he expressed hopes that the 
f~ght would be over soon. He left no doubJ. in the mind of 
many Germans that some .action would follow his visit. He 
even asked State Secretary Weizsaecker "if Roosevelt should 
ls· . imoni, 92. 2DGFP, D, VIII, 642. 
3·
r.R., 1940, I, 45. 4DGFP, D, . VIII, 649 • 
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act alone ·or preferably in con.junction with Mussolini." 1 
Upon leavi~g Berlin he. ·.told Ambassador Dieckhoff that he 
expected his ·trip to be successful. 2 In his conversation 
with the Italian Ambassador Bernardo Attolico he was ·even 
more outspoken: "Before the end of April, .the· Duce and 
Roosevelt would endeavor to make a decisive step in favor 
3·of peace." The same ·tho~ght was expressed by Kirk to 
Weizsaecker when the. cha~ge d' affaires. called upon the 'State 
Secretary to express his thanks for the ·.smooth course 
Welles's visit had taken. "In unmistakable terms Kirk stated 
as his opinion that at the end of Welles's trip some kind 
of initiative by President Roosevelt could be expected." 4 
Welles was still hopeful, even after. the problem of security 
had come up in France. In E~gland he left both Eden and 
Chamberlain with ·the impression that he looked forward to 
an ~greement as a result of his mission. 5 The Italians 
also expected some action after his return. 6
Italian diplomats in Berlin. could not ·understand Welles's 
optimism after his conversations there. Al01;1g with some 
officials in the Wilhelmstrasse they. concluded that an 
1DGFP, D, VIII, .642. 2Ibid., 655. 
3s· • • 92imoni, • . 4DGFP, D, VIII, .655fn. 
5Kei th ·Feiling, .The Life of Nevil'le ·chamb'e·ri:ain {London, 
19 4 6 ) , 4 2 9 ; Eden/ RedZonlil'g-;--9 37
6ciano, Diaries·,· .274. 
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American peace· ·move :had already been .planned and would c·ome 
r~gardles·s· of Welles·' s impres·si·ons • 1 Welles· '·s assurance ·in 
Berlin that action would follow his· mission points in the 
same 'directi'On, for he 'had not yet been· to Paris ·or London 
btit he· knew already that :a peace· .move would c·ome •· 
If Welles· had action in mind, March ·16 offered a unique 
opportunity. Welles· had completed his ·trip and had all the 
information he. ·could. get.· On the· afternoon of the same day, 
Mussolini told him that he :would meet Hitler in a few hours. 
Since :the Duce ·seemed willi~g to cooperate ·with ·the United 
States· in a .peace effort, .his ·influence .. combined with Ameri-
can prest~ge. ·.could be: used in the .tete-.a-,tete in the Alps 
to_ get matters· rolli3:1g. S.uch an opportunity would in all 
probability not appear ~gain in the ·ne·ar future. Welles· 
saw .this ·chance, and the· ·need for fast :action. R~ght after 
his ·conver.sation with Mussolini he :telephoned Pres·ident 
Roosevelt. 
This ·lo~g distance :call to Washi~gton is ·the. ·climax of 
Welles's trip to Europe.· It decided the· ·outcome ·of his 
mission. The topic of his ·conversation with the ·President 
was the advisability of an inunediate ·peace"initiative, al-
tho~gh Welles ·later denied this.· He stated in 1945 that 
"nothi~g was further ·from my own mind at that moment than 
to ask • permission to undertake· ·certain vague ·moves· for 
ls· . 1.mon1., 93£. 
peace.'' .,l Yet his. contemporary report sounds different. 
Italian and consequently German diplomats were convinced 
that the topic of the Conversation was a peace move. 2 
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The ·phone call or~ginated thr.o~gh a bold move by Mus-
solini. Apparently tired of the diplomatic beati~g about 
the bush, he had asked Welles bluntly if he should "com-
municate ·to Hitler· the impressions I [Weile.sl had formed 
with r~gard to the possibility of a n~gotiated solution of 
territorial and political questions in Europe. 113 Sumner 
Welles had just told Mussolini that he tho~ght a political 
and territorial peace possible, based essentially upon an 
"independent Polish :state .on a national basis • broaden-
i~g of the autonomy and independence conceded to Bohemia 
and Moravia, and ••• a plebiscite in Austria. 114 Welles 
realized that granti~g M~ssolini' s request m~ght lead to 
American involvement in a peace initiative. The mission had 
reached its final st~ge. Sumner Welles had to decide 
whether action should follow. He had tried to induce the 
1washington Post, July 11, .1945, · 8. Welles wrote this 
to refute the presentation of the episode in the recently 
published Ciano Diaries. 
2ciano, Diaries, 222 ;. Villari, 250 ;. Weizsaecker, 276; 
Ciano's diary note even suggests that he listened in, for 
he talks about the "tone of the telephone call" and who took 
which position. 
3·F.R., 1940, I, 102; Welles, Time, 138; Ciano, Diaries, 
359f., -also published in DDI, .IX, °3,"570 •· 
4ciano, Diaries,· 359f. 
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Italians to mediate peace without. getti~g involved himself 
in the procedure,· but the· Italians were not willi~g .to act 
alone. 1 Readi~g the dial~gue be.tween Welles and the 
Italians, one. gets the impression that both ·sides ·tried to 
saddle .the othe·r with rest:,onsibility and tried to avoid 
conuni tti~g themselves.· 
Now Mussolini had put the problem point blank to Sumner 
Welles, .the Under Secretary had to reach ·for the lo~g distance 
. phone.· Unfortunately, we have ~nly Welles's own account of 
this ·talk, and his -report is not fully trustworthy. Whatever 
passed between the President and his envoy duri1:1g their con-
versation remains speculation. Welles claimed that head-
vised the· President to reject Mussolini's offer and reported 
ful'l ~greerrierit with his superior on everythi~g. 2 
If Welles'·s presentation i~ ·true, one m~ght ask why he 
bothered to phone .the President. He could have rejected 
Mussolini's idea offhandedly. He had taken the responsibility 
for similar decisions before. Why did he make the statement 
that he tho~ght a territorial adjustment possible in this 
situation if he were not williJ;lg to stand by it?. Possibly 
he used this phone call only as an escape from statements 
which he considered later to have.gone too far, or he tho~ght 
l~•!•, 1940~ I, .112 .. 
2p··. t d. FR 1940 I 104 rin e in· ~. _. , , , . • 
the ·affair so important that only the ·President himse·If 
could make 'the': 'final. decision. 
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Another possibility is ·that the·. :call had been: planned 
before Mussolini even: made his s~ggestion. Welles· had not 
sent reports duri~g his ·European tour and he would take 
more than a week to return to Washi~gton. A telephone. call 
from Rome would enable ·the 'State ·oepartmerit to make ·the 
necessary preparations ·for a peace move while Welles· was 
still at sea. That explanation could be ·supported by 
Welles's remarks ·in Berlin on the·. ·inunediacy of action, and 
by the· fact that he. ·could hardly expect the ·President to 
decide ·.such ·an important matter in a .few minutes--af.ter 
consulti~g only.with him. Since ·.there is no direct evidence 
that the phone.·call had actually been planned, and since 
its or~gin m~ght well be ·explained by Mussolini's blunt 
request,. _this solution is not entirely satisfactory. 
The· bes·t information on the telephone call might be 
derived from the actual attitude ·of the Pres·i:derit and Welles 
at the time ·of their conversation. Welles· expected a de-
cision before he left Europe. Duri~g his stop-over in 
Paris on March 14, on his re.turn trip from ,..London, _he· told 
the ·rtalian Ambassador in ·France, _Raffaele Guar~glia, _that 
he considered his forthdomi~g conversation with Mussolini 
not only conclusive but decisive · (rion sole come. ·conclusi vo 
ma come 'decisivo) ; immediate action was needed, but he 
wanted to avoid a spectacular inte.rverition (interverito 
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spettacolare). 1 His interview with Mussolini the·n revealed 
that he was convinced that a territorial and political 
settlement was possible. This conviction, indeed, had 
prompted Mussolini to make the proposal which ·1ed to the 
phone call. But Welles had also been made aware that the 
real problem was security. Astonishi~gly eno~gh he remarks 
in the conclusion to his report--wri tten on the way back to 
America--that "if the attack for peace is made ·on the issue 
of security" there would be "a sl~ght chance" for a lasti~g 
peace. 2 To make this attack, he wrote, ·"there remains only 
the United States, supported by other neutral states. 113 
Welles ·tho~ght peace possible and believed it had to come 
through American initia~ive. 
The President, on the other hand, .by March .16, had 
reached the conclusion that peace could not be attained. 
On that same day he del.ivered a radio broadcast in which he 
emphasized the "moral bases·11 of peace. Though his phraseol-
'?gy was v~gue, it became clear that the President would not 
.4n~gotiate a settlement with Nazi Germany. Viewed from this 
a~gle one might. guess that Welles advocated some American 
action while the President--possibly under,: the influence of 
Hull--was opposed. 
1 2 DD I , IX , 3 , 5 5 0 • F • ~. , 19 4 0 , I , .116 • 
3Ibid., 117. 
4Rauch (p. 181) claims that Hull induced the President 
to make this statement. This is supported by Hull's memoirs 
(p. 739). 
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The telephone call decided for the ·time bei~g the fate 
of American peace endeavors. Welles once ~gain declared 
that he had made no proposal and no commitment, and then he 
left Europe." The address was obviously_ given in the inten-
tion to. counteract a poss·ible ·influence of the Welles mis-
sion and meant to choke risi~g hopes for peace among the 
population. 
While Welles was still on sea, peace ·rumors reached 
their climax when the New York Times presented the world 
with a complete Ge·rman peace Plan. These 1111 points" 
received. great attention. Even the State Department tried 
to_ get .to the bottom of the .story. 1 It was ·soon, _however, 
apparent that the terms were Mussolini' s, _not Hitler 1 s • 
The mouthpiece of the NSDAP, voelkischer Beohachter, termed 
it in due consequence "an unusually stupid swindle," 2 and 
swindle it was. 
When no peace move followed Welles's. visit, _the British 
were relieved. On March 22, Lord Lothian ." called at his own 
request" to thank the United States. government for dispelli~g 
the rumors of a n~gotiated peace, for such ·a peace would be 
"the equivalent of a German victory. " 3 Fo"!gotten were the 
days when that idea had been seriously discussed at Downing 
1Israel, Long Diary,, 71. 
2Headline in Voelkischer. Beobachter, March ·20, 1940 ,. 2. 
3r. R • , 19 4 0 , I , 19 ; Hul 1 , ; 7 4 0 •. 
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Street 10, .and when Chamberlain had written the ·President 
about Welles's peace attempt: "I sincerely hope that this 
mission may have fruitful results ·• . • in time to avert the 
. . 1 
worst catastrophe." Soon Chamberlain del.ivered another 
fierce speech ·to show allied determination. 2 France awaited 
her doom fatalistically. Germany made the final prepara-
tions for the 'imminent blow in the North. Welles hardly had 
returned to New York when the· H~gh Command reported readi-
ness to the 'Supreme Commander. Russian fears of another 
deal without theni. were easily dispelled by. Ribbentrop. There 
ld b . . . t" 3 wou e no peace n~gotia ions. The .Italians still har-
bored hopes ·for peace and ·dre·amed of joint action with ·the 
United States,· but .events soon swept these hopes away·. 4 
Welles·•·s mission, b~gun with so many hopes and fears, 
accompanied by so many expectations and appreh~nsions ,· faded 
out in anti.-climax. When he .left Genoa hfs mission had al-
ready been. cons~gned to the. back-p~ges· ·of the newspapers. 
The last traces of his ·four weeks in Europe were obliter-
ated by. the German attacks in spri~g 1940. Three months 
after he had left European shores ·France had to sign an 
armistice, Italy entered the. ·war, the British began their 
travail--and nobody tho'!J.ght about his mission any more. 
lF • g_. , 19 4 0 , I , . 87 fn • 
2Londoti Ti~e~, Mar. 21, 1940i. 8. 
3oGFP, D, VIII, 675, 684; IX, 7. 
4 F.g_., 1940, I, 112 •. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE AFTERMATH 
"The wisdom of any fore~gn policy can. generally be de-
termined only by. its results." Welles himself set a stand-
ard for a ju~gment of his mission. 1 
The positive results were me~ger. Reynaud was 
impressed with Welles's account of Italian resentment 
~gainst British domination of the Mediterranean. He tried 
to induce the British to concessions. Nothi~g came of it. 2 
Ciano attempted in a similar way to persuade the Germans 
to consider a peaceful understandi~g with .the Allies but 
equally met with failure. 3 
The Welles mission temporarily improved the diplomatic 
atmosphere, particularly with the· Axis. An excha~ge of 
Ambassadors with Germany was expected. In Washi~gton the 
Duke of Cobu!g, German Red Cross President and Hitler's 
good-will emissary to the United States,· was received by 
President Roosevelt after news of Welles'·s treatment in 
1Quoted in: Harry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual War for 
Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho, 1953), 597 • 
. 2. ·.
Paul Reynaud, La Fran·ce ~ sauve l'Europe. 2 ·.vols. 
(Paris, 1948), II, 201. 
3[.~., 1940, I, 97. 
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Berlin~ha:d reached the White House. Earlier the President 
had cancelled a scheduled visit.1 The press reported 
favorably on Welles's reception by the German government, 
but the hope for an improvement in the mutual relations 
lasted only for a few days. Cha:1=ge d'affaires Thomsen 
reported on March, 7:. "The attitude of· the American Govern-
ment toward us has not improved in any way. 112 Then the 
publication of the German White Book spoiled any possibility 
for a rapprochement. 
In Italy the Welles mission left a more lasting mark. 
The Italians still hoped for future Cooperation with the 
United States.· Ambassador William Phillips, who had not 
seen Muss.olini since 1938, suddenly found_open doors and 
friendly faces. 3 But as no deeds followed Welles's words 
and as German actions met with increasi~g success, the doors 
b~gan to. close ~gain. On June .10, Mussolini declared war on 
the Allies. 4 
1DGFP, D, VIII, 6 83 .' 2·Ibid., 659. 
3'F.~., 1940, I, 12f.; Phillips,· 262. 
4The Axis states were annoyed by a· minor diplomatic 
sensation in the wake of the Welles mission. A French 'il-
lustrated weekly published a photograph of Welles in Rey-
naud's office with a map of Europe in the. background. This 
map showed new boundary lines· which ·were unfavorable to the 
Axis. Goebbel' s propaganda Ministry __ ·made use of that pic-
ture claiming that Welles and the French ·had reached an 
agreement on the division of Europe. The Italians questioned 
the map in a note to the French government. As it developed 
later, the French censorship had not passed the original 
phot~graph, for some colors on the map could not be 
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R~lations to Great Britain and France did not ch~ge, 
nor did Welles ·contribute anythi~g to. their domestic sta-
bility.- While he was still in Europe the Daladier Cabinet 
fell and was replaced by a Reynaud Cabinet. 
Americans were not much impressed since Welles'·s 
mission had shown no results.· Interventionists and isola-
tionists continued their ~gitation, _and pacifists handed 
the President a new ple~ge for a n~gotiated peace as soon 
as Welles· had arrived in America. 1 
Hitler m~ght have been r~ght when he wrote Mussolini: 
"R~gardi~g the visit of Sumner Welles ·• • • all there is to 
say is ·that it contributed no new element for appraisi~g 
the situation,".2 ·but it surely contributed to a re-evalua-
/ 
tion of the situation. Welles's visit was accompanied and 
followed by. considerable activity inside the alliance sys-
tems,· tho~gh it is h~rd to es·tablish, whether the Welles 
mission or the imminent spri~g offensive ·was responsible for 
these developments. On March 28, as Welles· ·returned to the 
United States, France .and Great Britain consolidated their 
alliance by an agreement that neither would accept any 
proposition to open n~gotiations either fo~ an armistice or 
distinguished on a black-and-white picture and might lead 
to misunderstandings. The retoucher then had drawn the 
lines at will. · 
1New York Times, March 029, .1940, 3 •· 
2DGFP, D, VIII, 668. 
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a peace treaty. except by mutual consent. The ·fear that one 
partner m~ght be lured by: -a poss·ible· American move is evi-
dent in this ·decision. 
Welles· •·s most important accomplishment in this respect 
was the ·.revival of the 'Axis.· His. visit proved to. be ·a cata-
lyst in the. conciliation of the ·alienated friends. In its 
alliance_;r.evitalization pr~·gram Berlin even tho~ght of the 
Far Eastern partner and tried to improve· relations. 1 
The Welles mission left the severest and most lasti~g 
effects on the State Department itse·lf. Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull was,· as we have seen, opposed to the mission as 
such and to Welles' ·s ·role ·in it :in particular. Hull was at 
that time in a ·peculiar si:tua tion •. Roosevelt's se·crecy 
about his ·third term decision left him in the field as one 
of the· ·major contenders ·for the presidency. He was willi~g 
1Theo .Sommer,· Detits·chlahd und Japan zwischen den 
Mae·chten 1'935:-19'40 ·. (Tuebingen, 1962), 321, sees a direct 
relationship between the Welles··. mission and Ge·:anany' s new 
interest in the Far East. One should not overestimate the 
influence of the· Welles· mission. The imminent offensive 
was probably a more important factor. Yet,· the Foreign 
Office was reminded of Japan's value in: connection with 
Welles·•s visit: The Ge·rman Minister in the Netherlands sent 
a long telegram in which he reported that "a neutral source, 
we11· disposed toward us" had indicated to"him that ·Presi-
dent Roosevelt's anxiety over the Far Eastern situation had 
brought Welles to Europe.· The President wanted peace in 
Europe ·.to assure ·British and Frerich ·pressure on Japan. 
Germany, the ·."neutral source" advised, should foster its 
relations with Japan. "Roosevelt would then have to bring 
all his. influence to bear on England and France ·to break· 
off the futile war, accept the· ·new situation in Europe and 
devote themselves ·• • . to • • • the Far East." DGFP, 
D, VIII, 609. ~~ 
172 
to try his ·luck. But he would risk dissension within the 
administration if he forced Roosevelt to oust his ·friend 
Welles. If he res~gned himse·lf from office, he would seri-
ously enda~ger his chances ·for the fall elections,· which 
were_ good. Gallup polls ·in early 1940 ·.showed him stro~ger 
than Roosevelt, a developm~nt that did not at all please 
the President. 1 In. case he parted in ~ger with .the Roose-
velt administration and the Democratic Party the. chances ·for 
a Democratic victory in 1940 '.would decrease considerably. 
He was too loyal to run that risk. 
Tho~gh Hull did not protest openly ~gainst his mal-
treatment he was deeply hurt. He tho~ght his position over 
and looked for friends who m~ght support him. Breckinri~ge 
Lo~g relates ·that he had a confidential conversation with 
him shortly before Welles returned from Europe. Hull com-
plained about Welles's behavior and said "he tho~ght he 
[Hull] should be in entire control subject only to the Presi-
dent. He felt that there should be a united front by the 
Department. 112 To James Farley, a member of the cabinet and 
a man of_ great influence in the Democratic Party, _Hull also 
confided his ·troubles. He told him that ~e had "the 
3·devil's own time" with Roosevelt and Welles. Hull appar-
ently was looki~g for allies ~gainst the maneuvers in his 
1Farley, 232. 
3Farley, 233. 
2rsrael, Long Diary, 6 7. 
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own department. But he was not very successful. By late 
sununer 1940 he tho~ght of handi~g in his. res~·gnation, 
"partly,11 as he told intimates,· ."because the President very 
obviously seeks Sumner Welles's advice in preference to his 
own. 111 He may have had doubts about his ability to compete 
with Welles'·s brilliant mind and urbanity. As he told a 
friend, he could not follow Welles's swift thoughts. 2 
Possibly it m~ght have been better if Hull had resigned 
over the Welles mission contr.oversy--he ·certainly would have 
avoided much humiliation for himse·lf--or if the President 
had accepted one of his ·later. offers to res~gn. But Presi-
dent Roosevelt always ·refused to dismiss him, presumably 
for reasons of domestic policy. Hull was popular, his 
prest~ge was h~gh, .and his influence with ·the Senate stro:i;ig. 
President Roosevelt was mindful of ':i:he. ghost of Woodrow 
Wilson. The· success of the Moscow conference in 1943 'proved 
his consideration r~ght. Hull had n~gotiated it, and the 
Senate approved of the planned new international o~ganization 
by a vote of 85-5. 
Welles, the probable success·or in case Hull left the 
State Department, was neither popular nor vdid he have any 
influence with the Senate, tho~gh 'his ability was admired by 
most Co~gressmen and journalists. 
· 1Hooker, Moffat Papers, 332 •. 
2 rsrael, Long Dia·ry, 67. 
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It is :doubtful whether P.resident Roosevelt depen·ded 
only on such considerations·r it ·.is doubtful whether he was , 
fully aware how he had taken .over Hull' S. competencies: ·and 
functioned as his -own Secretary of State;'. .it is. :doubtful 
whether he. ·consciously withheld .information ,from Hull and 
went .over his he.ad. To be .sure,. he was not 'Complete:ly un-
aware ·of the situation,• :and his 'immediate :entour~ge 
realized what happened. "Pa" Watson was upset: "He ·entered 
in his quite ·outspoken way on a ·criti.cism of Welles·: ·for 
tryi~g to 'take ·over' Hull's :functions;- said he was ·con-
tinually tryi~g to: confer with ·.the President; and then went 
on to say that .the· P:res'.iderit felt the ·same ·way.· • • • Hull 
had_ gotten. very provoked . . • and . • . · used his. ·.cuss-· 
words. Pa's mind was very definite and his ·spee·ch devoid 
of delicate embellishnierit. 111 The Pres·iderit just did not 
seem to want to bothe.r with ·.this unpleasant relationship. 
Roosevelt's attitude· ·after. the ·affair is not clear. 
Apparently he 'did not talk much .about ·.it. But he 'did try 
stro~gly to induce Hull to :accept :the ·s:econd .place ·on the 
Democratic ticket. Hull tho~ght he was more nee·ded--and 
would have stro~ge:r influerice-·-in the <State Dep·artmerit. 2 · 
Possibly Roosevelt had the· same· reason for wanti!lg him to 
leave ·the Department. As. Vice Pres·iderit, as both men: real-
ized, he ·would be .on the. sidelines·, :while ·still be.i!lg obl~ged 
1Israel, · L·o·ng Di'ary, · .212. 2Hull,. 860:.....867. 
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to support the administration with all his ·skill and pres-· 
t~ge. Hull' s ·friend Jim Farley had found himse·lf shortly 
before in a similar position, when the President had done 
him the "honor" to insist that he run for Governor or 
Senator in New York. Farley had rather felt that the Presi-
dent wanted to. get him out :of the way for the 1940 ·nomina-
t . 1 ion. 
Welles also thought his position over. Tho~gh he had 
been unconcerned over domestic and party politics he sud-
denly developed unheard-of political activity. James Farley, 
chairman of the Democratic convention in 1940,' was amazed to 
see Welles's sudden interest in party affairs.· To his 
astonishment, Welles even showed up at the convention in July 
in Chic~go: 
As ·the delegates filed past the platf·orm in a 
joyous ·snake dance, _my eyes popped in surprise to 
see the austere, impeccable Under-Secretary of State, 
Sumner Welles, joggling along. I. could not have 
been more surprised if General MacArthur had trotted 
by in full dress uniform. Welles' -creased trousers 
were getting a collection of wrinkles and his collar 
was wilting~ He was going through ·the ·motions, but 
his wan smile was ample evidence that he was not 
really enjoyi~g himse·lf. 
As his feud with Hull did not develop into an open f~ght, and 
V 
his position seemed to be secure for the time bei~g, the 
Under Secretary of State apparently lost his interest in 
party affairs rapidly. 
1 Farley, 111. 2Ihid., 2 79-280. 
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But the feud was not over. Hull watche·d his Under 
Secretary's moves with deep distrust. The increasi~g fre-
quency of illness--possibly a psychol~gical escape from the 
fact that he was ·forced more .and more into the ·bac~ground 
without bei~g able to halt the development--pushed Welles 
automatically into the limel;lght. Hull felt that Welles 
used his weakness to proceed as Acti~g Secretary without 
consulti~g and informi~g him properly. Other. departments 
tried to increase their influence on fore~gn affairs.· A 
warni~g by Hull to Sec.ret.ary of the Treasury Henry Morgen-
thau to keep his hands off State Department affairs had no 
lasti~g effect. Hull felt put on the. ·defense· ~gainst in-
fri~gements ·from all sides.· On Welles ·centered his di~gust; 
in him he saw his main foe an:d competitor. In conferences 
amo~g State Department officials he tried to impress them 
and "to bolster himself ~gainst the .suspicion or impression 
that the President is favori~g the dashi~g, quick decidi~g 
Welles over himself and to. give the counteracti~g impression 
that he ·is·the ameliorati~g influence in the Cabinet and the 
personification of wisdom. I think that a natural human 
reaction and a ref~ge in self defense." J?reckinr.i~ge Lo~g 
noted that in his diary on A~gust 12 ,. _1941. 1 Hull's criti-
cism of Welles became more open. 2 
1Israel, Long Diary, 211. 
2Farley, 343;· Israel, Long Dia·ry, .215; Stuart, 381. 
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When Roosevelt took Welles alo~g to the Atlantic con-
ference with Churchill in 1941 without .consulti~g Hull, .the 
Secretary of State was much ·upset.1 Anxious to show himse·If 
the master of the· Department, .Hull see·med to have often re-
acted to Welles's proposals from spite.. The mark "made by 
Welleslf· would cause him to: refuse to buy the idea. Welles, 
on the other hand, seemed to enjoy usi~g his direct channel 
to the Pres·i-aent to. discredit Hull's s~9"gestions or to 
annoy the Secretary of State.. To name just a few .incidents: 
There was the affair of a loan to Spain in 1941 to keep 
Franco from joini~g the Axis.· Hull wanted to_ grant it. 
Welles hurried to the President. The loan was bl.ocked, and 
Hull blew up. 2 Or the Rio de Janeiro Confer.ence in 1942. 
Del~gate Welles· overstepped his orders and s~gned an agree-
ment which ·was not alo~g the lines ·of State Department 
policy. Hull telephoned while the President listened in. 
The Secretary used the occasion to speak to his rival "more 
sharply than I had ever spoken to anyone in the Department. 113 
The President could· see who the master in the house was,· 
tho~gh,· as the President pointed out subsequently, Welles's 
s~gnature had already been affixed and co1J,ld not be cha~ged. 
But Hull was so mad over this additional fl~grant violation 
1rsrael, Long Diary, 214£. 
2·Ickes, Secret Diaries,· .III, .401. 
3Hu11, 1143 •· 
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of accepted departmental procedure .that he was 'determined 
to res·~·gn and had actually. cleared hi.s. desk. 1 
In spri~g 1942 .it came ·nearly to the 'final breach when 
Hull accused Welles· of formulati~g and announci~g new lines 
of fore;[gn policy in public addresses· which had not been 
shown to the Secretary·. 2 The. :conflict was ·settled, but 
soon there ·was a new incident. After Operation Torch 'the 
·Frerich ·Governor General of A~geria Yves_ Chatel was to be 
replaced by Marcel Peyrouton, a former. Vichy official who--
as it turned out later-.-did not have ·a spotless· past. -
Welles had advise'd ?lgainst the appointment. This seemed 
to be .the more· :reason for Hull .to ?lgree to it. The uproar 
of public protests in allied countries· after the announce-
3 ·merit was tremendous.· 
Even Hull's. greatest dipl'omatic triumph ·duri~g the· war 
years ·came as a result of his ·from-spite ·policy. The Moscow 
conference was approachi~g and Hull read reports that·other 
persons were. goi~g to under.take ·this mission.· Tho~gh he had 
not planned to. go, upon readi~g this he ·.suddenly made up his 
mind, and werit over to the. White House, .and told the Presi-
dent that this time he was. goi~g. The President ?lgreed, 
but again seems not to have been quite ·frank with ·.the 'Secre-
tary of State. He appears to have toyed almost to Hull's 
1s.tuart, 38lf.; Hooker, Mo·f:fat Papers,: 379. 
2 3 Stuart, .382. Murphy, .157-159. 
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departure with ·se:ridi~g Sumner Welles or Ambassador Joseph 
E. Davies •1 
After such a state of affairs had developed between 
the Secretary and the Under Secretary, it does not se·em 
surprisi~g that Hull felt in no mood to defend Welles when 
rumors were spread that the Under Secretary had e~gaged in 
homosexual activities.· Hull was inclined to believe the 
story thcj'~gh he· had no proof. Welles was dismissed from 
the State Department. Hull· and Roosevelt tried to smooth 
over the ·aismissal by offeri~g Welles a post as Ambassador 
or Special Envoy, _but the· rift was too deep. Welles would 
rather not serve ·in a department headed by. Cordell Hull. 
"Secretary Hull ••• felt relieved of the most serious 
handicap·in his conduct of the Department." 2 After Hull's 
res~gnation Welles was mentioned ~gain as possible succes--
sor, _and insiders believed that Roosevelt would have pre-
ferred him to all othe·rs. But his appointment would have 
been a direct affront to Hull and provocative of intense 
resentment on Capitol Hill •. 3 
Over the Roosevelt-Welles plan the hostility came to 
the fore, _and could never be overcome thereafter. Much 
energy was wasted, much confusion createdvin the Department 
1Farley, 361. 
2 Stuart,. 2 82; Israel, Long Diary, 2 81. 
3sherwood, · 835; Stuart, 397. 
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of State, _and many decisions were affected by the ant~gonism 
between the nation's top advisers on fore~gn policy. A 
feud arose out of the .events of early 1940 which ·was to end 
in the ousti~g of one ·of the President's most esteemed 
advisers at a time when his advice was most needed. This 
development may well be the most important result of the 
Welles mission. 
CHAPTER IX 
CON CL US.ION 
The Sumner Welles· mission produced no lasti~g and 
beneficial results.· President Roosevelt's attempt to change 
the troublesome situation thro~gh the mission of a personal 
representative ·proved futile. Whose fault was it? The 
President's?· Hull's? Was the envoy not equal to his task? 
Or was the institution of special envoy to blame? Was it 
useless as a diplomatic means or was the mission of a 
special envoy futile only under those particular circum-
stances? Could there be any success in that situation at 
all? 
The failure of the Welles mission is based upon a com-
bination of errors. Indeed, the first might have been the 
assumption that there could be any solution to the problem 
of the European war. Corporate states devoted to the 
principle of expansion faced militarily inferior democracies 
which wanted to preserve the status quo. A compromise 
between the opposing powers would be hard to attain, especi-
ally as lo~g as the expansive forces had faith in their 
military superiority. In all probability a settlement could 
not be reached without outside pressure, and such ·pressure 
would have to come from a major military power. Only the 
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United States. ·could play that role but :it was ·faced with' 
stro~g domestic pressure to abstain from usi~g its influ-
ence. 
This was the situation which ·.the Roosevelt administra-
tion faced. The ·miss·ion of a special envoy could be justi-
fied only if there was an attainable_ goal under these 
circumstances·. The· President 1 s advisers -could not ?lgree 
on any such aim. The ·order to. gather information was ·indi-
rectly an admiss·ion that Washi~gton did not know what to do 
about the situation. ,Before a special envoy was ·sent an 
achievable. goal should have been set, and ?lgreemerit should 
have been reached about a proposal or commitment whi'ch 
seemed liable to bri~g some positive results. The precondi-
tions for the mission of any special envoy were not ful-
filled. Welles was. giveri neither a clear and accessible 
ta~get nor was he equipped with any power or authorization. 
As it wa·s, success of the Welles mission depended on the 
appearance of a deus 'ex· ma·china. 
The failure to define goal and commission of the· enter-
prise left the decision on the purpose of his mission and 
on the extent of his powers to the envoy himself. Sumner 
Welles was unsuitable for such a task. He-·tried anxiously to 
avoid any corranitment, but reached at the same time for the 
h~ghest. goal. Apparently he believed that he himself was 
the deus· ex· machina, .that his mere presence would solve all 
problems.· His str01;1g confidence in his abilities made him 
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strive ·only for the ·most difficult. goal and to disr~gard 
othe·.r. chances· whe·re he ·m~ght have. :gained 'important achieve...; 
merits.· Thus he ·accomplishe·a little.· His ·often: praised 
intellectual ability did not help him to rec~gnize 'the 
problems and cope ·with them. He· ·reminded the 'Ge·nnan inter-
preter of a pencil with 'two: ears,· .and was,· indee'd, hardly 
more. The personality of the envoy, his ·firm be.lief in 
himse'lf, .his haughty attitude ·.towa·rd the ·situation and the 
statesmen: whom he ·met, and consequently his ·conduct duri~g 
the conversations· made him the wro~g cho.ice ·for this ass~gn-
merit. 
The· ·seTection of Sumner We'lles· was :also unfortunate 
with ·r~gard to the ·personal relations amo~g the officials 
in Washi~gton. The ·ant~gonism between Welles and the 
Secretary of State. ·was bound to be intensified by this 
mission. Whatever Welles m~ght have ·accomplished in Europe, 
it was liable ·to arouse ·.opposition by Hull because· of the 
already existi~g hostility. Welles was not the only man 
available; the President could have ·sent another envoy. 
The ·errors made ·.in the. :case ·of the Welles mission do 
not justify a. general rejection of the· 'institution of the· 
special envoy. During the. course· ·of American hi.story, . '....,· 
special envoys have ·accomplished notable achievements.· 
Nicholas Trist' s mission to Mexico, _his flexibility, and 
willi~gnes·s to take· ·res·ponsibility ended the Mexican war of 
1846. Indeed, Sumner Welles· m~ght have had s·ome s'.uccess 
had he 'not reached so h~'gh .. 
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The Welles· mission was a m·omeritary :inspiration, :in-
sufficiently planned and prepared, and carried thro~gh by 
the wro~g man; it was ventured upon with. ·good intention but 
was inadequate ·to the. needs "Of the ·situation. One thi~g 
m~ght have bro~ght succes·s,· .as Welles himse·lf admitted: 
"What is 'imperatively required is statesmanship of the 
h~ghe·st ·character,· marked by. vision,· .. cour~ge ·and dari~g. 111 
Neithe·r Europe nor Amer,ica could offer that.· 
1so Welles· wrote in the·. :conclusion to his report. 
[.g_.:, 1940, .I, 116. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
The nature of this ·thesis. called for an emphasis on 
the use of primary sources,' mainly documentary and memoir 
literature." Relevant secondary sources· have been taken 
into account but most pr.o?ed unprofitable. The same was 
true for many of the memoirs.· Only works which ·made · 
s~gnificant contributions ·to this study are listed in the 
followi~g. 
A. Documentary material 
a} Italy 
Three· ·.countries· have ·.so far published their documents 
on the 'diplomacy of World War II. All three were ·of. great 
value ·for this the.sis. In Italy the Fore~gn Office (Minis-
tero degli Affari Esteri} has published !_ no·c·umehti 
· Dip'l'omati:ci Tta'l'i:ani·,· Nona Serie 1939-1943 · (quoted as 
~' IX}'. Relevant is vol'ume 3 · (Rome ·1959}. This ·collec-
tion of documents stands out for its able ·o~ganization and 
its excellent editorial' job, .. tho~gh ·documents in l~gu~ges 
other than Italian have ·to be ·read with ·care,' for they 
abound with ·typ~graphical errors. The ·editorial board 
presented not only material fr·om the Forefgn Office ·archives 
but has also incorporated materials ·from other sources, 
especially· memoranda of conversations which ·appeared in the 
memoirs of Italian dipl·ornats. This official publication is 
supplemented by Malcolm M~9ger.i~ge, ed.,· ci:an·o·• s· Diplomatic 
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·papers (London, .1948), .a selection of notes·,· records,· _and 
memoranda on official business·-·-often written for submit-
mitance to MU:ssolini--which ·the :rtali:an minister kept 
privately, possibly for the ·eventual publication of 
memoirs. Much ·of this material has also bee'ri printed in 
DDI. 
b) Germany 
The· G'e'.rman· oo·cuments' 'on· F'o·r·et·:gn: p·o1icy T9'1-8-19'45, 
series D (quoted as· DGFP, .D), have been publishe·d by an 
international editorial board. They repres·ent a detailed 
and well edited selection of the. ·captured documents 0£° the 
German Fore~gn Office. No other materials have bee·n: in-
corporated but footnotes· refer to relevant related publica-
tions. Conversations with Hitler not contained in this 
publication· can be found in Andreas Hil~·grub·er, ed., 
Sta·atsrnae'rin'er: :und Dip'lomateri: bei Hi'tTer. ve:rtrauliche 
. '
· Aufzefchn:u·n·g·en· ·ueber Unte'rre·au:n:g·en:: mi t Ve'.rtr:ete·rn: des 
Auslahds· '1939''-T941 (Frankfurt a/M, 1967), a complete col-
lection of Hitler's ·conversations with ·fore~gn statesmen. 
These are supplemented by materials and testimonies made 
for the International Military Tribunal in Nureirihe~g, 
published in: · Tria·1s 'of :the: Maj'or· War· Crimin·a:is he:fore 
·the Tntern:ati'on·a1· Milita'ry: Tribuhal,· Nur·emberg (Nurembe~g, 
1947-1949). 
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c) United States · 
Most :important for this study has been the publication 
of the Department of State,·· F'o·rergn· ReTati'ons· 'of the· United 
States· · (quoted as· r. ~.) . Vo.lume T for 1940 contains a 
section devoted to the Welles mission. It consists ·of some 
documents pertaini~g to the preparation and of Welles's 
confidential report to the Pres·ident and the Secretary of 
State. Forei·gn Re'lations is a very well edited work but, 
owi~g to its wide ·scope/ .rather seledti ve. Welles's report 
has been abri~ged, particularly when his evaluation of a 
statesman of a friendly country has not been favorable. 
B. Memoirs and Diaries 
a) United.States 
Sumner Welles has ·left no complete reminiscences, but 
his books on American fore;[gn policy contain much auto-
bi~graphical material. Of. greatest value for this study 
has been: Sumner Welles, The· Time ·for: ne·c:1·sion (New York, 
London, 1944). which includes a. chapter devoted to the Welles 
mission. This chapter is based on his report to the Presi-
dent and often coincides with it word for word; but there 
are some differences. 
Welles'-s presentations of his mission have been written 
at different times for different purposes. In contrast to 
the· report,· Time· ·for ne·cision was published when the United 
States· had been for some years at war with ·Germany and it 
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was meant for the publ.ic. This had several consequences. 
Welles· ·could not mention his conver.sati·ons with ·some of the 
French 'leaders who were .then in German reach,· and he had 
to leave ·out s·ome events and issues which ·m~ght prove 
detrimental to the ·relations amo~g the Allies.· Two e}C°amples 
will help to elucidate that point: In the· ·report Welles 
recalls how he told Hitler that he. could not conceive of a 
lasti~g and real peace ·unless the Ge·rman people were united, 
prosperous, _contented, and satisfied with ·their own domain 
and security. At the same time ·Germany should no lo~ger be 
r~garded as a threat ·to the independence and security of her 
ne~ghbors. In Time :f'or· oe·c·is·i'on the first ·condition for 
peace ·is :left out and the se-cond one ·is stressed. The 
same cha~ge is apparent in Welles's evaluation of the people 
he met. In his ·report he is ·equally. critical or appraising, 
Time for D'ecisi'on makes a sharp division between heroes on 
the· Allies· 1 · side ·and villains 'in Ger.many. An example ·is 
the meeti~g with Otto Meissner, the· 'State 'Secretary in the 
Chancellery. In his· ·report Welles· writes:· "He ·spoke to me 
most cordially in E~glish, as did all the· ·other officials 
present" (~.R., _1940,· I, _102}. In· Time: ··for· ne·ci:sion this 
sentence ·is ·replaced by: "Meissner • • • who, chameleon-
like, had maintained his position •••• A_ group of flunkies 
in the entrance hall were dressed in l~ght-blue ·satin 
liveries with ·powdered hair" (Welles, .. Time,· 102r. Issues 
which would be ·controversial in 1944 are ·completely left out 
in Time· :for ne·cfsi'on. 
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Particularly, the problem of American. 
peace mediation is ·treated very. v~guely. French and British 
willi~gness to. grant territorial concessions in the East is 
not mentioned. 
Welles ·treated his mission in· Time' :for: De'<:~ision in 
reflection of the situation at the· time ·of publishing and 
of the readership. Was his pres.eritation in the· rep·ort to 
the President restricted by similar considerations? This 
ques·tion is 'important since his story is not always ·identi-
cal with the European sources.· Welles· ·finished his report 
on the way back to the United States,· probably using notes 
he made ·immediately after the. ·.conversations. This report, 
he knew, would be read by. the Pres·.iderit and Secretary of 
State HulL Hull had been opposed to the. mission, .the·re 
had been some quarrels,· the Secretary of State had imposed 
some restrictions.· If Welles· :reported that he .overstepped 
these restrictions,· new quarrels were probable. The Secre....: 
tary of State would distrust his :actions in the future. 
Welles's careful wordi~g in the. description of discussions 
of problems like peace mediation, .and the· ·aiscrepancy to the 
Italian and German memoranda on these· subjects,· ;s~ggests 
that Welles modified his presentation, mindi~g the feeli~gs 
of his superior. When Welles· wrote his report he knew that 
his mission had failed. There was no reason why. he should 
ant~gonize the Secretary of State .any further. 
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The Geiman and Italian memoranda were written immedi-
ately after the conversations without knowle~ge of future 
developments.· They were meant mostly for the· archives. 
But the writers knew that Hitl·er and Mussolini m~ght read 
their reports and might have adjusted them accordil'.lgly. 
None of the sources· ·can be. 'trusted completely. One 
has to ask in every instance 'if the writer had some inter-
es·t in stres·si~g, chal'.lgil'.lg, or leavil'.lg out some issue.· 
Emphasis and selection indicate· further what appealed to 
each side. 
Welles was not the only American who reported on the 
mission. J. Pierrepont Moffat, who accompanied Welles, .has 
left a diary: Nancy H. Hooker, ea.·, The Mo'f'fat Papers. 
Selecti·ons· 'from the DipTomatic Corre·sp·ondehce Of ·Jay Pierre-
pont Moffat ·1919:-1943 ·(Cambridge,· Mass., 1956). He con-
structed his account ·from brief notes he· jotted down at 
the time. Moffat knew Welles·• s report and tried to tell 
of events which Welles has not mentioned, mostly his private 
talks and impressions. He also wrote an account of the 
h~ghly confidential aspects ·of the Welles· mission which has, 
unfortunately, not yet been found. 
Several of the American diplomats statfoned in Europe 
at that time have published memoirs in which they recall 
the Welles mission. Most important amol'.lg those :are William 
Phillips, Ventures in Dipl'oma·cy (Hoston, 19 53) , Robert D. 
Murphy, Dipl·on1at ·among· Warrio·rs (Garden City, N.Y • ., 1964), 
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Geo~ge F. Kennan, Merrioi·rs '1925-'1950 (Boston, 1967). The 
view from Washi~gton is_ given in Cordell Hull,' The· Me·mciirs 
·of co·rae:i1: Hull ,(New York, _1948), .Fred L. Israel,· The War 
. ----
Diary ·of· Bre·ckin·ridge L·ong (Lincoln, _Nebr. , 19 6 6) , Harold J. 
Ickes,· The: Se'dret Di'ati·es: 'of Ha·ro'ld !!· Tckes ··(New .York, 
1954) , Johri M. Blum,· From· the Mo·rg·erfthau n·i'a·ries· ·(Boston, 
1965) , .and Walter Millis,· _ed.,· The· F'otre·sta1· Di'aries · (New 
York, 1951) . The·se· as well as some of the memoirs of the 
diplomats offer also some 'ins~ght into the personal rela-
tions amo~g officials in the State ·oepartment. 
b) Italy 
Unfortunately, Mussolini I s reminiscences· do not cover 
the· ·time of Welles· 1 s visit. Most important is Hugh Gibson, 
ed., The ci·ano niaries: 1939:-'19'43 · (New York, 1946) which con~. 
tain Ciano's famous red diary book which he kept in a safe 
in his office .. Indispensable ·for the· influence of Welles's 
mission on Italo-German relations is Leonardo Simoni 
(pseudonym for Michele Lanza),· Be:rlin,· Amhass·ade d'Ttalie 
'1939-'19'43 (Paris, 1947). He also des·cribes· the situation in 
Berlin during Welles's visit. The work by another Italian 
diplomat, Lu~gi Villari,· Tta'lian· Foreign Po·1~cy ·under 
Mussolini (New York, 1956), is not strictly a memoir publi-
cation but rather a defense of Mussolini's foreign policy. 
The reminiscences of Marshall Pietro Bad~glio,· Italy in the 
second wo·rld War (New York, 1948) add also to the picture 
of Welles's trip to Europe. 
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c) Ge·rmany 
None ·of the ·Ge·rman memoirs treat Welles· '·s. visit 
extensively. The Fore~gn Office interpreter, Paul Schmidt, 
Statist 'a'uf: dipl'omati's·che·r~ B'u:ehrie.·. Er1ebni·s·s·e: ·des·· Che·fdol-
metsche:rs· 'im Atiswae·rtig·en: Amt :(Frankfurt a/M, Bonn, 1961) 
had been present at all conversations excep·t those· ·with 
Schacht and Weizsaecker. State: Secretary Ernst von 
Weizsaecker,· E.rihh'erun·gen ·(Muericheri, 1950). devotes· a p~ge 
to the Welles mission, Er.ich Kordt,' Wahn :und' Wirkli.chkeit. 
Die ·Auss'enpo'litik des Dritten>Re'iches;: Vet~s:u·ch einer n·ar-
·stellung (Stut~gart, 1948), a par~graph; Welles is ·fre-
quently mentioned in Ulrich ·von Hassell,· The Has·s'eTl 
Diaries·,. 1938-1944 (Garden City, 1947), and once in Hans 
Guenther Seraphim, ed.,· Das· po'liti:s·che· Ta·gebtfch ATfred 
m:,sehbe:rgs (Berlin, 19 56) •
d) Britain 
Welles· ·left even less of an impression on the ·British. 
Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, The· Eden Merrioi·rs:· The· Reckon-
ing (London, .1965) mentions him briefly. Winston Churchill, 
The Gathe·ring Sto'rm (Boston, .1948) is interesti~g for the 
situation. 
e) France 
French recollections show the least concern about the 
American envoy. Paul Reynaud mentions his mission once in 
his first collection of reminiscences·, Paul Reynaud,· La 
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Fr-an·ce· ·a: :s:a:uve· !:'E·u:r·ope,·. 2 Vols. (Paris,· 1947) 
Interes·ti~gly,: .the Welles·· miss·ion f~gures· -rathe·r la!ge 
in diaries. which have ·beeri written immediate·Iy after the 
events, but it :is hardly men·tioned in memoirs which have 
been written: at a later date.· The ·rtalians .accorded appar-
ently the·. :greatest importance '.to it. Ge·rmans,· especially 
those: ·connected with the .resistance, watched it with · 
interest.· In England and ·France. diplomats and statesmen 
did not expect many important results.· 
C. Seirii-of'ficial sources 
A special category are ·those· works which have been 
published by writers in or. close·ly related to the ·adminis-
tration. The'.se studies· are :neither official publications 
nor memoirs,· but they contain information which has bee_n 
inspired directly by government officials.· Most important 
amo~g these is William L. La~ger ands. Everett Gleason, 
The· Cha'llen·ge: :to· Tso'l'ati·on (Harper. and Row, New Y~rk ,· 19 6 4, 
new ed.) , .a semi-official. diplomatic history. Equally in-
teresti~g is a pamphlet by two· journalists who based their 
study on materials and information supplied by the White 
House .and the State Department, Joseph Alsop: and Robert 
Kintner, Americ·an White· p·a·p·erf the: 'Sto·ry of Ame·ric:an 
Dip'l'oma·cy- :and :t11e· ·s·e·cond' wo·r·1a War· (New .York, 1940 ). • Impor-
tant for the ·personal relations :amo~g officials is the 
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study by the writer and author of many official speeches, 
Robert E. Sherwood,· Ro·o·seVe'lt ·and uo·pkins (New Y~rk, .1948). 
D. Secondary sources· 
Secondary sources· provide .for the ·most part only the 
bac~ground of the Welles miss·ion. A detailed study on 
European diplomacy is Arnold and Veronica Toynbee·; .ed., 
Survey ·of Tntern:a:tio:n·a1: A:ffai:rs· T9:39'-T9'46. · The· Tniti:al 
Tri·urnph of the· Axis (London, New. York, .Toronto, ,1.958) 
and its ·shorter American counterpart, w. H. Shep·ards and 
w. o. Scr~ggs, The United States in World Affairs, 1940, 
published for the Council on ·Fore~gn Relations (New Y~rk, 
London, .1941). Helpful studies on the diplomacy of the 
Roosevelt administration are ·the works by Basil Rauch,' 
Roo·seve·1t 'fr·om: Muni.ch to Pe'a·ri: Harbor. · A Study in· the · 
cr·eati·on· of Fo·ret·gn Policy (New York, 1950)., who defends 
Roosevelt's ·fore~gn policy, .and the :revisionist Charles 
Callan Tansi·ll, Backdoor ·to War;. the Ro·osevelt Fo·r·eign 
Policy 19'33-·19·41 (Chicago, 1952). Much ·shorter but with 
good insights are Johri L. Snell,· Tl:i:u·si·on :and Ne·ce·s·s·ity; 
the Diplomacy' of Global War 19'39-1945 (Boston, 1963)', and 
a German study, Erich A~germann ,· Die· ve·reini:'gten Staaten 
von Amerika, dtv Wel~geschichte des '20. Jahrhtinderts v.· 7 
(Muenchen, .19 66) • An older, ~ut still helpful work on 
peace feelers is Maxime Mourins, .Les tentatives: de ·pa:ix dans 
la Seconde· Gu·e·rre Mondi·a:le :19'39-Tg:45 (Paris, 19 49) • Though 
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. generally acceptable,·. ;s·ome of the·. ·.details in this bo'ok have 
to be: ·treated with :.care.· Graham H. Stuart,: :The Dep~a:rtmeht 
·of State : (N.ew .Y~rk, 19 49.) .. deals with '.the State 'Department 
and its officials in particular. Works· treati~g diplomats 
are ·Julius w. ·Pratt,· co:rae·1.i: Hull,' 2. ·vols.· (New York, 
1964)., .s. F. Bemis, _ed.,' :The Ame·r;tc·an· S'e'dre:ta:r:fes: .'of state 
·a:nd The'i:r: DipTotriacY,'. vols.· XII. and XIII, whi.ch ·is ·based 
mostly on Hull·' s ·own· memoirs,· _and a popular work about Johri 
F. Kennedy's. ·father, .Joseph ·P.·. Kennedy: Richard J. Whalen, 
The· Fot1ndi:ng Father;: ·the·: Sto'ry'- :of 'Jo:s·eph P·. :. Ke'ririe:dy. · 
Elizabe'th Wiskerriann' s .work on Italo-Ge:rman relations: 
Elizabeth Wiskeniann ,· The.: :Rome'-B'e:r:iin: A.'xis ,' .a· Hi.story: of the· 
ReTati·ons: bet'vte·en·· Hit'l'er: ·and: M\l's·s'oTini· · (N.ew York,' 1949) is 
important. · It contains a whole ·.chapter about the Welles 
mission.· 
E. Literature ·on the German Resistance 
The Ge·rman resistance pose·s a special problem in the 
scope ·of this. ·thesis.· The above mentioned diary of Hasse·ll 
reveals the hopes ·and anxieties -of the. ·conspirators in 
connection with ·the Welles mission. Kordt's. book contri-
butes some. A main source has been Schacht '·os r·.ecolledtions: 
Hjalmar Schacht,· Con·fe·ss'i'ons: 'of :"the Old wi·z·a:rd"· (Boston, 
1956) supplenierited by a dissertation on Schacht: Earl Beck, 
verdict ·on· Schacht,· ~ study: :in: the: Problem: of Po'liti:c·a1 
Guilt. Florida State· 'University Studies,· .No. 20 
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(Tallahassee, .. 1955). The .outstandi~g work on the .res·is-
tance is by Gerhard Ritter,· ca:rT Gde·rd'eTer ·u:na die: n-e·ut'Efche 
Wide·r·stan·dbe'vie:g'uhg ·($:tut~gart, 1954)·. Ritter, who was 
profes·s-or of history at Freibti!g, was a meni.ber of the 
resistance movement. The British historian Johri W. Wheeler-
Bennett had also some ·connections to the. Conspirators and 
I 
presents a very_ good study of the· :role ·of the· ··armed forces 
in: John W. WheeTer-Berinett,· The: Neme·sTs· 'of Power,· The
Ge·:an:an· A·rtny: in· P-o1iti'cs· '19'1:B-T9:45, 2nd ed. (London, New York, 
1964). An earlier work which ·pres·ents many details but has 
been superseded by newer studies ·is Maxime Mourins , .. Les·· 
cotnplots centre· Hitler (P:aris ,· 19 48) . Hans Rothfels ,' Ge:rman 
oppo·siti·on to· HitTer,· rev. ed. (Chic~go, 1962)' is an ex-
cellent, but short modern wo·rk. 
Important for Hitl·er' s plans and the· ·military situation 
are the diaries of leadi~g. generals. Unfortunately, the 
official diary of the H~gh ·conunand of the ·Armed Forces, 
edited by Percy Ernst Schramm, has been lost for the ·rele...: 
vant period. But the· private diaries· of_ generals Halder 
and Jodl have ·been preserved: Arnold Lissance,· ed., Franz 
Halder.,· Diary, .MS, 3 vols. Jodl' s diary appears as evidence 
for the· prosecution in the· ·materials published for the 
Nurembe!g Trials. A secondary work is Walter Goerlitz, 




Newspapers give many of the. details and es·tablish ·the 
chronol~gy. Very valuable was :the New .York Times·.· The 
Chicago· Tr:ihuhe ·pres·ented an isolationist view. British · 
opinion was. ·given by the London· Times·, _the· Ge·rmans were 
repres·ented by. the· Voe1ki:s·cher: .Be·obcfchter,: the official 
organ of the NSDAP. The· ·m~gazines· Time ·and Ne'~iswe·ek con-
tributed many of the side ·events·.· 
